TMI - The Philosophy of Jouni Vilkka

Hatuttomuus hatuttaa

2011-11-18T14:38:00.001+02:00

Tampereen Normaalikoulussa (ja varmaan muissakin kouluissa) on käytössä pukeutumiskoodi. Oikeastaan siellä on opettajille muistaakseni oma pukeutumiskoodi myös, mutta nyt tarkoitan oppilaiden pukeutumiskoodia. Tarkemmin sanottuna päähineen (joiksi lasketaan ainakin lippikset, pipot ja huput) käyttökieltoa sisätiloissa.

Etenkin (aineen)opettajaksi opiskelevan näkökulmasta tämä on erikoista, koska kyseessä on harjoittelukoulu, jossa tulevia opettajia koulutetaan. Tulevia opettajia opetetaan samalla siis noudattamaan ylläpitämään tätä pukeutumiskoodia. Tämä on nähdäkseni ristiriidassa muun opettajien saaman opetuksen kanssa, jossa puhutaan sellaisista asioista kuin kasvattaminen kriittiseen ajatteluun, yhteiskunnalliseen osallistumiseen ja aktiivisuuteen, sekä painotetaan moniarvoisuutta, yksilöllisyyden arvostamista ja ainakin opettajan roolia jonkinlaisena intellektuellina ja kansankynttilänä.

Tällainen pukeutumiskoodi vaikuttaa kuitenkin perinteiseltä passiivisten, nöyrien ja ajattelemattomien alamaisten kasvattamiselta, jota nationalisessa hengessä aiempina vuosikymmeninä ja satoina on pidetty koulun tehtävänä. Samaiseen ajatteluun kuuluu myös yhteiskuntaluokkien ylläpitäminen, eli köyhien työläisten lapset pysyköön köyhinä työläisinä, varakkaampien lapsille olkoon korkeampi asema yhteiskunnassa. Olisihan se kamala, jos köyhällistökin uskaltaisi ajatella ja olla yhteiskunnallisesti aktiivista. Koulujärjestelmän toiminta työttömien, sekä lasten ja nuorten varastona voisi vaikeutua. Ties millä muilla tavoilla voisi yhteiskuntarauha (status quo, eli oikeasti vallanpitäjien valta-asema) järkkyä.

Samalla kun pukeutumiskoodilla kielletään päähineiden käyttö sisätiloissa lähes kaikilta (tosin naisille ehkä sallitaan jotkin pukuun kuuluvat päähineet mielenkiintoisena ja paljastavana poikkeuksena), perinteeseen vedoten, sallitaan epäilemättä kuitenkin joillekin toisille tiettyjen päähineiden pitäminen uskontoon, kulttuuriin tai toisiin perinteisiin vetoamalla. Samalla relativistisella tavallahan perustellaan myös tyttöjen ympärileikkausta, joten eipä ole ihme jos sitä päähineasiassakin käytetään. Mutta vakuuttaako tuo argumentti ketään? Ja missä suhteessa se on esimerkiksi perustuslakiimme? Perustuslain mukaanhan Suomessa kaikki ovat tasa-arvoisia riippumatta muun muassa sukupuolesta ja uskonnosta tai vakaumuksesta. Jos kuitenkin uskonnollinen päähine sallitaan, mutta uskonnotonta hattua ei, osoitetaan koululaisillekin selvästi kuinka toiset ihmiset ja asiat vain ovat eriarvoisia. Hienoa kasvatustyötä kouluilta todellakin.

Olen tämäntapaisia ajatellut jo aika kauan, enkä voi uskoa olevani ainoa tai edes ensimmäinen näin ajatteleva. Mistä sitten johtuu että tämä käytäntö kouluissa kuitenkin jatkuu? Ovatko intellektuellit eli toisinajattelijat opettajien keskuudessa edelleen niin harvoja poikkeuksia?

Mainoksista hyötyäkin

2011-10-27T12:26:00.000+03:00

Olen hyvin pitkään vältellyt mainoksia. Ovessani on noin kymmenen vuotta ollut ilmaisjakelukielto, enkä yleensä katsele mainoksia niistäkään lehdistä joita minulle tulee. Selaan kyllä nykyään jonkun kauppaketjun tms. lehteä, jotka minulle nimellä tulevat, koska olen ketjun kortin omistaja, mutta hyvin nopeasti, koska lehdessä ei juuri koskaan näytä olevan hiukkaakaan kiinnostavaa sisältöä. TV-mainoksia en ole katsellut sen jälkeen kun hankin tallentavan digiboksin (se on niitä ensimmäisiä lajiaan), koska katson ohjelmat vain tallennettuina, jotta voin hypätä mainoskatkojen yli.

Viime aikoina olen muutaman kerran kuitenkin huomannut, että mainoksien seuraamisesta olisi joskus hyötyäkin. Olen nimittäin tarvinnut joitain TV:ssä mainostettavia tuotteita, joiden olemassaolosta tai myyntipaikasta en olisi tiennyt mitään, jollei ystäväni olisi niistä kertonut. En myöskään juuri koskaan tiedä mielenkiintoisten TV-sarjojen alkamisesta, koska www.telkku.fi ei niistä erikseen huomauta. Tämän takia en taaskaan ehtinyt huomata Myytin Murtajien aloittaneen uusien jaksojen näyttämisen, ennenkuin sattumalta osuin telkkarin eteen oikeaan aikaan. Onneksi netti auttaa tässäkin. :-)

http://dsc.discovery.com/tv/mythbusters/

TMI - The New Title

2011-10-25T17:09:00.002+03:00

I still haven't come up with a good title for my blog, but walking home from a coffee corner I like to frequent, I decided to use "TMI - The Philosophy of Jouni Vilkka". TMI here means just what it usually means: too much information! I have been told I tend to share too much, so why not use that as my title? The rest of the the title doesn't really refer to the first, but to the general content and subject of my ramblings and musings here. Or whatever category my writings tend to fall into.

A listing of the most important topics touched upon in my blog can be seen on the top of the main page of my blog. The clever, and those who speak Finnish, can also find a listing of the most important blog entries on my home page.

Pelitkö aiheuttavat väkivaltaa?

2011-10-09T19:17:00.001+03:00

Tiede -lehden uutisen perusteella etsin artikkelin
"The Effect of Video Game Competition and Violence on Aggressive Behavior: Which Characteristic Has the Greatest Influence?"

Kirjoittajat Paul J. C. Adachi and Teena Willoughby, Brock University, Kanada.

PDF täällä.

Tutkimuksen mielenkiintoinen, mutta näin jälkikäteen ei ollenkaan yllättävä tulos on se, että aggressiota lisää ilmeisesti lähinnä tietokonepelien kilpailullisuus, ei niinkään väkivaltaisuus.

Ja miettikääpäs sitten urheilua, urheilun seuraajia, yms. ja heidän käytöstään etenkin urheilutapahtumien yhteydessä tai niihin liittyen. Ja verratkaapa sitten iltamyöhään kotona tietsikkansa ääressä virtuaalihahmoja lahtaaviin nörtteihin. Kummat vaikuttavat todennäköisemmin aggressiivisemmilta noin mielikuvien perusteella? Pitääkö minun oikeasti etsiä tutkimustuloksia?

Tai ajatelkaa vaikka kouluaikojanne, jos niitä muistatte. Kummat enemmän käyttäytyivät väkivaltaisesti, aggressiivisesti, tai muuten vaan törkeästi - nörtit vai urheilullisemmat tyypit? Eivätköhän jenkkien teinileffojen stereotypiat ole tässä aika realistisia: urheilijatyypit ovat nimenomaan niitä kiusaajia ja öykkäreitä aika helvetin paljon todennäköisemmin kuin nörtit.

Jos siis jotain pitää kieltää, kielletään kaikenlainen kilpailu. :-)

Lapsen kasvattajan tärkein velvollisuus

2011-10-09T18:58:00.000+03:00

"Annetaan lasten olla lapsia" implikoi, ettei kasvateta heitä kohti aikuisuutta. Se on varsinaisen pahoinpitelyn jälkeen kai epäeettisin teko, mitä kasvattaja voi tehdä. Hänen velvollisuutensa on nimenomaan ohjata tähän pahaan maailmaan syntynyt lapsi potentiaalinsa mahdollisimman hyvin toteuttavaksi aikuiseksi, joka osaa sitten itseohjautuvasti toteuttaa itseään ja edistää yleistä hyvää.

Mielestäni kasvattajan tehtävä (kasvattajana) on nimenomaan (mielestäni itsestäänselvästi) kasvattaa lasta. Siis ei yrittää säilyttää lasta sellaisena kuin se on, vaan auttaa tätä kehittymään.

Olen monta kertaa kuullut (lähinnä tai ainoastaan äitien) valitusta, jonka olen tulkinnut niin, että he haluaisivat pitää lapsensa lapsina ja hoidettavinaan. Sellainen osoittaa mielestäni aika äärimmäistä itsekkyyttä. Hankkisivat vaikka koiran mieluummin. Koiraa saisi sitten helliä ja pitää lapsena sen koko eliniän. Ihmisen kasvattaminen on ihan eri juttu.

Ikävä kyllä ainakin osa lasten huoltajista jättää kasvattamisen lähes kokonaan koulun ja harrasteohjaajien tehtäväksi. Jotkut vanhemmat yrittävät hidastaa lastensa kehittymistä kohtelemalla heitä kuin pikkulapsia, riippumatta lastensa iästä ja kehitysvaiheesta. Tämä on sitä toimintaa, jota sanoin yllä ehkä pahoinpitelyn jälkeen pahimmaksi epäeettiseksi toiminnaksi, johon kasvattaja voi syyllistyä.

Lapset eivät itsekseen kovinkaan hyvin kehity aikuisiksi ihmisiksi. Lapsia täytyy aktiivisesti kasvattaa aikuisuuteen ja ihmisyyteen. Jos kasvattaja vain "antaa lasten olla lapsia", syyllistyy tehtäviensä laiminlyöntiin ja suorastaan lastensa tai kasvatettaviensa heittellejättöön.

Twelve posts on The Phenomenon of Religion

2011-10-04T13:09:00.000+03:00

A while back I read The Phenomenon of Religion. A Thematic Approach by Moojan Momen, published by Oneworld Publications, 1999. Here is a list of all the 12 commentaries on that book that I have previously posted in my blog, in chronological order:

1. Thematically about religion

2. Eastern and Western religions

3. Features of a Religious Experience

4. Pathways to Religious Experience

5. Faith and Belief (and Superstition)

6. Acquisition of Religious Belief

7. Religious Conversion

8. The Religious Life

9. Trance and Religious Experience

10. The Origins of the Hadith

11. Fundamentalism and Liberalism

12. Modernism and Religion

Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam (in 8 parts)

2011-10-04T13:00:00.001+03:00

Here are the links to all the 8 texts about a book concerning Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam that I have previously posted in my blog (in chronological order):

Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 1

Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 2

Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 3

Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 4

Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 5

Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 6

Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 7

Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 8

Journalismin puutteista

2011-10-04T11:48:00.000+03:00

Tämä nyt on jo aika usein soitettu levy, mutta koska se on niin tärkeä, niin soitetaan nyt vielä kerran:

Etenkin USA:ssa, mutta ehkäpä muuallakin, on typerästi korostunut sellainen näkemys, että "objektiivinen journalismi" esittää aina "asian molemmat (2) puolta", eli jonkun asian puolesta ja vastaan. Aihepiiristä on ollut USA:ssa keskustelua (ainakin Skeptical Inquirer -lehdessä) jo pitkän aikaa.

Tuo ajatteluhan sortuu nimittäin väärään dikotomiaan (miksi 2 ja vain 2 näkemystä asiasta?), sekä johtaa kyvyttömyyteen arvioida eri näkemysten painoarvoa ja argumentaatiota (siis journalistin toimesta). Tämä tietysti sopii relativistiseen ajatteluun, jonka mukaan mitään totuutta ei olekaan, mutta tämmöinen naivius ei oikein sovi aikuisille. Siitä seuraa, että lehdissä yms. esitetään kuin saman arvoisina vaikkapa evoluutio ja kreationismi, ihmisten aiheuttama ilmastonmuutos ja sen kieltäminen, yms.

Lukijan tai katsojan tehtäväksi jää vain valita kummasta tykkää enemmän. Yleensähän asiat esitetään niin suppeasti ja pinnallisesti, ettei esitysten perusteella voi niiden uskottavuutta arvioida, eikä useimmilla ihmisillä ole kompetenssia muodostaa perusteltuja käsityksiä merkittävistä asioista. Journalisteilla pitäisi ammattinsa puolesta olla (siis sitä pitäisi voida vaatia), mutta eipä näytä yleensä olevan.

Tekstejäni mediakasvatuskurssilta

2011-10-03T15:41:00.000+03:00

Olen suorittamassa mediakasvatuksen peruskurssia kirjoittamalla blogiini aihepiirin tekstejä. Tässä luettelo tähän kurssiin liittyvistä postauksistani (julkaisuajan mukaan järjestettynä):

Johdatus mediakasvatukseen

Sanomalehdistä

Koulukiusaamisen uudet muodot

Median kasvattama

Netti ja ystävyys

Minä median käyttäjänä

Kerhot vastauksena lasten liialliselle mediankäytölle?

Mediapaasto

Medialukutaidon reflektointia

Valintoja mediassa

Pari loistavaa sarjista

Kuvia ympärilläni

Journalismin puutteista

(lisätty 2011-10-04)

Pelitkö aiheuttavat väkivaltaa?

(lisätty 2011-10-10)

Mainoksista hyötyäkin

(lisätty 2011-10-27)

Kuvia ympärilläni

2011-10-03T15:34:00.001+03:00

Elämismaailmamme on varsin visuaalinen (ainakin ns. länsimaissa, mutta varmaan melko lailla kaikkialla nykyään). Myös tekstit kuuluvat yleensä visuaalisuuteen (pistekirjoitus siitä poikkeuksena), mutta kuvallisuus on puhtaasti visuaalista, sillä kuvaa ei voi (tietääkseni) oikeastaan kokea muuten kuin näkemällä. Tämä visuaalisuuden korostuminen (ehkä jopa ylikorostuminen) on erityisen suuri ongelma näkövammaisten osalta, mutta siihen liittynee muitakin ongelmia. Erityisesti ärsyttävää on se, että luullakseni suurin osa tästä visuaalisuudesta on kaupallista, (yksityis)yritysten markkinointia. Etenkin katunäkymissä tämä on ikävän selvää.

Näkisin kadunvarsilla paljon mieluummin ei-kaupallisia kuvia, vaikkapa taideteoksia, mutta niiden sijaan näen lähinnä mainoskylttejä: yritysten nimiä ja ulkomainoksia. Ainoan vastakohdan niille taitavat tuoda graffitit, jotka taas ovat nähdäkseni vain rumia suttuja -- jos ne jotain viestittävät, en ehkä edes halua tietää, mitä.

Lehdissä, etenkin aikakauslehdissä (jopa Tiede -lehdessä), kuvat vievät suuren osan sivujen pinta-alasta. Monet lehdet on tarkoitettu vain kevyeksi vilkuiltavaksi, eikä vakavammissakaan ole sinänsä haitaksi jos informatiivisten kuvien ohella käytetään joitakin vain lukukokemusta miellyttävämmäksi tekeviä kuvia. Sen sijaan erityisesti naistenlehdet tuntuvat sisältävän suorastaan haitallista materiaalia.

Tässä esimerkki. Muita voit vaikka tilata täältä.

Tarkoitan tietysti nykyään jo paljon (muttei ehkä vielä puhki) puhuttuja kuvia etenkin naisista, mutta myös miehistä, jotka vaikuttavat etenkin nuoriin mieliin haitallisesti. Naistenlehtiä lukevat tytöt voivat saada itsetunto-ongelmia (ja mm. syömishäiriöitä) näistä leikattujen ja meikattujen naisten photoshopatuista kuvista, jotka tavoittelevat sellaisia kauneusihanteita, joihin kuolevainen ihminen ei pysty. Siksi mielestäni pornon ja väkivaltaviihteen sijasta kielletyksi kannattaisi mieluummin asettaa tämä paljon haitallisempi median muoto.

Pari loistavaa sarjista

2011-09-30T10:51:00.000+03:00

xkcd on monien suosima (ja ehkä kaikkien aikojen ja koko maailman paras) nettisarjis.
Tuo nimi ei muuten ole lyhenne eikä tarkoita mitään.
Tässä sarjiksessa on ollut ainakin joitakin mainioita strippejä (kai tämä on oikea termi?) tähän Mediakasvatus -kurssiin liittyen, jolla olen. Yritän lainata niitä tässä. Klikkaamalla kuvaa saat suurennoksen.

Ensimmäinen ( http://www.xkcd.com/936/ ) liittyy salasanoihin. Kaikkien tietokoneita käyttävien pitäisi ottaa tästä heti opiksi:

Toinen ( http://www.xkcd.com/903/ ) liittyy suoremmin kurssiin, erityisesti tiedon uuteen luonteeseen, mutta myös lähdekritiikkiin ja Wikipediaan:

Valintoja mediassa

2011-09-27T23:27:00.001+03:00

Ensin urputus: termin "media" yksikkömuoto on "medium". "Media" on siis jo monikko. "Mediat" on jotain aika outoa minun korvilleni. No se siitä. Olen liian humaltunut muistaakseni edes mitä minun tästä piti oikeastaan sanoa. Soittakaa joku "Red, red wine"... ;)

*

Asiaan. Olen tässä huvikseni ja kyseenalaiseksi hyödykseni ja ehkä harjoitukseksikin tai sitten vain viinin vaikutuksen takia kerännyt Mediakasvatuskurssimme blogeja seurattavakseni. Onneksi suurin osa on samalla alustalla toimivia, joten ne on helppo ottaa stalkkauksen kohteeksi. Osa on tehty muilla ja muissa systeemeissä. Niistä joitakin saa silti helposti seurattua. Joidenkin kohdalla seuraaminen olisi "kohtuuttoman" vaikeata, eli vaatisi jonkun tilin perustamisen tms. Semmoiseen en rupea. Tämän takia en siis seuraa kaikkia kurssin blogeja.

(EDIT: Minulle näyttää kertyneen 49 blogia listalle ja olen niitä kaikkia seurannut, myös kommentoiden ja +1 merkkaillen aika ahkerasti. Melko paljon hommaa se on ollut, enkä tiedä kuinka työekonomisesti järkevä tämä ratkaisu oli. Mutta olipahan mielenkiintoinen kokemus.)

Vastaavia valintoja mediamaailmassa tehdään muuallakin. Tämähän on se syy, miksi FB on niin suosittu, ja Google+ ja muut kilpailijat niin kovien vaikeuksien edessä: on todella vaikea saada suostuteltua ketään "muuttamaan" toiseen systeemiin, jos ei saa varsin suurta osaa suostuteltua kerralla.

Medialukutaidon reflektointia

2011-09-26T15:24:00.001+03:00

Joudun aina välillä häpeämään heikkoja taitojani, koska historiaakin opiskelleena minulla pitäisi olla mainiot tiedonhauan ja lähdekritiikin taidot, mutta usein tunnen olevani niissä huono. En siis ainakaan ole niin hyvä kuin voisin olla. Tämä koskee lähinnä perinteisten tiedotusvälineiden käyttöä.

Toisenlainen epäpätevyyteni liittyy "sosiaalisena" tunnettuihin median muotoihin. Olen kyllä ollut internetin asukas jo kauan ja tämän bloginikin perustin jo 2007. Facebook on käytössä ja muihinkin sosiaalisen median muotoihin olen vähintään tutustunut. Osallistumiseni, siis sosiaalisuuteni, näissä medioissa on kuitenkin hyvin vähäistä. En esim. tee YouTubeen videoita, enkä edes lue toisten blogeja normaalisti kuin harvoin. En ole koskaan kirjoittanut Wikipediaan mitään. Varmasti "lukutaitoni" eli todellinen käyttötaitoni olisi toisenlaista, jos olisin sosiaalisempi netissä.

Tallentavan digiboksin ansiosta seuraan mainoksiakin nykyään erittäin vähän, mikä joskus aiheuttaa jopa tunteen tietämättömyydestä (olen törmännyt tilanteeseen että jotain tarvitsemaani tuotetta on mainostettu TV:ssä, mutten ole ollut tästä tietoinen). Seuraan ylipäätään TV-ohjelmia erittäin vähän: katson vain elokuvia (erityisesti komediat), uutiset, sekä ehkä joskus jotain TV:n komediasarjaa, jos tiedän sellaisesta (uusien sarjojen alkaminen on hankala huomata Telkku.comin sivulla). Olen kyllä jo kauan tiedostanut sarjoissa ja elokuvissa käytettyä tuotesijoittelua, mutta esim. "tosi-TV" ohjelmat saattavat sisältää paljonkin minulle tuntemattomia vaikuttamisen muotoja.

*

No niin. Yritän tässä liittää Picasasta kuvan tekstiäni kaunistamaan, mutta idiootti saitti muuttaa kielen saksaksi, joka on minulle yhtä siansaksaa (vaikka olenkin joskus hieman saksaa muka opiskellut). Vaikeuteni tässä osoittanee ainakin heikkoa mediakirjoitustaitoa. No, laitoin sitten Flickr.com -saitilta tuon "filosofisen" kuvan kun kerran oli helpompaa.

Mediapaasto

2011-09-26T14:54:00.001+03:00

Tiesin jo etukäteen, että Mediakasvatuskurssin tehtävä pitää päivän mittainen "paasto" eli tauko mediankäytöstä olisi mahdoton. Ajattelin silti ihan oikeasti yrittää yhden päivän ajan käyttää erilaisia tiedotusvälineitä mahdollisimman vähän. Tämä päivä oli eilen.

Huomasin kuitenkin aamupäivällä ruokaillessani, että olin jo hyvän aikaa katsonut elokuvaa. En kuitenkaan lopettanut elokuvan katsomista, koska siinä oli tyylilajilleen poikkeuksellisen mielenkiintoisia asioita (ikävä kyllä loppupuoli elokuvasta sortui kliseisiin). En malttanut myöskään olla tarkastamatta kännykän kautta wikipediasta erästä elokuvassa mainittua termiä ja siihen liittyvää vuosilukua. Minulle oli tullut sähköpostia, jonka lukaisin myös kännykän kautta pikaisesti.

Olin sopinut erään lautapelin pelaamisesta iltapäivällä. Koska en osaa olla tekemättä mitään, enkä keksinyt muutakaan tekemistä odottelun ajaksi, luin Skeptical Inquirerin uusimman numeron loppuun.

Pelaajien saavuttua pelasimme hauskaa lautapeliä nimeltä A Touch Of Evil: The Supernatural Game. Pelin aikana minun täytyi useaan otteeseen lukea sääntökirjaa. Taustalla soitin tapani mukaan tietokoneen kautta levyjä.

Pelaajien lähdettyä juttelin hetken jonkun kanssa gTalk-sovelluksen kautta ja luin Tiede-lehden uusimman numeron loppuun.Aloin masentua, joten katsoin vielä yhden komediaelokuvan.

En siis onnistunut vähentämään mediankäyttöäni juuri ollenkaan (minun täytyi pinnistellä, etten kirjoittaisi tätä blogia jo illalla). Ainoa ero tavalliseen päivään oli se, etten lukenut kurssikirjoja ollenkaan. Tämä ei liene edistystä. Saatan vielä yrittää mediapaastoa uudestaan joku päivä, mutten usko saavani kovin erilaista tulosta aikaiseksi, ellen sitten joudu tilanteeseen, jossa minun on todellakin mahdotonta käyttää tiedotusvälineitä.

Kerhot vastauksena lasten liialliselle mediankäytölle?

2011-09-24T18:05:00.000+03:00

Kirsi Pohjola ja Kimmo Jokinen ovat kirjoittaneet vuonna 2007 kolumnin "Huoli lasten mediankäytöstä on osin turha", jota tässä lyhyesti kommentoin. Kolumni perustui kirjoittajien tekemään tutkimukseen lasten mediankäytöstä. Heidän mielestään lasten virtuaaliympäristöihin liittyvät pelot ja moraalinen paniikki ovat turhan suuria; asiat ovat pääasiassa hyvin. Suurimmat todelliset ongelmat näyttävät olevan joidenkin koulujen tai luokkien (tarkentamattomat) ongelmat estävät opettajia antamasta yhtä paljon (tai hyvää?) koulutusta ja (media)kasvatusta kuin toisten koulujen tai luokkien opettajat. Myös kodeissa on erilaisia valmiuksia tässä suhteessa, mistä esimerkkinä kirjoittajat mainitsevat lapset, joiden elämä näyttää aika yksipuolisesti pyörivän pelien ja (väkivaltaisten) elokuvien ympärillä.

Mainitut ongelmat ovat varmasti todellisia ja vaikeasti hoidettavia. Kaikilla lapsilla ei vain ole mahdollisuuksia harrastaa erilaisia asioita, eikä heidän vanhemmillaan ehkä ole mahdollisuuksia viettää lastensa kanssa aikaa niin paljon kuin joillain toisilla. Jos tällaisille lapsille (etenkin jos heillä ei ole juurikaan ystäviä IRL) ei määrätä rajoituksia esim. pelaamiselle, ei kai ole ihmekään, jos he viettävät aikansa pääasiassa pelikonsolin, tietokoneen tai TV:n ääressä. Pelkät rajoitukset eivät ole tässä mielestäni mitenkään rajoittavia, vaan vaihtoehtoja on tarjottava, jos rajoituksia tehdään. On turha käskeä lapsi ulos leikkimään, jos ulkona odottaa vain vihamielinen tai ainakin sellaiseksi koettu maailma.

Kummallista kyllä, kolumnissa ei mainittu mitään nettikiusaamisesta, eikä tarpeesta opettaa lapsia käyttämään nettiä ja kameroita ja kännyköitä oikein sekä tiedollisesti että eettisesti. Tähän asiaan liittynee paljon enemmän ongelmia kuin pelkkään pelaamiseen tai TV:n katseluun.

Yksi, en tosin tiedä kuinka realistinen, tapa yrittää korjata vähävirikkeisyyttä niiden lasten osalta, joilla on vain vähän mahdollisuuksia "tosielämän" harrastuksiin ja sosiaalisiin suhteisiin, olisi tarjota koulussa harrastuskerhomahdollisuuksia. Näiden tarkoituksena olisi pääasiassa auttaa lapsia verkostoitumaan ikäistensä kanssa, vaikka eksplisiittisesti esitetty kerhon tarkoituskin (esim. pelikerho) on tietysti toteutettava. Vaikeutena on kuitenkin saada aikaan lämmin, hyväksyvä, vastaanottava, inklusiivinen, siis sanalla sanoen ystävällinen ilmapiiri, jotta ujoimmat ja sosiaalisesti heikkolahjaisimmatkin saataisiin mukaan.

Ainakin joissakin kouluissa pelikerhoja jo harrastetaankin.
Kuva on Varissuon koulusta, Turusta.

Jos tällainen toiminta olis mahdollista toteuttaa (toivottavasti sellaiseen saadaan jotenkin riittävä rahoitus kaikkialla), sillä voisi olla suurikin vaikutus juuri kaikkein huonoimmassa asemassa olevien lasten kohdalla. Rahoituksen oikeuttamiseksi tähän voitaisiin vaikka yhdistää jotain opetuksellista, mutta vain jos lapset saadaan hyväksymään se ja kerho saadaan pidettyä selvästi hauskana ja (varsinaisesta) koulusta irrallisena. Tärkeintä on ilo ja omaehtoinen toiminta ystävällisessä ilmapiirissä.

Minä median käyttäjänä

2011-09-23T17:51:00.001+03:00

Kurssilla annettiin tämmöinen tehtävä, jota yritän nyt suorittaa:

Seuraa jälleen omaa toimintaasi median käyttäjänä. Oletko vastaanottaja, sisältöön tarttuva kriitikko, muodon analysoija vai vaihtoehtoisten tapojen suunnittelija? Vai vaihteletko näitä tapoja? Miten nuo suhtautumistavat mediaan näkyvät käytännössä toimintana?
Erityisesti kiinnitä huomiota niihin tilanteisiin, joissa on useampia henkilöitä median äärellä.

Viimeinen kohta tuottaa heti vaikeuksia. Olen median äärellä yhdessä muiden kanssa lähinnä luennoilla, tai nykyään myös koulun oppitunneilla opettajakoulutuksen yhteydessä. Median määrittely on myös edelleen ongelma. Olen pelinjohtajana roolipelissä, jossa pelaajia on (lisäkseni) neljä. Pelimateriaali, jota käytän, on pääosin kirjamuodossa, tosin jonkin verran lisään siihen kirjoittamalla itse ja etenkin etsimällä sopivaa materiaalia netistä. Tässä tilanteessa olen vastaanottaja, joka kirjoista ja netistä suodattaa pelaajille valikoiden materiaalia.

Facebookissa ja jossain määrin myös täällä blogissani olen suunnittelija ja tuottaja, sisällön kriitikko ja ehkä joskus myös muodon analysoija. Sosiaalisesta mediasta kun kerran puhutaan, niin siinä mielessä näissä tapauksissa median äärellä on useampia ihmisiä. Sisällön osalta saatan kommentoida esimerkiksi epäuskottavan oloisia väitteitä, tai tulkintaa jostain asiasta. Muodon tai paremminkin tyylin osalta olen joskus esittänyt kommentteja jopa Facebookissa, mutta enemmän keskustelualueilla ja sähköpostilistoilla. Eniten kai kuitenkin olen vastaanootajana näissä kaikissa. Selvästi kuitenkin siis vaihtelen näitä tapoja.

Netti ja ystävyys

2011-09-23T17:31:00.000+03:00

Lueskelin taas viinilasi kädessä teosta Kynäslahti, Kupiainen & Lehtonen (toim.): Näkökulmia mediakasvatukseen. Mediakasvatusseuran julkaisuja 1/2007. Siinä on artikkeli nimeltä "Tunteella ja järjellä nettiin – Internetissä tarvitaan uudenlaisia mediataitoja" (kirjoittajina Suvi Tuominen ja Anu Mustonen). Ehkä johtuu osittain viinistäkin, mutta nyt alkoi kiinnostaa.

Artikkelissa kerrotaan tutuista asioista, joihin haluan tehdä muutaman henkilökohtaisen lisäyksen. Ehkä sitten selvempänä poistan koko tämän tekstin, tai sitten en. Sosiaalisen median yksi puoli on juuri tämä, eli mahdollisuus tehdä itsensä naurunalaiseksi poikkeuksellisen monen ihmisen edessä. Asiaan.

Artikkelissa huomautetaan hyödyllisesti esimerkiksi siitä, että nettiystävyys (ja -rakkauskin) on paitsi jo ihan normaalia, se on myös jollain tapaa parempaa kuin perinteisempi kasvokkaisen elämän ystävyys. Näin siksi, että ihmiset voivat jopa asua vaikka kuinka kauan yhdessä silti oikeasti tuntematta toisiaan. Tämä tuntemattomuus voi sitten tietysti tulla esiin jossain yllättävässä tilanteessa, kun selviää, ettei toinen ajatellutkaan niinkuin oli itse ajatellut. Netin kautta muodostettu ystävyys tai mikä vain suhde on lähes välttämättä tässä erilainen, sillä se perustuu sanalliseen kommunikaatioon aivan toisella tavalla kuin "reaalimaailman" kontaktit. Kun ystävyys perustuu (edelleenkin usein kirjalliseen) keskusteluun, ystävystyvät ihmiset oppivat tuntemaan toisensa paljon paremmin kuin muuten olisi mahdollista.

Olen jopa tätä oivallusta käyttänyt hyväksi siinä, että olen kehottanut avioliitossa olevia kirjoittamaan toisilleen joko perinteisesti paperin tai sitten sähköpostin välityksellä. Teknologioihin (siis myös perinteisiin kynään ja paperiin) liittyvän tietyn etäännyttävän vaikutuksen takia sanallinen kommunikaatio esimerkiksi riitatilanteessa on helpottava jo siksikin, että se auttaa rauhoittamaan voimakkaina vellovat tunteet, joita taas kasvokkainen kommunikaatio ruumiinkielineen vain ruokkisi. Tämä voi tietysti olla haitaksi myönteisten tunteiden osalta, mutta toisaalta sitä voidaan haluttaessa ainakin jonkin verran kiertää. Toisaalta järkevyys on aina parempi kuin voimakkaat tunteet, joten ehkä tätä ei edes pitäisi nähdä ongelmana?

Netin hyödyllisyys ystävyyssuhteissa on tullut omalla kohdallani selväksi jo kauan sitten. Olen nimittäin jo 1990-luvulta lähtien toiminut terapeuttisena ystävänä netin kautta tapaamilleni ihmisille. On vaikea uskoa, että samanlaista suhdetta voisi kovin helposti muodostaa IRL (In Real Life), kuten nettikielellä sanotaan.

Minusta netti on yksi kaikkien aikojen hienoimmista ja parhaimmista keksinnöistä, koska se voi yhdistää ihmisiä ennennäkemättömällä tavalla, sekä tuoda tietoa lähes kaikkien saataville varsin helposti. Tietysti siinä on ongelmansa, niinkuin kaikessa. On kuitenkin tärkeää opettaa jo lapsia (sekä tietysti myös aikuisia) netin käytössä. Tätä varten pitäisi julkaista kunnollinen netin käytön ja netiketin opas, joka olisi mieluiten ilmainen. Siinä opetettaisiin kriittistä suhtautumista nettiin ja tiedonhakua yms., sekä käytössääntöjä ja järkevän toiminnan suosituksia. Siinä kerrottaisiin siis esimerkiksi, ettei nuoren ole järkevää välttämättä esiintyä netissä omalla virallisella nimellään, eikä välttämättä kannata lähettää kavereilleen tai ladata kuvagalleriaan sellaisia kuvia, joita ei haluaisi kaikkien nähtäville. Oleellista olisi selittää, miksi peruskäytössääntöjä on hyvä noudattaa etenkin netissä (mutta muuallakin). Tähän kuuluu myös hyväntahtoisen tulkinnan periaatteen selittäminen ja perustelu. Tietysti siinä pitäisi kertoa myös lakiasiat, eli mikä on laitonta ja mikä ei. Yhtä tärkeää kuitenkin on kertoa ovelista mainonta- ja manipulointikeinoista, joita netin ja muidenkin medioiden kautta voidaan käyttää.

Median kasvattama

2011-09-22T22:02:00.001+03:00

Kuinka minua on mediakasvatatettu

Ala-asteelta muistan kuinka meille hoettiin, että "televisio on hyvä renki mutta huono isäntä". Tämän lisäksi ainoa huomaamani tai muistamani mediakasvatus ala-asteella oli äidinkielen tuntien yhteydessä tehty elokuva. Olin nimellisesti kuvaajana, eli en oikeasti tehnyt mitään. Elokuvan tekemistä ei opetettu mitenkään teoreettisesti, eikä hyvin ylipäätään muuten, vaan kyseessä oli melkeinpä vain kotivideotasoinen yritys. En muista edes koskaan nähneeni tekemäämme "elokuvaa". En tiedä osallistuivatko elokuvakerholaiset (joita saattoi olla joitakin) projektiin enemmän. Muistikuvani mukaan koko projekti oli opetuksen kannalta lähinnä menetetty tilaisuus.

En muista, että peruskoulussa tai edes lukiossa olisi käytetty edes sanomalehtiä opetuksessa, mutta on mahdollista että niin on tehty kerran tai pari. Minkäänlaista kriittisen ajattelun opetusta ei missään vaiheessa meille annettu. Romaaneja peruskoulussa ja lukiossa ohjattiin lukemaan ja niistä kirjoitettiin arvosteluja, mutta mitään kunnon analyysejä ei opetettu tekemään, vaan ilmeisesti opetusta ohjasi usko siihen, että "lukeminen kannattaa aina", kuten erään kirjakaupan mainos on väittänyt. Kyllähän minä mielelläni aina olen kirjoja lukenut, mutta en kyllä välttämättä niitä, joita koulussa käskettiin lukemaan. En ole vieläkään lukenut Seitsemää veljestä. Kalevalaakin olen lukenut mieluummin hieman englanniksi kuin suomeksi.

Ammattikorkeakoulussa opetettiin tekemään kotisivuja, jotain graafistakin muistaakseni, sekä käyttämään tietokoneita ja oletettavasti myös hyödyntämään internettiä. Viimeisimmästä varsin hyödylliseksi osoittautui pian erään kirjan loppuun lisätty netiketti, eli käytösopas internettiin, jota pitäisi kyllä hyödyntää jo alakoulussa.

Avoimen yliopiston tilastotieteen kurssilla sain varmaan ensimmäisen kerran varsinaista kriittisen ajattelun opetusta ja mediakasvatusta, kun lehdissä ilmestyneiden mainosten tilastotieteeseen liittyviä väitteitä arvioitiin. Ehkä jotain samantapaista on saattanut olla jo lukiossa (esim. korkojen ja koron koron laskemisen yhteydessä), tosin ilman todellisia esimerkkejä lehtien sivuilta.

Kuinka media on kasvattanut minua

Tulin maininneeksi, että luen mielelläni kirjoja. Niitä meillä oli kotona paljon (ja luulin pitkään että niin on kaikissa kodeissa), joten oli luontevaa lukea niitä. Enimmäkseen luin kuitenkin aika huonoa kirjallisuutta, jonka ainoa vaikutus sanallisen taidon parantamisen lisäksi varmaankin oli mielikuvituksen kehittäminen. Sanomalehtiäkin meille tuli, mutten ollut niistä kovin kiinnostunut. Aku Ankka ja Tieteen kuvalehti olivat tärkeimmät lehteni nuorena, vaikka myös Time ja Newsweek tulivat jonkun aikaa ja olivat mielenkiintoisia. Englanninkielisiä kirjoja aloin lukea 13-vuotiaana, mikä varmasti kehitti kielitaitoani.

Meille ostettiin ensimmäinen televisio harvinaisen myöhään, kun olin jo ehkä 12-vuotias. Television tai kavereilta lainaamieni videoiden katselua ei rajoitettu muistaakseni ollenkaan. Katselin jonkun verran toiminta- ja kauhuelokuvia, mutta mitään kovin hurjaa (esim. snuffia tai sellaiseksi väitettyä) ei tullut vastaan. Esim. Terminator on edelleen aika hieno elokuva ja pidän naurettavana tapaa, jolla jotkut hurskastelijat ovat sitä kommentoineet. Voi olla, että olin sen verran hyväosainen muuten, ettei katsomillani elokuvilla siksi ollut minuun kovin haitallista vaikutusta, mutta toisaalta on mahdollista, ettei niillä ole sellaista juuri kehenkään. Kielitaitoa TV:n ja elokuvien katselu paransi tietenkin, etenkin sitten kun näköni heikkeni niin, että tekstityksen lukeminen vaikeutui (olin tyypillisen hölmö, enkä hankkinut silmälaseja) - tällöin keskityin kuulemaani ja näkemääni huulten liikkeisiin yms.

Pelasin myös tietokoneella väkivaltaisia pelejä, joita myöskin on syytetty välillä aivan turhaan. Siihen aikaan pelit olivat sarjakuvamaisia, eivät realistisia kuten nykyään. Sillä on varmasti merkitystä niiden vaikutukseen. En tosin ole kovin innostunut nykyisiäkään vastaan esitetyistä syytöksistä. Jos joku väkivallantekijä onkin niitä pelannut, etsisin syitä hänen käytökseensä kyllä aivan muualta kuin hänen pelaamistaan peleistä.

Pelasin jo lapsena myös roolipelejä, joissa väkivalta oli keskeistä. Niillä oli jopa hyödyllisiä kasvatuksellisia vaikutuksia etenkin siksi, että ne herättivät minut ajattelemaan etiikkaa ja metafysiikkaa (vaikken tuolloin näitä termejä edes tuntenut). En tällä kertaa kuitenkaan kerro tästä sen enempää, koska olen juuri tehnyt niin toisaalla.

Internet avasi minulle tien tietoon. Vuosia keskityin jälkiviisaudella arvioiden aivan vääriin asioihin, eli kaikenlaiseen okkulttiseen huuhaa-aineistoon, mutta niiden kautta löysin kuitenkin tieteellisen skeptisismin. Aikani siihen netin kautta tutustuttuani tilasin Skeptical Inquirer -lehden, jonka tilaaja olen edelleenkin. Tämä lehti ja aihepiirin kirjat (sekä jotkut hyvät TV-dokumentit) opettivat minulle enemmän tieteestä ja filosofiasta kuin kaikki koulussa oppimani yhteensä.

On todella surkea tosiasia, että suomalainen koulutusjärjestelmä ei edelleenkään ole merkittävästi tainnut noista ajoista tässä suhteessa parantua, eikä yleisen kriittisen ajattelun ja tieteellisen maailmankuvan kursseja järjestetä edes yliopistoissa juuri koskaan. Erityistieteiden opiskelijat voivat näin hyvinkin valmistua jopa tohtoreiksi asti, oppimatta koskaan yleistämään kriittistä ajatteluaan oman alansa ulkopuolelle. Tästä minulla on ikäviä, henkilökohtaisia kokemuksiakin.

*

Kuten Suorannan, Sintosen ja Kupiaisen artikkelissa "Suomalaisen mediakasvatuksen vuosikymmenet" (teoksessa Kynäslahti, Kupiainen & Lehtonen (toim.): Näkökulmia mediakasvatukseen. Mediakasvatusseuran julkaisuja 1/2007) kertovat, 1980- ja '90-luvuilla tuntuu vallinneen lasten medialta suojelemista painottava käsitys, mutta kovin vahvasti tämä ei meillä kotona onneksi vaikuttanut. Voi vain toivoa, että artikkelissa mainittu medialukutaidon korostaminen vuoden 2004 opetussuunnitelmassa tuo lisää kriittistä ajattelua kouluihin. En kyllä pidätä henkeäni tätä odottaessani.

Koulukiusaamisen uudet muodot

2011-09-21T21:34:00.002+03:00

Onneksi ei ollut "sosiaalista mediaa" silloin kun minä olin koulussa, voisi ajatella.

Etsin materiaalia Mediakasvatuskurssin toista välitehtävää varten, ja törmäsin puolen vuoden takaiseen juttuun Hesarissa (tässä vain hieman lyhennetty versio):

Kiusaamisvideot yleistyvät kouluissa
Koulukiusaaja levittää yhä useammin uhristaan kuvia tai videoita internetissä.
[...] videoiden levittäminen tekee kiusaamisesta entistä rankempaa.
"Ennen vanhaan lapsi pääsi kiusaajistaan eroon, kun lähti koulusta. Nykyään lasten elämä pyörii niin paljon sosiaalisessa mediassa, että kiusaaminen jatkuu myös vapaa-ajalla ja kotona."
"On eri asia, jos lapsi nolataan viiden kaverin edessä kuin joka ikisen koulutoverin edessä. Lapsi miettii, voiko mennä kouluun, jos kaikki nauravat hänelle."
HS:n haastattelemien rehtoreiden mukaan asiaa pyritään pitämään kouluissa esillä, ja nuorille annetaan mediakasvatusta.
Käytännössä todellisuus näyttäytyy nuorten arjessa erilaisena. HS:n tapaamat Laajasalon yläasteen oppilaat sanovat, että opettajat eivät yleensä tiedä kiusaamistapauksista mitään, eikä oppilaille ole puhuttu yleisistä pelisäännöistä.

Näin kirjoitti Jorma Palovaara 14.4.2011 Helsingin Sanomissa. Täällä koko teksti.

Tämä uusi kiusaamisen muoto on luultavasti tärkein syy antaa (tuleville) opettajille koulutusta mediakasvatuksesta. En ole varma auttaako se, mutta pakkohan sitä on yrittää, koska tuskin moni asia on yhtä tärkeää kuin kiusaamisen poistaminen koulusta.

En ehkä seuraa perinteisiä tiedotusvälineitä kovin ahkerasti, mutta luulen, että juuri nämä kiusausasiat ovat niitä yleisimpiä syitä nostaa mediakasvatus esille. Tosin mediakasvatusta ei välttämättä useinkaan tällä termillä mainita. Tässäkin se mainitaan vain rehtorien puolustuspuheessa, josta jää sellainen käsitys, ettei heillä ole nettikiusaamiseen muita vastakonsteja. Tämän jutun perusteella näyttää siltä, ettei mediakasvatusta ainakaan jutussa mainitussa oppilaitoksessa juurikaan harjoiteta, eikä nettikiusaamisen vastustamiseksi (voida) tehdä mitään muutakaan.

Sanomalehdistä

2011-09-21T16:38:00.000+03:00

Lueskelen sitä mukaa kuin ehdin teosta nimeltä Näkökulmia mediakasvatukseen ja pääsin viimein toiseen osaan. Tämä toinen osa alkaa artikkelilla, jossa puhutaan sanomalehtien lukemisesta ja etenkin nuorista sanomalehtien lukijoina. Siinä mainittiin, että 2 % nuorista ei lue sanomalehtiä ollenkaan ja sitten hieman pohdittiin, kuinka nämäkin saataisiin lehdistä kiinnostumaan. Minusta tämän lukeminen toi mieleen puhelinmyyjät, jotka silloin tällöin yrittävät minulle jotain lehteä tai muutamaa kaupitella, eivätkä aina meinaa uskoa, ettei minulla ole varaa sellaisiin. Kysehän ei oikeastaan ole rahasta. Minun pitäisi olla todella rikas, että viitsisin rahojani haaskata tarjottuihin lehtiin, jos silloinkaan. Hieman sama pätee sanomalehtiinkin.

Miksi nuorten, tai ylipäätään kenenkään, pitäisi lukea sanomalehtiä?

Minulle ja varmaan monille muillekin jo ala-asteella yritettiin takoa päähän sanomalehtien lukemisen tärkeyttä. En silti niitä pidä tärkeinä, enkä lue niitä kuin satunnaisesti silloin, kun sopivassa tilanteessa huomaan lähettyvillä lojuvan lehden, eikä ole todellakaan muuta tekemistä kuin sen lukeminen. Siis lähinnä odottaessani vaikkapa luennon alkua.

En vain näe sanomalehtiä kovin hyödyllisinä informaation lähteinä. Niiden sisältö on hyvin pinnallista, eikä yleensä minua kiinnostavista aiheista niissä sanota juuri mitään, tai jos sanotaan, niin todennäköisesti jotenkin virheellisesti. Osaan etsiä webistä niistä asioista paremmin tietoa, kuten myös kirjoista ja (lähinnä akateemisista) aikakauslehdistä.

Paranormaaleista ilmiöistä, tieteen ja epätieteen rajanvedoista, sekä jonkun verran tiedepolitiikastakin kerrotaan tässä lehdessä.

Sanomalehtien pinnallinen tiedotus on hyödyllistä vain nimenomaan tiedotustarkoituksessa, luulisin. Siis lähinnä jonkin paikkakunnan tapahtumien ja ehkä paikallispolitiikan keskustelunaiheiden kannalta. Artikkelissa paikallislehtien lukemista pidetäänkin tämän takia keinona kotiutua uudelle paikkakunnalle muuton jälkeen. Ehkäpä niin, mutta minulla ei olekaan koskaan ollut tarvetta kotiutua millekään paikkakunnalle (vaan paremminkin esim. yliopistoon - tietysi yliopiston lehtiä voikin pitää niiden paikallislehtinä, jolloin täytyy myöntää että olen niitä käyttänyt juuri tähän tarkoitukseen). Erityisesti maahanmuuttajille paikallislehdet ja ylipäätään uuden asuinmaan lehdet kyllä ovat varmasti todella tärkeitä apuvälineitä kulttuuriin tutustumisessa ja oman paikan etsimisessä.

Mielenkiintoista oli myös artikkelin esiin nostama huomio sanomalehtien lukemisen vaikutuksesta PISA-kokeissa menestymiseen: suomalaisten menestyminen PISA-kokeissa voi selittyä yksinkertaisesti sillä, että monet PISAn kysymykset ovat usein sanomalehtitekstityyppisiä, joiden lukemiseen suomalaisnuoret ovat tottuneet muita keskimääräisesti paremmin. Siis suomalainen koulu ei ehkä olekaan ansainnut saamaansa kiitosta. :)

Johdatus mediakasvatukseen

2011-09-17T10:27:00.003+03:00

Olen päättänyt opiskella opettajaksi. Pääsin sellaiseen ohjelmaan (Opeksi V), jonka pitäisi valmistaa minut ainakin nimellisesti päteväksi opettajaksi alle vuodessa. Osana näitä noin lukuvuoden kestäviä opintoja on kasvatustieteen perusopinnot, joista Johdatus mediakasvatukseen on piakkoin alkamassa. Tämän kurssin vaihtoehtoisena suoritusvaatimuksena on blogin kirjoittaminen kurssin aiheista. Niinpä kirjoitan niistä nyt jonkin aikaa tähän blogiini. Jossain määrin filosofiaan tämäkin kurssi liittyy, tai filosofia kurssiin oikeastaan, koska filosofia liittyy jotakuinkin kaikkeen. Ainakin jos sen niin päättää ymmärtää. :)

Kurssin ensimmäinen tehtävä oli yllättävän mielenkiintoinen. Yhden päivän ajan täytyi pitää mediapäiväkirjaa, johon merkitsi ylös mitä mediaa käytti mihinkin aikaan. Esim. mitä kirjaa luki, mitä katseli telkkarista, surffasiko netissä jne. Tein tuon tehtävän eilen. Mielestäni katsoin silloin hieman tavallista enemmän telkkaria (TV:stä tallentamaani elokuvaa ja uutiset suorana - näin minulla on tapana toimia, koska en halua katsella mainoksia). Myös Facebookissa tuli tuhlattua aikaa, mutta tämä on ikävä kyllä ollut jonkinlainen trendi viime aikoina. Täytyy yrittää vähentää selvästikin. Tällainen harjoitus voisi olla hyvä kaikkein aina silloin tällöin tehdä, sillä voisi olla hyvä huomata kuinka paljon aikaa tulee tuhlattua aivan vääriin asioihin.

Semmoinen ajatuskin minulle tuli, etten oikeastaan ole varma termin media merkityksestä. Olen tottunut ajattelemaan että sillä tarkoitetaan sellaisia tiedotusvälineitä kuin TV, radio ja lehdet. Siis sellaisia, joiden sisältö tarjotaan julkisesti kaikille halukkaille, vaikkakin ehkä maksua vastaan. Mutta ns. sosiaalisen median (tai web 2.0 kuten sitä joskus harvemmin nähtäväsi nimitetään) kohdalla termin media merkitys tuntuu hämärtyvän. Onko Facebook tiedotusväline? Siis muillekin kuin siellä mainostaville tahoille? Minun statuspäivitykseni siellä näkyvät vain "Ystävilleni", vaikka jotkut muut asiani sielläkin saattavat olla avoimemmin nähtävissä.

The Most Important Teachings of Philosophy

2011-08-16T20:39:00.002+03:00

I will list here some of the most important teachings of philosophy that I hope all people (or at least my students) to learn. They are not in a particular order.

It is most important to learn to cope with epistemic (and other) uncertainty, acknowledging this uncertainty. The feeling of certainty is only psychological and it is an epistemic error. The absolute truth cannot be attained, or even if it can, it is methodologically better to assume that it cannot.
In addition to known alternatives there are other possible choices. You can also invent new options yourself.
Aspire to remember all your sources (what have you adopted and from where). That means not only books and movies, but also other people, from whom you have adopted opinions.
It is important to learn the difference between yourself and the beliefs and opinions you hold (for now). You should not identify with any belief, belief system, or even a way of thinking. Identities are separate from your self, and exchangeable. The Self is a matter of definition. Identities are rarely rationally chosen.
Critical thinking does not mean being critical of others or of their works. It means being rational, and so also giving critical praise when it is due.
Criticism is best to be formulated as a question. That will teach also (epistemic) humility. Criticism is very probably erroneous as well, which is worth remebering.
The Principle of Benevolent Interpretation: Interpret others as if they were ethically, intellectually, and epistemically excellent.

I hope to continue this list later.

Filosofian tärkeimmät opetukset

2011-08-16T20:05:00.003+03:00

Listaan tähän jotain tärkeimpiä filosofisia opetuksia, joita toivon kaikkien (ainakin oppilaideni) oppivan. Ne eivät ole missään erityisessä tärkeysjärjestyksessä.

Tärkeintä on oppia tulemaan toimeen tiedollisen (ja muunkin) epävarmuuden kanssa, tämä epävarmuus tiedostaen. Varmuuden tunne on vain psykologista ja se on tiedollinen virhe. Absoluuttista totuutta ei voi saavuttaa, tai vaikka voisikin, on menetelmällisesti parempi olettaa että ei voi.
Tiedettyjen vaihtoehtojen lisäksi on myös muita mahdollisia vaihtoehtoja. Uusia vaihtoehtoja voi myös keksiä itse.
Pyri muistamaan kaikki lähteesi (mitä olet mistäkin omaksunut). Siis ei vain esimerkiksi kirjat tai elokuvat, vaan myös toiset ihmiset, joilta olet omaksunut käsityksiä.
On tärkeä oppia ero itsen ja (toistaiseksi) kannattamiensa käsitystensä ja uskomustensa välillä. Ei pidä samastaa itseä ja jotain tiettyä uskomusta, uskomusjärjestelmää, tai edes ajattelutapaa. Identiteetit ovat itsestä irrallisia ja vaihdettavia. Itse on määrittelykysymys. Identiteetit ovat harvoin rationaalisesti valittuja.
Kriittinen ajattelu ei tarkoita kritisoimista. Se tarkoittaa rationaalisuutta, eli myös kriittistä kehumista silloin kun se on perusteltua.
Kritiikki on paras muotoilla kysymykseksi. Se opettaa myös (tiedollista) nöyryyttä. Myös kritiikki on hyvin todennäköisesti virheellistä, mikä on syytä muistaa.
Hyväntahtoisen tulkinnan periaate: Pyri tulkitsemaan toisia niinkuin he olisivat eettisesti, älyllisesti ja tiedollisesti erinomaisia.

Toivottavasti jatkan tätä luetteloa vielä myöhemmin.

Modernism and Religion

2011-04-01T14:19:00.002+03:00

I have finally finished reading Moojan Momen's book The Phenomenon of Religion. A Thematic Approach (Oneworld Publications, 1999), a good popular introduction to comparative religion. I have posted several times in this blog about various chapters in that book before, and now is the time for the last one.

Momen writes about the insights of Wilfred Cantwell Smith on the study of religion:

What we now call the religions of the world were [...] not always seen thus. [...] In the pre-modern world, religion was not a separate part of life that could be analysed as an entity. Rather, it was intergral to living; it was the way that people saw the world. Since what we now call the religious view of the world was the way that people saw the world, it was, in a sense, invisible, part of the basic assumptions that people made about life and the world about them. These assumptions were so basic that they were not a subject for discussion, they were accepted as 'given', forming an inherent and seamless part of people's reality. What the modern world has done is to separate this part of human life and call it religion.

[...] The use of the word 'religion' itself, in its sense of differentiating the different religions of the world, is a new usage. In earlier times its meaning was closer to the present use of the word 'piety'.
(P. 475.)

The 'religiosi' were monks or hermits in the past, but everyone (except perhaps some very rare individuals) seems to have lived within the conceptual world of religion simply because there was no alternative. People usually just accept their traditions as the way things have always been done, even if those traditions are really just a generation or two old. They go by their daily lives without bothering to think too much. They perform the usual rituals, because that's just what they've been accustomed to doing.

Each religion is now seen as one of a number of competing religions, and even these must struggle for people's loyalty with a large number of modern ideologies and worldviews.

[...] Religion has lost its claim to be the exclusive viewpoint from which people see the world.
(P. 476.)

Knowledge of the scientific worldview, and the awareness of the sheer plurality of religions and different worldviews (no longer just in some distant countries, but even in one's own) makes it impossible for people pretty much anywhere to simply implicitly assume that their traditional religious worldview is true. They force people to recognize the fact that others don't believe what they believe. Especially in the West, knowledge of historical religions, such as the polytheisms of Antiquity, forces people to acknowledge that as the ancient religions are discarded as false, so can theirs. Science is pushing all gods out or its worldview, and at least educated people accept the superiority of science as a truth seeking method. One can only hope people will also learn to think scientifically (critically), and eventually to discard the last vestiges of religion. This, of course, is what intellectuals have for a long time thought would occur very soon.

Towards the middle of the twentieth century, the outlook seemed bleak for religion. Many scientists and sociologists were prepared to foretell its demise, either over a few generations or over the next few centuries. (P. 484.)

The response to the advancement of "Western" Christian and then secularized culture has been a problem for other cultures it has come to contact with:

The arrival of the Western powers in most parts of the world during the nineteenth century brought with it severe problems for the religions of those places. The technological and political superiority of the West appeared to lay down an unanswerable challenge to the established religions of other parts of the world. (P. 490.)

For the present, the clash of the "two cultures", that of the "West" with that of the Islamic culture, is of present concern:

For the Middle-Eastern Muslim in the nineteenth century, this dilemma could be expressed thus: if the religion of Islam is the true religion of God, why has God allowed the Muslim nations to fall so far behind the Western, Christian nations? One partial solution to the dilemma appears to be a wholesale adoption of modernity so as to close the gap. It is, in particular, modern technology that is imported -- this being something that does not inherently challenge the religious worldview. But along with modern technology comes modern education, to enable people to use the technology. Thus, gradually, there arrive otehr modern concepts such as democracy and individual rights. These are much more challenging to traditional society, its structures and, ultimately, its religious foundations. (P. 490.)

The teaching of the scientific way of thinking itself is inherently dangerous to the traditional worldview because in its progressivism it is so contrary to the religious, conservative way of thinking. It teaches the student to not be dogmatic, to not accept anything without proper justification. This is detrimental to religious faith more than anything else. It is no wonder that the religious (especially the fundamentalists) want to take use of all the fruits of science and technology, without accepting source of those innovations, the science itself. They try to retain their superstitious worldviews by refusing to accept the scientific worldview, but how long can they resist? Perhaps their verbal and sometimes physical violence is actually caused by their desperation in the face of certain extinction?

But there is also the recent resurgence (or death growl?) of fundamentalism, even in the West. The US is the leading country in Western religiosity. In fact, it is a strange exception to the general development of secularization. Americans are surprisingly religious, while Europeans and other "Westerners" tend to be almost non-religious, and certainly becoming less religious. As explained in a great article in Free Inquiry (or was it Skeptical Inquirer?) some years ago, this is probably due to such social differences as the lack of real social security in the US, combined with a highly competitive and individualistic culture. These leave the individual rather helpless and at the mercy of fate, compared to the situation in European welfarestates, for example. When nothing else can be done, the resorting to religious wishful thinking is understandable.

The trend could be changed by the failure of the welfarestate systems under the pressure of global economic powers, climate change, and other events and things uncontrollable by the people in European and other countries. It could spell disaster for us. Religion could rise to power again, at the worst possible time, resulting in the destruction of all the good things we have achieved, such as (more or less) secular states that (more or less) uphold humanrights, provide high quality education for the masses, and support the progress of science. It is possible that mankind, and science with it, will perish in the near future. To avoid this, we must actively seek ways to educate each other, and to find rational solutions to our problems.

Religion has a strong hold of American politics not only because of the lack of social security, but also because the powerful use of the media by religious individuals and organizations:

In 1960,the Federal Communications Commission, the government organ that controls broadcasting in the United States, issued a ruling that meant that local radio and television station owners could charge for religious broadcasting and still have it count towards their public interest broadcasting commitments. The mainstream churches, who had until then dominated the media, refused to purchase broadcasting time. The evangelical movements enthusiastically picked up the vacant slots. From that time onwards, it has been evangelists who have dominated religious broadcasting in the United States.

[...] By the 1980s, the televangelists were building churches and universities and funding such projects as theme parks with the money being raised by their broadcasts. In addition, several televangelists began to move into the political arena. Pat Robertson's Christian Coalition and Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority supported both of Ronald Reagan's presidential campaigns and were credited with delivering a large block of votes to him.
(P. 521.)

And as anyone reading this (if anyone is actually reading this), things have only gotten worse since the 1980s in the US.

Fundamentalism and Liberalism

2011-03-25T14:27:00.004+02:00

I am still reading Moojan Momen's book The Phenomenon of Religion. A Thematic Approach (Oneworld Publications, 1999), and blogging about what I find interesting in the book. Before starting to read this book, I wrote about what I read in another book about Fundamentalism and Modernism in Islam. The title of this text is taken from chapter 14 in Momen's book. It should be obvious that I am very much interested in this subject, and so will quote much of that chapter here. Momen begins by explaining the importance of the topic:

One aspect of religion that has come to general attention in recent years has been the upsurge of fundamentalism. The split between fundamentalists and liberals appears to affect almost every religious community to one extent or another, in many different countries. Almost every religious movement, other than the most narrow sects, contains individuals who tend towards either extreme. (P. 363.)

It is often thought that the term 'fundamentalism' cannot be applied to religions other than Christianity. This is due to the history of the term, as Momen notes before defining the term for wider usage:

Historically, many authorities date fundamentalism from the publication in North America of a series of pamphlets, The Fundamentals, between 1910 and 1915. Although to trace the name to this event would be correct, to date fundamentalism from it would be a very limited view of a phenomenon that has a long history in religion. Also limited is the opinion that fundamentalism is a reaction to modernity. This view would restrict the occurence of fundamentalism to modern times (although it must be admitted that modernity has brought fundamentalism very much to the fore). Nor, indeed, should fundamentalism be limited to Christianity or even the Western religions. (P. 363.)

The point is that the phenomenon referred to as fundamentalism is much wider than one religion (or even religions in general), so it makes sense to define the term in a way that allows the student of religions to use it in a wider scope. Momen goes on to analyze the characteristics of both fundamentalism and liberalism, in order to show what kind of phenomenon (or phenomena) we are trying to understand. First, he looks at the attitude toward "holy" scriptures:

The fundamentalist looks to the holy scriptures of the religion as absolute and unchanging truth. [...] Even in religions that have no concept of a scripture revealed by God, Theravada Buddhism for example, a similar attitude towards scripture can exist.

As a secondary principle, fundamentalists also favour a literal interpretation of scripture. [...] [T]he fundamentalist always regards the scripture as referring to real situations and facts. What the scripture says corresponds to empirical reality. For example, even if heaven and hell are acknowledged not to be physical places above and below the earth, these two words nevertheless do refer to existent realities. Barr points out that the importance of preserving the first principle, the inerrancy of the text, will often compel the fundamentalist to relax the second principle and allow some degree of non-literal interpretation. (P. 364.)

Christian Fundamentalists claim to read their scriptures literally and without interpretation (which is really impossible, because even a literal interpretation is an interpretation). In fact, though, they do not. They actually have a set of beliefs that guides their interpretation. But this is rather well known, and besides the point. Perhaps I will write about that some other time. Momen continues to point out one of the biggest problems of fundamentalism, and then compares the fundamentalist view to the liberal:

Another characteristic fundamentalist attitude is that the whole of the scripture stands or falls together. This view maintains that since the scripture is the Word of God and therefore infallible, the inerrancy of every single sentence of the scripture must be maintained, otherwise the slightest error in any smallest part casts doubt on the whole.

By contrast, the liberal is willing to allow that the texts of the scriptures are open to more than one interpretation; parts of the scripture are more 'true' -- in the sense of being more likely to have actually occured physically -- than other parts. As well as truth relating to empirical reality, the liberal is prepared to see other types of truth -- typological, metaphorical or mythological -- in the scripture. Allegorical and symbolic interpretations may be used, particularly of passages that appear to contradict human reason, and social and contextual factors taken into account. [...] As a relative, rather than an absolute, truth, therefore, the meaning of the scripture is not considered fixed but must be reinterpreted in every age, for the concerns of that age.

The liberal is much more willing to view the holy scripture as a historical document, written down by fallible men and women sometimes many years after the events portrayed. [...] In contrast, the fundamentalist, if he or she does accept the historical nature of the scriptures, will insist that they were divinely protected from alteration or error. Certainly, no external factors such as the social conditions pertaining at the time that the scripture was written down, are considered relevant to the understanding of the texts. It is, therefore, a characteristic feature of fundamentalists that they consider that they can derive the meaning of the scriptures directly, just by reading them. No contextual, philological, or historical information beyond what is evident in the text is needed. The plain meaning of the texts is their intended meaning. In contrast, the liberal considers that the scriptures have to be read contextually, taking into consideration historical and philological information [...].
(Pp. 365 - 367.)

The attitude of the fundamentalist is clearly opposed to modern academic (historical, critical) exegetics, as is well known in that field of study. The liberals are much better equipped to accept the findings of exegetics.

Aother source of authority in religions is tradition. Momen justifiably defines two different types of fundamentalism based on their view of tradition, as follows:

When one consideres the traditions of a religion, we find that there are different types of fundamentalists, whom we may define in two major groupings.

Some fundamentalists are conservative and traditionalist. These regard tradition as an element in the religion that is as authoritative as the scriptures themselves. [...] In Islam, the concept of the Sunna (the deeds and words of Muhammad as the perfect example for ll Muslims to follow) and the doctrine of ijma' (that whatever the Muslim world holds as a consensus must be correct) act as a powerful force for maintaining traditional attitudes and positions. If any of the religion's structures or doctrines are in conflict with society, then it is society that must change to conform with what is perceived to be the Divine. [...]

The second group of fundamentalists is of teh evangelical, radical, revivalist type. These regard the traditions of the religion as the main obstacle to a return to the 'pure' original religion. [...]

Radical and traditionalist fundamentalists only differ in how they define the boundary of what they consider to be unalterable and inerrant. The radicals place the boundary aroud the scripture itself, while the traditionalists extend it to the traditions of the religion. [...] In the Christian world, Roman Catholicism holds that the traditions of the Church are of equal authority to the scripture. (This has been the official Catholic position since the Council of Trent, 1563.) The fundamentalists among the Catholics tend to be traditionalists. [...] Radical fundamentalists in the Christian world are to be found among the Protestant sects -- Protestantism being a movement that arose as a reaction to the traditionalism of Catholicism. In the Muslim world, most fundamentalists are traditionalists, since Islam is a religion in which tradition plays an important part. There are, however, a few modern radical groups -- for example the followers of Rashad Khalifa and of 'Ali Shari'ati.
(Pp. 367 - 369, emphasis added.)

Some people think that fundamentalists actually have more in common with freethinkers (non-religious atheists) than with liberals, and there may be some truth to that. The reason is emphatically not that freethinkers are equally dogmatic, as often claimed by propagandists, but the demand for clarity on the issues of religion. Liberals can have very vague ideas about religion, that defy rational criticism by simply avoiding it. This does not seem intellectually honest or sensible to either the atheist, or the fundamentalist. The freethinker wants to know what the claims of the religious person actually are, and the fundamentalist wants to know exactly what her religion teaches, so she can (dogmatically) believe it. It also seems to both of these that the liberal believers can have any number of different ideas of what their religion is all about, which makes them all seem rather baseless:

A more basic criticism levelled by fundamentalists at liberals concerns the arbitrary nature of their view of the scriptures; some parts of the scripture liberals regard as the religious core and therefore to be preserved; other parts are culturally determined and therefore can be dispensed with or interpreted liberally. What determines which parts are treated in which of these two ways? To a fundamentalist, the dividing line appears not to be defined by any discernible logical rules, but rather by whatever happens to be the current social fashion. [...] Are fashion and current secular sensibilities to be the arbiters of the standpoint of faith? If so, will the inevitable result not be eventually to jettison everything? In this sense, we can say that fundamentalism is much more of a reaction against modern, relativizing, liberal trends in religion than a reaction against modernity itself. (P. 370.)

Momen notes that in modern times there has been a linking of "xenophobic fundamentalism to a strident nationalism in many parts of the world" such as the United States (p. 371). I think that there is a similar attitude in Islamism (various forms of political Islam), but it is connected to the presently non-existent, ideal, unified Islamic nation, rather than any of the present nations.

There is marked difference in the attitudes of fundamentalists and liberals towards people of other faiths (or of none), as Momen points out:

The fundamentalist's conviction of possessing the truth leads to a strong tendency to correct the errors of unbelievers. Thus the interreligious activities of the fundamentalist are typically evangelism and missionary work. The interreligious activities of the liberal, on the other hand, tend towards ecumenism and interfaith dialigue. Fundamentalists have no time for such activities. Since their own religion already possesses the absolute truth, there is no point in looking elsewhere for it. (P. 372.)

It is very interesting how these different types of religious beliefs have influenced the political views of their adherents:

In the past, there does not appear to ahve been any characteristic political stance from either fundamentalists or liberals. If anything, both parties often tended to political quietism. [...]

Recently, much of this has changed greatly. Both sides have taken on characteristic political attitudes and fundamentalists have left their social isolation and entered social and political life in every part of the world. In recent times, fundamentalists have tended to be found at the right of the political spectrum, encouraging individual self-reliance and stressing public morality and order. Some fundamentalist groups have even reversed their previous tendency towards asceticism; they now adopt a positive, encouraging attitude towards the accumulation of wealth. These groups have become actively involved in politics. They advocate capitalism and a laissez-faire social philosophy, while raising communism to an almost mythological level of evil. The best-known example of this is the Moral Majority movement in the United States which contributed to Ronal Reagan's electoral success.

An important social and political feature of fundamentalism is the tendency to promote a traditional role for women in society within the sphere of home and children, rather than working outside the home and taking a political role. [...]

Liberals, on the other hand, tend to the political left in modern times, due to their concern with social issues. [...] Liberals have also changed their previous tendency and now incline towards asceticism. They have a negative attitude towards the accumulation of wealth and are supportive of the emancipation of women.

Fundamentalists regard existing political structures with suspicion as the products of human thinking and efforts rather than divine revelation. The extreme wing of fundamentalism would overthrow them in favour of a political structure based on the holy scripture. [...]

The fundamentalists' rejection of all doctrinal positions outside their own leads to highly demarcated, tightly knit, highly committed, socially isolated communities. Liberals, on the other hand, consider the beliefs of the rest of the world sympathetically and are much more integrated into society. The great diversity of beliefs among them, however, hinders the formation of coherent groups. It also reduces the likelihood of a high degree of commitment.
(Pp. 372 - 375.)

It is obvious why fundamentalism is a political danger all over the world. They oppose the idea of a secular state (i.e. the separation of church/temple/mosque and state), and would rather see it replaced by a theocracy. That would mean turning the proverbial clock back to middle ages, which is something humanity simply cannot afford to do. They are such a powerful force because of this commitment and hierarchical organization (not to mention being very well funded). That is why the best hope for the rest of us is to form secular, political opposition to them, and to battle their attempts to bring religion into politics every step of the way (unfortunately, in the United States things are so bad that it's actually a battle to remove religion from politics). Because of the fuzziness of the religious beliefs of the liberals, there is usually much less "friction" between freethinkers and liberals than there is between freethinkers and fundamentalists. This should make alliances in politics between liberals and freethinkers not only the prudent thing to do.

Momen returns to the issue of defining fundamentalism:

For the fundamentalist, the secular world must adapt to and come under the control of the religious world. The liberal considers that it is the job of the religious world to adapt to and become relevant in the secular world. [...]

[A]lmost all Muslims believe in the inerrancy of their scripture, the Qur'an, but this does not make them all fundamentalists. To differentiate between fundamentalists and liberals in the Hindu, Buddhist and Muslim worlds, one must examine such factors as social relations and the attitude towards modernity and religious diversity. [...] Thus the arguments presented in this chapter point to a position in which fundamentalism and liberalism are not defined in any absolute terms. Rather, the definition is multi-factorial and relative to the particular religions and historical situation of the individual. In other words, fundamentalism and liberalism must be identified through a pattern that changes from one religion to another [...].
(Pp. 375 - 376.)

Momen rejects attempts to base the liberal--fundamentalist dichotomy on social or intellectual categories or factors, and seems to believe instead that it is likely that the differences between these groups are caused rather by different psychological types (pp. 276 - 378):

In psychological terms we may characterize fundamentalism and liberalism as two different ways of thinking, two cognitive styles. Cognitive style refers to the individual's characteristic and consistent manner of organizing and categorizing perceptions and concepts. [...]

The fundamentalist mentality is characteristically one that sees things in terms of black and white. [...] The liberal is more inclined to allow for 'grey areas', intermediate situations. [...] In this way, we are gradually soming to the point at which it is possible to see that the fundamentalist--liberal split is not something that affects religion alone; rather, it is one facet of a much larger phenomenon in the psycho-social life of humanity.

One of the underlying differences between fundamentalists and liberals is that the former are driven by a desre for certainty. [...] For the fundamentalist, certainty is only to be found in objectivity. The indecisive world of the liberal who is willing to see some truth in all opinions; the uncertain fields of historical and literary criticism, where different opinions abound: these are all tainted by personal opinion, and therefore by subjectivity. This is deeply unsatisfactory to the fundamentalist psyche. The only way of achieving objective truth is to take a standard that lies outside human subjectivity. [...]

The fundamentalist favours absolutes, while the liberal favours relativistic styles of thinking. [...]

It should be noted that cognitive style is not the same thing as personality. Cognitive style is a much more flexible function that can change relatively easily in a person. Although we can define fundamentalism in terms of a particular cognitive style, there is a problem as to which phenomenon causes which.
(Pp. 378 - 380.)

This hypothesis certainly seems plausible. It also points to a possible way of changing the world for the better: children should be taught more open-minded cognitive styles, and possible the same could be done to adult fundamentalists as well. This roundabout approach to the problem might prove more effective than attempts to reason with fundamentalists -- anyone who has tried that knows how pointless it is.

Momen states that "it has been the phenomenon of secularization and religious pluralism in the modern world that has brought the liberl--fundamentalist split to the fore of religious life" (p. 381). This seems obvious enough. Momen gives an abstract, "historical" perspective to the cause of the spli:

At some stage in the development of the religio, its history, doctrines and social laws are written down, thus creating the sacred text of the religion. [...] This process of writing down what then becomes regarded as sacred and unalterable is the historical crux of the fundamentalism--liberalism dichotomy. Two problems arise from this process.

The first and less important problem relates to the question of authenticity. [...]

[I]f particular religious reachings become a source of difficulty as social conditions change, the question of the authenticity of the sources may be reaised by liberals wishing to adapt the teachings to social change.

Much more important for our present concern is that the writing down of the teachings, laws and history of a religion in effect freezes them into a particular setting. Thse texts are written within the worldview -- cosmology, mythology, social concerns and intellectual debates -- of a particular time. This does not mean that the sacred scriptures are necessarily frozen in the worldview of the time of the founder of the religion. Rather, it is the worldview of the time when the scripture is written down that is important, as this is what is fronzen into the texts. [...]

This increasing divergence between the worldview of the texts and the contemporary worldview results in the fundamentalists--liberal dichotomy. The fundamentalist regards the texts as unalterable and divine and so struggles to make the contemporary worldview fit in with the worldview embodied in the texts. The liberal, on the other hand, is striving in the opposite direction, trying to make the texts fit in with the contemporary worldview. [...] We can note, in passing, that those religions in which the tradition has remained largely oral up to the present time, the primal religions, have suffered very little from this fundamentalist--liberal split. Such religions are adapting to new circumstances all the time but this change is gradual and without a written record of the past for comparison, occasions no adverse comment.
(Pp. 382 - 384.)

It remains an endless source of amazement, how some people can actually believe written word so gullibly as to believe that it is somehow of divine origin, merely because it is written, because the text itself claims to be of divine origin, or because they have been told it is of divine origin.

The Origins of the Hadith

2011-03-23T18:18:00.006+02:00

I'm still reading Moojan Momen's book The Phenomenon of Religion. A Thematic Approach (Oneworld Publications, 1999), and blogging about what I find interesting in the book. Some time ago I was reading about Islam. Now I want to extract a longish excerpt from Momen's book on the same topic, specifically the Hadith, or Traditions about the alleged sayings and doings of Muhammad the alleged prophet:

Of course, Muslims themselves have always recognized problems regarding the authenticity of the Hadith literature. Acknowledging that many Traditions relating to Muhammad were forged in the early period, they developed a whole branch of Islamic science that sought to distinguish between the true and the forged Traditions. They examined the line of transmitters of each Tradition and tried to ascertain the reliability of each person in the chain. They also examined the line as a whole and determined whether the individuals in the chain of transmission could have been in contact with each other.

Modern Western scholarship, however, examining critically the earliest surviving documents, has cast a much more fundamental doubt over the Hadith literature. The first to raise questions about the traditional version of the rise of the Hadith literature was Ignaz Goldziher. He showed that up to three centuries after Muhammad, many individuals, political parties and sectarian movments within Islam were manufacturing Traditions that supported their claims and positions. These Traditions, claiming to be on the authority of Muhammad, gave each faction legitimacy and authenticity.

Joseph Schacht took this line of research further. He showed that the schools of Islamic law that arose were in fact the result of differing sets of customary law in such towns as Medina and Kufa. These centres established what had been the customary tribal law from pre-Islamic times in their area by incorporating it into the Holy Law. It was only at a later date, when it became the norm to trace all law back to the Prophet Muhammad, that there evolved numerous Traditions relating these practices back to him. In this way the customary law of each of these places became enshrined in the Holy Law, the Shari'a of Islam.

We should not see this process of the retrospective attribution of customary practice back to Muhammad as the activity of malicious forgers. Rather, these were the actions of sincere and pious men who regarded their views as the correct Islamic standards. From this it was only a short step to being certain that the Prophet would have acted in the same way if faced with the same situation; and then another short step to saying that the Prophet did act thus; and then yet another short step to creating a Hadith that confirmed that he did act thus.
(Pp. 325 - 326.)

Momen goes on to talk about Wilfred Cantweel Smith's hypothesis about the the origins of the term Shari'a, but since it is apparently not as well established as the above, I won't quote that part.

Trance and Religious Experience

2011-03-21T18:47:00.002+02:00

I'm still reading Moojan Momen's book The Phenomenon of Religion. A Thematic Approach (Oneworld Publications, 1999), and blogging about what I find interesting in the book. Momen describes common features of the experience of trance or mystical ecstacy:

Those who enter states of trance or ecstacy report the experience of a monist state (i.e. when the 'me' and 'not-me' division in the world breaks down and they experience an intense sense of unity with Reality). Trance or deep meditation produces a state that appears to correspond in many respects to the 'infantile state' (Piaget), the 'state of hyper- or hypo-arousal' (Fischer), or 'deautomatization' (Deikman). These states result, as described above, in a breakdown of subject--object differentiation. The self and the world around become merged. A monistic state is experienced.
They report the phenomenon of the differing passage of time. Those who have an intense religious experience often claim that time stood still or passed very slowly during this. This, again, was found by Fischer to be a phenomenon associated with altered states of consciousness, hyper- or hypo-arousal.
They report that their intense religious experience is ineffable (its reality cannot be communicated by words). It can only be understood by another who has also experienced the state. This phenomenon can [...] be explained on the basis of state-bound knowledge and meaning. The experiences of a person at extremes of hyper- and hypo-arousal only have meaning in those states. The experiences cannot easily be communicated once the person has returned to the level of everyday life.
They report unusual perceptions: perceptions of infinite energy, dazzling light and so on. In states of altered consciousness, controlled analytical thought is absent. The subject's attitude is one of receptivity to stimuli. There is heightened attention to sensory pathways. All sensations are therefore experienced more vividly. It may also be that psychic phenomena (such as tension, conflict or repression) will be perceived by being translated via the relatively unstructured sensations of light, colour or movement.
They report a feeling of reality associated with the mystical experience. Those who have had intense religious experiences often assert that they do not need external evidence for their reality, because of the intense 'feeling if reality' experienced during the state. In fact, however, this intense 'feeling of reality' has no connection with an objective judgment of reality. It may, for example, be experienced in dreams. On the other hand, objective reality may on occasion be deprived of the 'feeling of reality'. This occurs, for example, in the brief feelings of depersonalization (where on feels as though one's self is unreal) or derealization (where on feels as though the world around is unreal) that most of us experience from time to time (often associated with déjà vu and other similar phenomena). During the early childhood stages of individual development, the 'feeling of reality' becomes fused with the objects of the outside world. In states of altered consciousness, however, the process of deautomatization breaks this link. The 'feeling of reality' can then become linked to the feelings and ideas that enter awareness during this state. The stimuli and images of the inner world become thus endowed with the 'feeling of reality'.

An additional reason for this 'feeling of reality' results from the process of deautomatization. Due to this, stimuli are no longer systematized and selected before being presented to conscious thought. Therefore all stimuli present themselves equally strongly to the consciusness, which is only able to focus on one unselectively. That one stimulus therefore has none of its features attenuated by subcortical processing. It also has the 'feeling of reality' attached to it and so it appears with a vividness unlike anything that is experienced in ordinary life.
Lastly, it should not surprise us if the mystic describes his or her world as being outside the bounds of reason or not attainable by intellect and analysis. This is to be expected because, as we have noted, in moving away from the level of everyday experience, we are moving away from the realm in which Aristotelian logic and intellectual analysis function.
(Pp. 177 - 178.)

That's an interesting checklist for anyone who has ever had a strange (religious) experience.

Momen notes the "chicken and egg quandary" with regard to the religious experience and the truth-claims of the religion:

Do Eastern religions meditate because it helps them to perceive reality as they consider it really is; that is, in monistic mode? Or do they see reality in monistic mode because they meditate? Similarly, do Western religions emphasize such acts as prayer and ritual worship because they help the believer to see the reality of the theistic mode? Or do they tend to see reality in a theistic way because of the activities of prayer and ritual worship? (P. 180.)

I don't really see that as being a quandary myself, but Momen is being very accomodating to the religious (being one himself), as can be expected from one doing comparative religion (a certain amount of relativism is probably almost a requirement there).

Fischer's work on state-bound knowledge, for example, shows that the aroused state of mind produced by religious experience is also produced by several other mechanisms (including the use of drugs), all of which produce certain common features (time passing differently, state-bound knowledge, and so on). It is therefore reasonable to assume that these features are due to the common result of the differing mechanisms (the aroused state of the mind) rather than the mechanism of arousal itself (mysticism, drugs and so on). In other words, if trance-like states produce several common features no matter whether they are induced by religious mysticism or drugs, then one can assume that these features are a general property of the neurophysiological state induced in the brain, rather than the specific property of the religious experience or drugs themselves. This observation casts no aspersions on the veracity of the religious experience. It merely indicates that these phenomena probably cannot be used as proof of the truth of religious experiences. (P. 180.)

I cannot agree with Momen's politically correct view here: it is obvious that these findings make the claims of religions about the Ultimate Reality even less plausible than they would otherwise be. If one can induce a religious experience with the use drugs, then the experience, reagardless of how it is achieved, is clearly proof only of the fact that people can have hallucinations or other experiences when something strange happens in their brains. No big surprise there. And no gods or ultimate reality are likely to be involved.

The Religious Life

2011-03-21T16:06:00.003+02:00

Here's an interesting bit from Moojan Momen's book The Phenomenon of Religion. A Thematic Approach (Oneworld Publications, 1999), about the different ways of being religious:

There are different ways for the individual to be religious, different modes of the religious life. [...] One categorization that is very influentional distinguishes between extrinsic and intrinsic ways of being religious. Persons with an extrinsic religion tend to use their religion for their own ends. Religion is thus instrumental and utilitarian. Thus, for example, such persons may use religion to provide security, solace, or self-advancement. Persons with an intrinsic religion, by contrast, have their religion as an end in itself. They attempt to internalize the beliefs and prescriptions of their religion. [...]

To this, a third mode of religious life has been added by some psychologists, the quest mode. This is characterized by persons who are open-ended and questioning in their approaches to religion. They resist clear-cut tidy answers to the existential questions trouble human beings. [...]

Various studies have been done assessing these three ways of being religious against both individual factors, such as mental health, and social factors, such as freedom from prejudice. The results of this research are complex and some of them are contrary to what one might expect. Extrinsic religion performed poorly in all areas. Individuals with extrinsic religion have poorer results on mental health, are more prejudiced, and are less likely to help others. Taking the mental health of the individual as one's criterion, intrinsic religion scores best of the three types in the various factors that have been eliminated. If one examines what most religious consider to be good relationships with others, however, one finds that individuals with intrinsic religion perform well only in circumstances where they are promoting a positive self-image. When measured by more subtle, covert techniques, they are also prejudiced, they only help others when there is minimal inconvenience to themselves and their help in such circumstances is likely to be only poorly related to the needs of the other person. In other words, it was found that their actions were motivated more by a desire to present themselves as good, caring people than by a concern for others. Individuals with the quest type of religion were found to be less prejudiced than others, even when this was measured covertly. They were not particularly more motivated to be helpful than the other groups but when they did help, their assitance was more closely related to the needs of the person bein helped.
(P. 163 - 165.)

It would be interesting to know how well non-religious people, and especially Secular Humanists, would do in an experiment of this kind. My guess is that non-thinking, non-religious people (such people do exist) would be no better than people on average. But one would expect thinking individuals, such as most who identify themselves as Secular Humanists, would do at least as well as those of quest type of religious people. Of course, thinking people are on a quest, so perhaps they were included in the experiment. I will have to look for more information about this.

Religious Conversion

2011-03-19T12:33:00.004+02:00

I'm still reading Moojan Momen's book The Phenomenon of Religion. A Thematic Approach (Oneworld Publications, 1999), and blogging about what I find interesting in the book. This time the issue is conversion. Here's how Momen describes the basic requirements for religious conversion to occur:

When a religious conversion occurs, whether this be in an individual conversion, the mass conversion of society or a religious reform, many of the same features arise. The first necessity is for a sense of dissatisfaction with the old religion. There must be important, 'toublesome' questions that the old religion is either unable to resolve or over which it cannot agree. [...]

An alternative religious viewpoint must be available which addresses these issues (or at least some of them) coherently and in an illuminating manner. [...] One important point of note is that there must be some degree of overlap between the old religious worldview and the new one. [...] A modern European is extremely unlikely to understand, let alone adopt, the religious worldview of a Papual head-hunter, but there is a considerable overlap between the Christian-based European worldview and those of communism, Islam or the Baha'i Faith.

Those who represent the old worldview, in particular the priests or the religous professionals of the established religion, will put up resistance to the new viewpoint. Among other measures, they will adapt the old worldview so as to make it more compatible with the new questions that have arisen [...].

Those who adopt the new religious worldview are, in effect, making a leap of faith. The change from one worldview to another cannot be solely justified on rational grounds, for each worldview is wholly consistent and coherent within itself.
(Pp. 152 - 153.)

This seems reasonable, for the most part. I'm especially glad that communism was counted as a religion here, for it certainly seems to be a religion to some (as are movements like veganism, the Zeitgeist Movement, and the ideology of the free market system).

There are only two squabbles I have with the above. First is that it doesn't necessarily apply to what is often called "deconversion", i.e. the discarding of religion without turning to a new one. But then I suppose this is just about the conversion from one religion to another, and "deconversion" can be dealt with elsewhere.

The second issue is somewhat more serious. It's the claim that all worldviews are internally consistent and coherent. I seriously doubt that is the case. The whole idea that conversion could never be rational, is highly suspicious. Here it may be that the writer's own religion (which is somewhat relativistic, AFAIK) may be influencing how work a little too much. Certainly it cannot be just assumed that all worldviews are consistent and coherent -- they must each be examined on a case by case basis.

Momen then analyzes the causes and requirements of conversion in more detail as follows:

MARGINALITY. Individuals who are at the margins of society (in terms of being connected to the sources of power or being involved in the culture) are more likely to convert to a new religion that is presented to them.

SOCIAL OR CULTURAL CRISIS. Individuals from cultures and societies that are in crisis are more likely to convert than those from stable cultures and societies. [...] A high degree of cultural and conceptual dissonance will inhibit conversion.

INDIVIDUAL CRISIS. Just as social and cultural crises serve to highlight the breakdown of the old order and lead to a search for a new basis for society, so an individual crisis may destroy the old framework of a person's life and open up the possibility of a new worldview. Apart from the usual personal crises in health, finances or family that individuals may experience, mystical experiences, intellectual doubts, leadership crises in their present religion, or dissatisfaction with life can all lead to individual crises that leave a person open to conversion. [...] Of course, both with individual crises and social and cultural crises, the new religion must offer some new vision or a means of interpreting the current situation that offers a better resolution of its problems than the existing religion.

INDIVIDUAL BACKGROUND. Research has shown that those who do convert to a new religion have a much greater likelihood of having had a long history of emotional problems in childhood, adolescence and in the period immediately before conversion (often resulting in problems in making relationships), when compared to those who remain within a religion.

KINSHIP AND FRIENDSHIP NETWORKS. Religious conversion is much more likely to occur within networks of families and friends. The conversion of a friend or relative whom one knows to be trustworthy opens on up to the possibility of converting oneself, especially if one observes a change for the better in that individual. [...] A close personal relationship helps the potential convert to feel accepted; it increases self-esteem and enables the potential convert to overcome conflicts and uncertainties that may block the path to conversion. Of course, those who have experienced emotional and social deprivation in their earlier years will be more attracted to the new religion by the formation of a close personal relationship with a member of the religion. It should be noted that just as frequently, kinship and friendship networks may be a constraint upon conversion. If the family and friends of a potential convert are strongly against the potential conversion, this may be a decisive factor in his or her withdrawal from the process.

CHARISMATIC ATTRACTION. Many converts report that what initially attracted them to a religious movement was the charisma of the leader of the group. The perceived power, energy, and authoritative exposition of the leader can be an important catalyst that opens a person up to the possibility of change.

ENCAPSULATION. I noted above that human beings are constrained in their choices by their background, their culture, family, friends, social roles and so on. [...]

Encapsulation may be of different kinds and degrees. [1.] Physical encapsulation may be achieved by removing a person from all contact with his or her normal daily life. This would usually be achieved by going to a remote location or a physically surrounded building such as a retreat. [2.] Social encapsulation means restricting the access of the potential converts to all normal social interactions. This may be achieved in some groups by filling up all free time with group activities. Christian missionaries usually insist on indigenous converts changing their names to Christian names and frequently even changing their style of dress, thus making the conversion public and, often, isolating the convert socially. [3.] Ideological encapsulation means the creation of a state of mind that resists consideration of alternative religious options. This may be achieved by teaching that the group's doctrines are the only pure and redeeming path and that the outside world is irredeemably evil and corrupt.
(Pp. 154 - 156.)

The above are mostly understandable and only somewhat problematic (for example the idea of following a charismatic leader makes me nauseous), but clearly the last one, encapsulation, is something questionable. It is obviously a technique use by various evil cultists to brainwash people into joining their cult or to remain in it. In other cases it might be used in a less obvious manner, for example as more subtle uses of the ideological encapsulation, but even then it is at least intellectually dishonest. So, encapsulation certainly looks like a harmful feature of religion that just has to go. I will never consider as acceptable a religion that utilizes it.

People often like to depict things like conversion rituals as something wholly good, but they should realize that they exist for reasons that might not be completely nice, when you think about them. This is what Momen writes about them:

The process of conversion is often sealed by a ritual, such as the Christian baptism or confirmation. This serves to give public testimony of the event that has occurred in the convert's life; it sets the boundary between the new and the old and it serves to burn the convert's bridges, thus making it less likely that the convert will return to his or her previous allegiance. [...]

[H]owever enthusiastic the convert may be, a considerable proportion of converts do leave the religion again.
(P. 156.)

Such rituals as baptism are actually used (besides whatever other meaning they might have, also) to bind the convert more strongly to the new religion (and the religious organization, and the religious group). This can be a form of encapsulation. In any case, it is nice to know that people who do convert, are likely to convert again, so perhaps they tend to be thinking individuals, seeking something real?

Although it is convetional to think of a conversion as being a complete rejection of the past and a turning to a new way of life, in fact there is rarely such a complete change. [...] Inevitably, each convert brings into the new religion something of his or her previous religion.
(P. 158.)

This is one reason for the evolution of religions. They don't remain unaltered, especially their everyday practise, which is most likley to change slightly with new converts bringing their own previous customs, values and opinions within the sphere of the new religion.

Moving on, Momen analyzes the experience of conversion as follows:

The experience of religious conversion is reported differently by different individuals. This experience is partly moulded by the expectations of what conversion will be like [...]. John Lofland and Normal Skonovd have described six patterns or motifs of religious conversion.

INTELLECTUAL. This involves an intesive study of a religion, using books, lectures, television, the Internet and other media that involve little interpersonal contact. Social pressure is usually avoided and belief precedes participation in the community.
MYSTICAL. The prototype of this is the 'Road to Damascus' experience. It occurs suddenly and dramatically and may be associated with dreams or visions.
EXPERIMENTAL. This involves an active exploration of different religious options with the potential convert assessing whether a religion 'works' and what benefit it brings. This motif is gradually worked through over a long period of time and participation in the community precedes belief.
AFFECTUAL. This involves the creation of a direct, personal bond with members of the religious group over a period of time, thus giving the potential convert the experience of being loved and nurtured.
REVIVALIST. This is the type of conversion that occurs in a revivalist meeting. It uses crowd conformity and a high degree of emotional arousal to achieve the conversion.
COERCIVE. This is the type of conversion that involves brainwashing, coercive persuasion and thought programming. Although many new religious movements are accused of using this method, it is, in fact, probably rare and is often reversed if the coercive pressures are removed.
(P. 158 - 159.)

Of these different experiences of conversion, I really accept only the first, intellectual conversion. I understand this as meaning rational conversion. It is also what should be (but isn't) the common type of "deconversion", i.e. the discarding of religions altogether.

Acquisition of Religious Belief

2011-03-18T19:14:00.004+02:00

I'm still reading Moojan Momen's book The Phenomenon of Religion. A Thematic Approach (Oneworld Publications, 1999), and blogging about what I find interesting in the book. Momen outlines the following three phases of a child's acquisition of religion, based on Herbert Kelman's work:

COMPLIANCE. Initially, a child learns certain religious beliefs and behaviour through a mixture of reward and punishment. [...]
IDENTIFICATION. This way of acquiring beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour involves taking someone whom one admires and trying to be like that person as much as possible. [...]
INTERNALIZATION. While identification involves conforming, in order to think and act like an admired person, internalization involves a process of transforming oneself so that new ways of thinking and acting become a part of one's personality and being. These new ways are thus valued for themselves and can exist independently of what others may say or do and independently of whether an admired person says or does them. Most religious people would say that a person's religion is not trie religion until it exists at this level within the individual.
(Pp. 145 - 146.)

Momen uses James Fowler's work (based in turn on the works of Piaget, Kohlberg, and Erikson) to distinguish "six stages of faith development that are considered to evolve out of the basic pre-stage of undifferentiated faith that is characteristic of the first two years of life" (p. 147):

INTUITIVE-PROJECTIVE FAITH. This is characteristic of ages 3-7. The child's faith is fantasy-filled and imitative of parents and other significant adults. There are the beginnings of awareness of self-identity, death and sex, and of the taboos related to each.
MYTHIC-LITERAL FAITH. This corresponds to Piaget's stage of concrete operations (ages 7-11). It is when the child appropriates the stories, beliefs, and practices of his of her faith community. [...] Interpretation is, however, concrete and literal rather than abstract and symbolic.
SYNTHETIC-CONVENTIONAL FAITH. [Emerges around adolescence.] It is at this stage that deeply-held values and beliefs are established often by identifying with and internalizing those of authority figures and role models: a personal ideology evolves.
INDIVIDUATIVE-REFLECTIVE FAITH. This stage, which may occur in young adulthood, involves the integration of the various roles and patterns that the adolescent has acquired. [...] In relation to faith, this involves a realization of the fact that one's own view is only one of many possible worldviews and a rejection of literal interpretations of narratives and myths learned in childhood. [...]
CONJUNCTIVE FAITH. This stage, which may emerge in mid-life, involves a sensitivity to patterns of interrelatedness. Efforts are made to accept and unify apparent opposites. There is a re-examination of the symbols and myths of the faith community and the development of an appreciation of these as a source of non-logical insights. The dangers if this stage are the development of passivity, complacency and cynical withdrawal.
UNIVERSALIZING FAITH. Rarely, individuals may reach the stage which involves an awareness of an ultimate environment that is inclusive of all being. These individuals incarnate the spirit of an inclusive and fulfilled human community. They not only free themselves from the social, political, economic and ideological shackles that bind humanity but they create this possibility for others. Theirs is a universal, affirming, transcendent viewpoint. Because of this, they are often regarded by social institutions, including those of their religion, as being subversive.
The surveys that have been done to assess Fowler's stages have shown that there is a definite movement through stages 1 and 2 and into 3 in the first two decades of life (probably due to cognitive maturation, as described by Piaget). The evidence beyond this gets somewhat weaker, with roughly equal numbers past the age of 20 being assigned to stages 3 and 4, while 5 is uncommon and stage 6 is rare. [...] Thus it may be that [...] Fowler has taken the different styles of faith that exist in the world and given these a hierarchical value based on his own liberal Protestant Christian background.
(P. 147 - 148.)

Momen writes about what might be termed the context of discovery and the context of justification of religious belief:

William James argued that, in practice, human beings choose a particular conception of the world on the basis of faith and only then do they look for arguments to support the conclusions that they have reached. The work of several writers from fields other than religion seems to support James's view by describing parallel processes in other fields of human activity. (P. 149.)

This is an important passage that I must return to at a later time. It is of great importance to the issue of rationality, another special interest of mine.

Faith and Belief (and Superstition)

2011-03-18T18:33:00.002+02:00

Moojan Momen notes in his The Phenomenon of Religion. A Thematic Approach (Oneworld Publications, 1999) that despite many attempts to define religious faith, there is still no agreement on an adequate formulation of it that describes all aspects of faith. He attempts to clarify the matter by using a disctinction between 'immediate and intuitive' faith (or 'faith-in') and 'intellectual' faith (or 'belief-that'). (P. 141.)

'Faith-in' is the disposition to believe in something, or as having a particular, committed worldview. It is thus personal, an individual's commitment. It does not depend on doctrinal formulas and propositions. 'Belief-that' on the other hand "indicates a disposition to believe that a proposition is true; it is impersonal in the sense that it is independent of the person making it" (p. 141).

Momen analyses these concepts further, and I will compile the following quotes from his book. The quotes are not direct, because I want to edit them a bit.

First, 'faith-in':

Faith-in involves an element of trusting in the object of one's faith; it involves the feeling that the object of one's faith is in some way greater than oneself and is able to lead one to greater fulfilment and happiness; that one can trust it to act in a beneficent way.

The factor of trust leads naturally to the feeling of dependence one the object of faith; a feeling that one can, with confidence, rely on the object of one's faith.

Part of the faith-in relationship involves a sense of loyalty and faithfulness towards one's object of faith, together with confidence that this is reciprocated.

Faith-in involves a great sense of love towards the object one's faith and a feeling of being in turn loved.

One aspect of faith-in is the willingness to obey the instructions of the object of one's faith.

One aspect of faith is the feeling that one would be willing to sacrifice for the object of one's faith. There is also often the idea that the sacrifice is mutual, that the object of one's faith has already sacrificed for one.

Faith-in is accompanied by a feeling of certainty concerning the promises made in the scriptures, together with the disappearance of the feeling of doubt and meaninglessness.

The consequence of faith-in should be seen in the life of the individual. Faith-in leads to a focus and direction for one's life. It ats as an absolute standard for one's conduct.
(Pp. 142 - 143.)

Second, 'belief-that':

In belief-that, dependence is expressed in such doctrinal formulas as determinism (that all of one's circumstances and actions are already predetermined by God).

Most religions have a doctrinal formula that emphasizes the need for faithfulness and loyalty. This is often translated into doctrines of faithfulness and loyalty to the institutions of the religion and to the religious community. Laws relating to marriage and the bringing up of children often emphasize the need for this loyalty to the religion.

Love is often emphasized in credal formulas that refer to the mutual love between God and humanity.

Obedience is expressed in the religious requirement to carry out the details of ritual law or spiritual discipline. Any deviation from the laws and rules of the religion need repentance and expiation. This aspect of a belief is also usually extended to obedience to the institutions of the religion.

Sacrifice may be expressed at the simplest level in sacrifices of one's property and wealth to the object of one's faith; it may also be expressed as a state of detachment from material things. From the other perspective, the object of one's faith is considered to have sacrificed also.

The various creeds, doctrines and dogmas express the certainties of the religion.

The consequences of faith are expressed doctrinally as being born again, englightenment, transformation, the work of the Holy Spirit.
(Pp. 142 - 143.)

Momen then goes on to explain:

Thus we can see that religious experience produces a certain disposition in the individual -- faith-in. If the believer tries to express this faith-in, he or she can only do so in terms of concepts that are available to him or her -- this immediately then enters the real of belief-that. We may say that faith-in is analysed by theologians and [philosophers of religion] and piut into doctrinal formulas that seek to express it -- and so becomes belief-that. (P. 143.)

* * *

Momen also mentions in this context the issue of superstition (which is of special interest to me personally):

Magic and religion are not easily separable entities. Most religions have incorporated at least some magical elements, if not into the orthodox religion, then at least into the popular religion. Indeed, if we consider the miracles said to have been performed by the founder of the religion as magic, then almost all religions have what may be called magic even in their orthodox elements. (P. 144.)

I have nothing to add to that statement for the moment, except my endorsement. This is an issue I will no doubt visit again, as will Momen in his book.

Pathways to Religious Experience

2011-03-12T20:21:00.014+02:00

The title of this text is the title of Chapter 5 in Moojan Momen's book The Phenomenon of Religion. A Thematic Approach (Oneworld Publications, 1999). In that chapter he goes over the

[...] various pathways that attempt to recreate the central experience of religion in a systematic way in society. These then are the principal forms in which religiosity expresses itself in society. Since the religious experience gives one the feeling of salvation or liberation, these pathways to religious experience may be called pathways to salvation or liberation. (P.117.)

Copied here is a picture from the book (p. 118) that nicely illustrates the author's point:

At the center of the picture is the religious experience, surrounded by all the pathways that lead to it. Of course there are actually several different religious experiences, as has been discussed in my previous posting, and will become apparent later in this one as well. The fact that they are all considered, nonetheless, to be what all religions have in common, could be due to the author's religious (Baha'i) views. Even if that might be misleading in some way, I do find it (for now) a useful way to look at religions.

Below I have copied a table from the book (p. 121) analyzing the common features of each pathway. I hope the writing isn't too small - the picture is as big as I was able to upload here.

The rest of this text will be a digest of the book's information on these pathways.

Ritualism

Ritualism is usually based on theistic assumptions of the otherness of a God or god to whom praise and glorification are due. [...]

The typical religious attitude on this path is that of piety, love and devotion. There is both love and often some degree of awe or fear of the Deity or figure that is the object of the ritual or worship. [...] The typical religious experience of this path is of the regenerative type, confirming and commissioning.
(Pp. 119 - 120.)

Legalism

This path to salvation is characterized by the belief that the will of a deity has been revealed in the form of a Holy Law. This law determines most of one's actions in daily life. [...]

Legalism is [...] the result of two main impulses in religion. The first is a concern to maintain ritual purity in society. This ensures that the rituals of the religion can be performed in the manner decreed and so be pleasing to the Deity. The second, which is in a sense a correlate of the first, is to maintain the ethics and morals of the society, and thus to maintain the order and correct functioning of society. [...]

In this path of salvation, the religious professional is not, as with ritualism, one who has a mysterious power to transform the ritual act into a path for salvation; rather he [...] is the man of learning who knows the Holy Law. [...]

The religious attitude on this path is one of discipline and self-control. The believer must control his or her life so as to stay within the limits of the Law. [...]

Legalism is usually linked to some extent with ritualism. The Holy Law prescribes rituals that must be performed according to the Law. Religious experience on the legalistic pathways usually arises, therefore, out of the ritual that is performed -- often in the saying of a prayer. [...] [T]he sense of the sacred is evoked not just by the correct performance of the ritual but also by the fellowship of the believers gathered for the occasion. The religious experience on this pathway tends to be of the regenerative type, confirming or commissioning.
(Pp. 120, 122 - 123.)

Evangelism

In this group the emphasis is on the grace and beneficence of the Deity. Salvation is then usually a matter of faith that this grace will be extended to all who seek it with love and devotion. These groups will tend to emphasize a personal relationship with the Deity. [...]

The task of the religious professional in these groups is to make the personal relationship between the Deity and the believer seem real. [...]

The religious attitude of this group usually involves a 'puritanical' approach to the world. It is expected that one's life be lived according to a strict moral code. [...] Another aspect of the religious attitude of these groups is triumphalism, the belief that their religion will triumph in the end over all others. These are also features of fundamentalism, with which evangelism is closely linked. [...] The main religious experience of this pathway to salvation is often of the charismatic type that is brought on by the preaching of the evangelist. Sings of this include ecstatic trance, speaking in tongues, and the otehr phenomena described above. There may also be regenerative religious experiences of the conversion type.
(Pp. 123, 125.)

Social Reformism

Social reformism goes out into the world and seeks to transform it into an ideal society. This pathway has historically been mainly that of the theistic religions. [...]

The religious attitude in this pathway is an outward-looking one that expresses itself in service and shows love and charity towards all, in particular the poor and disadvantaged. The source of religious experience on this pathway is the feeling of unity and fellowship with others who are imbued with similar ideals. Some may have a commissioning type of regenerative religious experience on this pathway.
(Pp. 126, 129.)

Ascetism

Some of those who see the world as the source of evil and corruption have considered that the best means of achieving salvation is to isolate oneself as far as possible from the world. This is often linked to disciplining the body severely, to reduce its dependence on the physical world. [...]

The religious attitude of those who follow this pathway is one of detachment from the world. They put themselves outside the social world in which other human beings participate; they become outside observers. The main source of religious experience in this pathway is the reading of the scriptures, prayer, fasting, and the other austerities that the ascetic undertakes. The ascetic may have any of the types of religious experience, but typically the mystical or charismatic.
(Pp. 129 - 130.)

Monasticism

The monastic community provides the opportunity to concentrate on the religious life for those who see no way of doing this in the outside world. [...]

The religious attitude in monasticism is towards an inward-turning detachment from the world. The source of religious experience is reading from the scripture, prayer, fasting and sometimes some austerities. There may, in some monastic communities, be a religious experience from the sense of community and fellowship. The main types of religious experience on this pathway are the mystical or the confirming type of regenerative experience.
(Pp. 131 - 132.)

Gnosticism

The principal idea of the gnostic movements is that the central religious experience is linked to a special knowledge to which only a select few have access. The knowledge usually takes the form of an inner (esoteric) understanding of either the scriptures or the rituals of the religion. [...]

One of the features of this tendency in the West is its eclectic nature. Consequently, many gnostic groups in the West have little connection with Christianity, for example New Thought, the Rosicrucians and Scientology. The approach that has become known as the Perennial Philosophy can also be classed as gnostic.

The principal religious attitude on this pathway involves a search for truth. This search is principally intellectual, a struggle to understand; some would say that it is also élitist. Part of the religious attitude must also be that of obedience to one's spiritual master, particularly in the early stages of the path. [...] The main source of religious experience is the scriptures; it occurs when there is an intellectual enlightenment regarding the true meaning of the scripture. The gnostic pathway is closely linked to mysticism. Many gnostic pathways use the experiential dimension of mysticism, including meditation or chanting, which helps to achieve altered states of consciousness.
(Pp. 132, 134 - 135.)

Mysticism

The term 'mysticism' is used to describe a wide variety of religious phenomena. For lack of a more suitable word, I shall use it to refer to those groups that consider that the central religious experience can best be recreated through achieving altered states of consciousness. Such states can be reached in two different ways. The first is the path of increased psychological arousal achieved, for example, by rhythmical chanting or dancing. This culminates in mystical ecstacy [...]. The second is the path of decreased mental activity leading to a deep state of meditation [...]. Both paths lead finally to a trance state. [...]

This type of religious experience, which can be found in both Eastern and Western religions, is usually closely linked to gnosticism. [...]

The trance-like state achieved by Western mystics is often described as filled with vivid visions and auditions. [...] The trance-like state of the Eastern mystic, however, is usually formless, visionless experience. [...] Western religion is predominantly devotional in nature, and so the product of the trance-like state is a vision of either the object of devotion or something closely associated with it. Eastern religion is predominantly oriented towards achieving an abstract notion - insight. The trance-like state therefore tends to be empty and formless. The main method of achieving altered states of consciousness is also different in the two forms of mysticism. It is achieved by increasing levels of mental arousal through chanting and similar activity in the Western religions, and decreasing levels through meditation in the Eastern religion. This may also have a bearing on the content of the trance.

The religious attitude on this pathway is one that tends to be turned inwards, trying to obtain a direct personal experience of the sacred. Once it is felt that this has been attained, then there is usually a feeling of love and compassion, not just towards other individual human beings, but more expansively, towards the whole cosmos. The main source of religious experience on this pathway is in the achievement of altered states of consciousness by such methods as chanting and meditation. The religious experience on this pathway is of the mystical type.
(Pp. 135 - 137.)

Classification of Religious Groups

The above are the different pathways to religious experience as classified and described by Moojan Momen. There is some overlap between these pathways, and a religious group may exhibit the use of more than one of them. Momen also classifies religious groups according to their utilisation of the pathways as follows.

Some religious groups only exhibit one of these methods of social expression (or possibly two interlinked methods). Therefore their appeal will be to only a narrow range of psychological types from among the general population. We may name these groups 'sects' or 'cults'. [...] In general, the word 'sect' applies to those groups that are more tightly organized and where beliefs are more narrowly defined (that is, they are epistemologically authoritarian); the word 'cult' to the more loosely organized groups where there is not such a strict insistence on adherence to particular beliefs.

On the other hand, any religion that would claim to be a 'world religion' should included all the different forms of religious expression and thus, potentially, be able to appeal to all types of people. [...]

An approach incorporating more than one, but not all, social expressions can be found in intermediate groupings that we might call 'churches' or 'denominations'. [...]

As well as catering for all types of social religoius expression, a world religion must also appeal to all types of individuals at the conceptual level, by its ability to encompass both the theistic and monistic viewpoints. A sect will usually only appeal either to the theistic or to the monistic viewpoint.
(Pp. 138 - 139.)

I was going to make several comments along the way, but this is too long as it is. No doubt I will return to those individual points I wanted to comment on in later posts.

Features of a Religious Experience

2011-03-11T12:35:00.006+02:00

This text mostly consists of quotes from Moojan Momen's book The Phenomenon of Religion. A Thematic Approach, published by Oneworld Publications, 1999.

According to the book's author, there are three features that "apply to phenomenon of religious experience":

UNIVERSALITY. Numerous surveys have consistently shown that even in the highly secularized societies of North America and Europe, a large proportion of the population have had what they describe as religious experiences. The proportion approaches one hundred per cent in traditional societies.
DIVERSITY. Religious experience is unique for each individual. Religions may attempt to impose a uniformity of doctrine or of action upon their followers, but each person's religious experiences, when taken as a whole, will be different to those of another person.
IMPORTANCE. Religious experience is almost invariably very important to the individual to whom it occurs, in a way that other experiences usually are not. A religious experience can result in change in the way that individuals think about themselves, a complete alteration of lifestyle, or a reorganization of the individual's conceptual world. (P. 88.)

I wonder if the secularized society in North America, alluded to in point 1, is Canada?

For someone (like me) who has never had a religious experience, it is difficult to imagine what is being talked about by those who claim to have had it. It is noteworthy that the experience is extremely common in "traditional societies", and less so in modern "Western" societies. It would be interesting to know why it is not so common here anymore. Has it become unnecessary for many of us secular Westerners? What then has taken its place?

Momen lists general features of the experience of the holy, another concept very important to religions, and closely connected to religious experiences:

It is a very intense, energizing experience. It feels important and demands respect and attention.
It is a liberating experience, in that it seems to free on from the demands of the physical world (but, in some, it may induce a sense of dependence on an 'other reality').
It brings peace, joy, exultation, even exhiliration, although this can, on occasions, be mingled with awe and even dread. Some may even report the feeling of being possessed by a spiritual power.
It seems to give on e a feeling of having achieved insight or knowledge, although it is often difficult to specify the content of this knowledge (it is ineffable, incapable of being adequately expressed in words). It is often described as 'confirming', in the sense of giving one the assurance that one's faith is true.
Time may appear to stop and space may seem to become distorted. It may seem that the experience occurs 'outside' time and space.
Many would say that for an experience to be truly religious, it should involve the whole person, lead to some element of personal transformation and result in some outward manifestation of the change in terms of action. Some may report a feeling of having been summoned to a mission through this experience. (Pp. 88 - 89.)

It is important to remember that there are many kinds of religious experiences even to the same individual. Momen speaks of this spectrum:

I have attempted to formulate these descriptions so as to include all levels of religious experience. Many of these descriptions have been attributed to mysticism and states of deep meditation, but I would maintain that it is more useful to see the mystical and meditative experience as being at one extreme of continuum of religious experience and activity. At the other end of this spectrum are the mundane tasks of the religious life, such as arranging the flowers in the church or sweeping out the Hindu temple. As one goes from one extreme to the other, the intensity and frequency of the experience may change, but all the above features may occur at any point in the continuum.

The Experience of the holy is the core of religion and its initiating and driving force. (P. 92.)

Momen analyses types of religious experience.

I. The first is The Regenerative Experience. It is subdivided thusly:

CONVERSION EXPERIENCE. For many people, the experience takes the form of a conversion, leading them to align themselves to a religious movement to which they have not previously been aligned, because they experience the truth of that movement.
CONFIRMING EXPERIENCE. For others, the experience regenerates their faith within a religious movement to which they already belong; the 'born'again' experience in Christianity and religious revivalism in Islam are two common examples.
COMMISSIONING EXPERIENCE. This experience may be in the form of a 'call', a divine commission to carry out some action or take up a new way of life.

II. The second type of religious experience Momen explains is The Charismatic Experience.

This experience makes those involved feel that a gift has been bestowed upon them. This gift may include a feeling of being in a 'wider life than that of this world's selfish interests', a sense of being in continuity with the powers of the universe, and a sense of elation and joy as the sense of self and attachment to this world is abandoned. There is inner equilibrium and calm. It has been described as the experience of saintliness.

Typical this 'gift' gives its recipient the ability to heal, drive out evil spirits, speak in tongues, and perform other miracles and wonders. The receipt of this 'gift' is often marked by trance or ecstacy. (P. 94.)

III. The third type is The Mystical Experience.

This experience is characterized by James as being ineffable (impossible to describe in words), noetic (giving insight and knowledge that feels authoritative), transient (it cannot be sustained for long) and passive (although certain steps may be taken to induce the experience, it then takes over and possesses the person). (Pp. 95 - 96.)

IIII. Finally, Momen also mentions The Paranormal Experience (p. 97) as frequently associated with religious experiences in (at least some) Eastern Religions. He doesn't mention stigmatism, and other alleged paranormal phenomena connected to Christianity, but it's obvious that these things are important to some in the West as well.

Momen states that "very often the precursor to an intense religious experience [...] is a religious crisis. [...] A religious crisis is usually a period of existential doubt; a questioning of one's cognitive structures; a loss of confidence in one's interpretation of the world." (P. 98.) According to him, "there are three possible outcomes to such a crisis":

A RESOLUTION WITHIN CURRENT COGNITIVE STRUCTURES. The person in crisis may eventually be able to resolve the crisis within his or her existing cognitive structures. This may be done by delving more deeply into the scriptures of one's religion and finding an answer there. Alternatively, discussion with one's fellow-believers may result in a solution being found. This may then be reported as a confirming religious experience.
A CREATIVE RESPONSE, CHANGE TO A NEW COGNITIVE STRUCTURE. The inner struggle may reach the point at which the existing cognitive structures dissolve. Since our cognitive structures define reality for us, some report it as a dissolution of reality. At this point, thre religious person often reports a sense of surendering the self (giving up one's existing cognitive structures, which define one's self). Following this surrender, a new vision may emerge, a new way of looking at the questions, a new self, a new cognitie structure, the basis for a new reality. This may be reported as a confirming or conversion experience, but will usually be more intense than the first outcome.
A PATHOLOGICAL RESPONSE, COGNITIVE DISSONANCE. Some react to the threatened breakup of their reality by retreating into denial of the problems that caused the crisis. In effect, they build up a fantasy world in which they create a reality that accords with their cognitive structures. This type of process is usually unstable and eventually breaks down, as such a response negatively affects the way that such people function in society. The process can usually only be stabilized by individuals either retreating from society or finding social support for this pathological response. (Pp. 98 - 99.)

Later, Momen writes about how people in the West tend to think of religious experience as a private affair, while for the rest of the world it usually occurs communally, and how the sense if unity and fellowship amongs the community can itself be a religious experience (pp. 109 - 110).

Momen then moves on to the social influence of religious experience. He notes the obvious fact that "religious experiences tend to conform closely to cultural and religious expectations".

Thus it would appear that religious experiences, no matter how intense and all-consuming, are subject to contraint by the cultural and religious normas of the person to whom they occur. Another way of looking at this is to say that there can be no such thing as a pure experience. An experience always happens to a person, and that person already has an interpretative framework through which he or she views the world. [...]

The most basic interpretative framework is language. We do not have an experience and then find words to describe it. Our language prefigures our experience of the world.

[...] We may think that we are free to choose whatever religious style of life we like, but in fact we are very unlikely to choose some and very likely to choose others, because of our background. (Pp. 114 - 115.)

This should be enough of an introduction to religious experiences in the abstract. What I am left wondering is could there be, or is there even in actuality, a non-religious equivalent for the religious experience? Also, is religious experience among the necessary criteria of something qualifying as a religion? If no follower of a movement claims to have had such an experience, do we have to call the movement something other than religion, even if it fulfills other criteria of religion?

Eastern and Western religions

2011-03-06T14:56:00.005+02:00

Moojan Moomen defines two types of religion in his book The Phenomenon of Religion. A Thematic Approach (Oneworld Publications, 1999) as follows:

I use the term 'Western religion' to refer to the mainstream orthodoxies of the Judaeo-Christian-Muslim group of religions. 'Eatern religion' refers to Buddhism, Taoism and Hinduism, especially of the Advaita Vedanta school. This division is useful in that these two groups of religions hold very differing and even contaradictory vies on the nature of the Ultimate Reality and of humanity's relationship to it.
[...]
Regarding the difference with the Eatern religions, the most important point is that in the Western religions those characteristics mentioned above, such as anger and kindness, all make God appear to have a personality, to act as a person. An impersonal entity would not have such characteristics.

In contrast, the Eastern religions, Buddhism, Taoism and Hinduism of the Advaita school, have no concept of God as a person; rather their concept is of Ultimate Reality as a process, a truth, or a state of being. This is usually stated as a concept of an Absolute Reality. The phrase 'Absolute Reality' implies that there is a single Reality in the cosmos; everything else that may appear real has only a relative or a contingent reality or is illusory or non-existent. The Absolute is therefore both transcendent and immanent. (P. 31 - 33.)

This bit about God (or gods) being a person is important and worth repeating. It makes little sense talking about a god in any other way, although apparently the word has been used in a more poetic ways (by Albert Einstein, for example), to refer to something like the God of pantheism. Such talk is only misleading and confusing, and will end up being used by theists in an attempt to support their claims. It clearly also makes no sense to pray to a god that is impersonal, while it does make sense to try to connect with such an entity somehow -- assuming of course that one already believes in the existence of such a god.

It also makes sense to seek enlightenment if one believes in the illusoriness of the sensible universe. It is no wonder that belief in paranormal powers goes with such a worldview as well. In Eastern religion, these alleged powers would be clearly magical, derived from the thaumaturgist herself, while in Western religion the power would be from God, and miracles not controlled but only asked for by the believer. Clearly, it is easy for belief systems to incorporate some from both views, as seems (IMHO) to have been done by (some) renaissance "mages".

We can call the view held by many Eastern religions that there is only one fundamental reality in the world, 'monism'. And by contrast, we can call the Western view that God and humanity form two distinct and separate realities, 'dualism'. Alternative names for the two systems would be 'absolutism' and 'theism' respectively. (P. 34.)

One type of religion is perhaps monistic, in the sense that there is only one reality, and the illusion we experience as reality is actually not real, and the other accepts the reality of two categories of entities -- one being everything in the material world, and the other usually being made of just one God; although the latter might comprise all sorts of entities made of spiritual substance. Nevertheless, both do seem transcendental in the sense that followers of both religions are oriented toward the (alleged) transcendent reality, whether it is the Absolute Reality, or the One God (or even just a more vague "hereafter"). This is the usual emphasis of relgion, caused no doubt by the fact that everyone can see (and has always been able to see) that this material world we live in is fundamentally evil, full of suffering and pain, and in many ways displeasing especially to us humans. Because we are naturally fair-minded, humans have decided that there must be some other world or level of reality that will balance this evil.

It is then curious that some Eastern religions, much like the philosophical schools of the Hellenistic period, seem to have also allowed for the possibility of reaching the transcendental goal in this life:

In Hinduism, the final goal is liberation (moksha or mukti). This state may be achieved in life, in which case it is called jivanmukti. Such a person is described as having achieved a state of existence-consciousness-bliss (sat-chit-ananda). For Buddhists, the final goal is the state of Nirvana (which means 'blown out'). This state is characterized by the extinction of all craving and desires, a complete detachment from the world. (P. 35.)

In Western religions, only some saints, mystics, and monks have attempted to reach for the final goal within their lives, and even they have (if I am not mistaken) always believed it to be impossible to completely reach it during their lives. They could perhaps experience Union with God briefly (albeit ecstatically), but only after their deaths would they actually get to meet their maker.

The idea of a living holy man who has reached the heights of illumination of course has the unfortunate effect of making people gullible and thus vulnerable to all sorts of hoaxers and charlatans. One would think that the Rationalists of India will be kept busy as a result, for quite a long time to come.

Thematically about religion

2011-03-03T16:30:00.003+02:00

I started reading The Phenomenon of Religion. A Thematic Approach by Moojan Momen, published by Oneworld Publications, 1999. It seems interesting, but there are questionable passages already in the beginning.

The first (pp. 24 - 25) is a claim about religion even in the West not being seen as an individual choice until the rise of Protestantism (it was an important part of Islam before that). If this is taken only to be saying that the surrounding communities did not (usually) allow its members to make individual decisions, then that is a fairly obvious point. But surely it was understood even before the Middle Ages that individuals could and did convert on their own, contrary to social norms. In Medieval times heretical individuals were even hunted by Inquisitors. Usually, I accept, it was whole communities that converted at once, but the existence of individuals who think differently was known.

The author acknowledges in the beginning of the book that his attitude toward religion is broadly sympathetic (p. 3), and according to his homepage he is a Baha'i. I have no problem with that, but I do have a problem with someone presenting religions in general as something good, as opposed to the lack of religion. This is what Momen seems to be doing in the second questionable passage that I've already come across. It is a list comparing worldly values and religious values (p. 29). Among worldly values are listed things like "revel in self-glory" (and others much worse, even amusingly the claim that the worldly "are rigid and self-opinionated", while the religious "are flexible in thinking"). Now, I can understand that this is how the religious believer may think that this is the case, it is not what I would expect to see in an academic work on "religious studies".

I can only hope the rest of the book is of better quality.

I did encounter something better already, about the definitions of religion. Momen lists (p. 27) the following aspects of religion as something definitions of religion have to try to cover:

The first, at the individual level, is religious experience. It is what was described at the beginning of this chapter, as bbeing the experience of the 'holy' or the 'sacred'. It is the personal, experiential aspect of religion.
The second, at the conceptual level, is the universal idea that there is some Ultimate Reality, and that the most important activity for human beings is to establish and clarify their relationshup with this Reality. This is the conceptual and doctrinal aspect of religion.
The third, at the social level, is the fact that all religions are to a greater or lesser extent involved in creating social cohesion and the integration of the individual into society. All of them have created some form of social and institutional order. From this, the ethical and social aspect of religion is derived.

In this book Momen uses a concept of religion that "relates it to a concept of the supernatural or supra-human (or perhaps even supra-scientific), rather than the wider functional definition that would include such secular ideologies as Marxism and nationalism" (p. 28). As he makes the choice while being aware of this problem, it is acceptable. Less clear is whether the reader should accept his intention of distinguishing religion from magic. He notes that they "commonly coalesce and interpenetrate" (p. 28), but will not go deeper into this question at this early point.

I will continue reading the book, possibly commenting on it again in separate posts.

Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 8

2011-02-27T22:23:00.002+02:00

This continues what I started in Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 1. The previous installment was Part 7.

I am reading Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam. A Reader, edited by Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof, and published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2002. All citations refer to that book, unless otherwise stated.

This is the last installment of this series. It will be a short one, because I will have nothing to say. You really should quit reading now. I'm only doing this because of consistency. Because I listed all the previous articles, I will list the rest of them as well.

"Part Two: Islamic Fundamentalism" contains two sections. The first of them is "III. Islam and Western Civilization". It contains the following five articles, the titles (given by the editors) of which give some idea of the content:

"Critical Attitude Toward the West and the Idea of Western Decadence" by Ali Shariati (1933-77).
"Self-Destructiveness of Western Civilization" by Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi (1903-79).
"Granting Capitulatory Rights to the U.S." by Imam Ruhullah Khomeini (1902-89).
"Islam and Its Adversaries" by Abd al-Latif Sultani (d. 1984), and
"Westoxication" by Jalal Al-i Ahmad (1923-69).

The book's final section is "IV. Women and the Hijab". Unfortunately, it is not as interesting as one might think. It contains only two articles:

"A Moralizing Fundamentalism" by Abd al-Latif Sultani (d. 1984), and
"On the Islamic Hijab" by Murtaza Mutahhari (1920-79).

All the articles in these last two sections of the book are pretty boring. They are made up of bad rhetoric and seem to have very little of relevance now. And what relevance they might have, is repulsive, dogmatic, and conservative drivel, lacking in argumentation. It was my intention to seek interpretations of Islam compatible with the 21st Century global, secular, humanistic civilization. These texts are not helpful, even as something to argue against. There is so little here to argue about. The dogmatics who accept the views of these articles will not listen to reason, and those who have an open mind won't learn anything new from them.

This project may continue in the future, with different sources.

Three short videos about the Qur'an

2011-02-26T12:04:00.003+02:00

A YouTuber calling himself "Ozmoroid - pronounced Ahulzmoroiyd" has made a trilogy of short videos concerning the Qur'an (and also Islam a bit more generally). He has done a bit more study of the Qur'an than I have, and has the same motivations for studying it as I do for studying Islam in general. Namely, to see if Islam is or can be interpreted in a way that makes it compatible with 21st Century globa, secular, humanistic civilization. He's titled his videos as follows:

The Qur'an through godless eys

Part 1 - Introduction
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S_l-a20fqMM&feature=related

Part 2 - The Good
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zbRq8Gs6QWM

Part 3 - The Bad
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wI8SeMja_MM&feature=related

I highly recommend watching these videos.

Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 7

2011-02-23T10:59:00.008+02:00

This continues what I started in Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 1. The previous installment was Part 6.

I am reading Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam. A Reader, edited by Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof, and published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2002. All citations refer to that book, unless otherwise stated.

Now I continue reading "Part Two: Islamic Fundamentalism". The second section of this part is about "Islam and Politics".

Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) begins this section with an article on "War, Peace, and Islamic Jihad". He attacks the Modernists' interpretation of Jihad, and continues to reveal goals of his militant, fundamentalist type of Islam:

It is the result of this defeatist mentality that these people maintain that "Islam only believes in defensive war." On top of that, they are laboring under the misconception that they have rendered some good to the religion by this discovery, although by this incorrect deduction they want religion to surrender its distinctive method. In other words, religion should relinquish its ideal of destroying all the Satanic forces from the face of the earth and making human beings bow down their heads before one God, relieving them from the servitude of the servants and making them enter the servitude of the Lord and Creator of the servants. But Islam, in order to translate this ideal into reality, does not corcibly compel people to accept its faith but provides them with a free atmosphere to exercise their choice of faith. It either completely dynamites the regning political systems or, subjugating them, forces them into submission to and acceptance of Jizyah. Thus it does not allow any impediment to remain in the way of accepting the belief. Thereafter it allows complete freedom to people to accept or reject belief. (p. 226.)

It would be interesting to know what exactly are the "Satanic forces" alluded to here. I wonder if any critic of this form of Islam can avoid being placed into that category? The notion that destroying such forces and making everyone bow to God are ideals of the religion Qutb clearly promotes is horrible and scary. It shows how little he has learned from history. It clearly implies the use of force to convert people, which he seems to quickly backtrack from, as if only realizing a bit late how disgusted his readers must feel at that point.

It seems clearly hypocritical of Qutb to claim that his religion qould not forcibly compel others to accept it if it were in power: there certainly would be a lot of incentive to do so, and at least social cost to not doing so. It doesn't seem to bother the Islamist fanatic that other people might actually prefer their non-Islamic political systems, which he is eager to "dynamite" (how metaphorically this can be taken at this time, I am not sure). Qutb manages to show that like some others, Fundamentalist Islamists can also play the "Liberator card" in politics, and use double talk about removing obstacles "from accepting the faith". Even if other religions besides Islam would be tolerated in Qutb's ideal Islamic state, I suspect there would be no such freedom to refuse to accept any faith.

It is especially ironic that a proponent of a religion the very name of which means "submission (to God)" pretends it to be a liberator of mankind. Of course, he cannot hide very long what this "liberation" really means:

This means that religion is an all-embracing and total revolution against the sovereignty of man in all its types, shapes, systems, and states, and completely revolts against every system in which authority may be in the hands of man in any form or in other words, where he may have usurped sovereignty under any shape. [...] In short, proclamation of the sovereignty of Allah and the declaration of His authority connotes the wiping out of human kingship from the face of the earth and establishing thereon the rule of the Sustainer of the world. [...] The establishment of God's rule means that the laws of God whould reign supreme and all the affairs should finally be decided accordingly. (p. 228.)

The idea here is that instead of man-made political systems, an Islamic state would be based on a God-made political system. That is, it would be a theocracy, with some sort of priest class ruling by divine mandate. Just exactly how this differs from the medieval European idea that kings rule by divine mandate. Oh yes, of course, that belief was false. But this Islamist idea is obviously true. No need to prove it, except by a show of force. How enlightened.

It matters little to such Islamists that the actual rulers in a theocracy would be those who get to interpret God's allegedly revealed will, those who get to decide for everyone else, what reality is like. And those people would be humans, just like everyone else, and presumably fallible as well, unless he wants to claim that religious authorities are infallible in matters of religion. But I thought only the Pope of the Catholic church could be that silly. And no one in their right minds believes that piece of Catholic dogma. The fact is, achieving the Islamist goal would (and has) put a tremendous power in the hands of a few humans, exactly the situation Qutb claimed his religion would liberate people from. The only way people could be liberated from the rule of a few humans is if the chosen political system and the policies of the government are based on frequently checked consensus (or something near enough). Religion that cannot exist within such a political system cannot be accepted at all. It follows in a pluralist society that the society must be secular, i.e. there will have to be a separation of State and Mosque. But this Qutb would not accept:

Whatever system of governance may be established in the world, it should be based on the worship of God, and the source of authority for the laws of life should be God alone, so that under the shade of this universal system every one may be free to embrace any faith one likes. (p. 231.)

I cannot resist to urge to phrase Qutb's wish a little differently: One religion to rule them all, and to darkness bind them. That captures rather well, I think, what any theocracy would amount to (at best). It is incredible that someone not completely ignorant of world history could even desire such a regress in the 20th Century. That some people still want the same in the 21st, is incomprehensible. How can anyone fail to see how disastrous the rule of religion has been throughout the middle ages, or better yet, thoughout all history? Progress in thinking and in society has only come from freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and freedom of inquiry, the latter two being impossible without the first. It simply follows that society must be secular, or it will regress rather than progress. Religions, if they wish to survive, must find a way to adapt to and exist within secular states.

The militant nature of Qutb's Islamism is shown in its imperialism, as seen in the following quote:

The peace Islam desires is that the religion should be established in its entirery in the world. All the peopole should bow in submission before One God, and should not take their fellow men as lords in place of God. [...] Thus the entire people of the world stood classified under three categories: first, the Muslims who had reposed belief in [Muhammad]; second, those peace-loving who had been granted peace by the Holy Prophet [...], and third, the opponents who were afraid of him. (p. 233.)

For Qutb, Islam would bring peace to the world by dominating it. This is such a stupid view that it doesn't deserve a response. It is just another form of imperialism, and just as any other, the only justification for it is that happens to be the proponent's own style of imperialism. It cannot be taken seriously, except as a violent threat. Clearly the modernist interpretations of Jihad do not fit this imperialist form of Islam very well, so Qutb attacks them and supports a far more dangerous interpretation:

Thus according to the explanation by Imam Ibne Qayyim, first all Muslims were restrained from fighting against the polytheists and unbelievers, then permission was accorded them to fight, then they were commanded to fight against the aggressors and, ultimately, they were commanded to fight all the polytheists and the unbelievers. These verses of the Holy Quran, the traditions of the Holy Prophet [...] prompting and inciting to Jihad, the Islamic wars of the early period, rather the entire Islamic history replete with the description of Jihad, are eloquent testimonies in the presence of which every Muslim's heart will abhor to accept the commentary about Jihad conceived by minds having been defeated by the pressure of unfavorable conditions and the treacherous propaganda [of] the orientalists. Can such a person claim to be an intellectual who may have listened to the clear commandments of God, pursued the distinct sayings of the Prophet of God [...] and seen the historical records full of Islamic victories, but still labor under the misconception that the scheme of Jihad is a temporary injunction, related to changing conditions and transient circumstances and only that aspect of the scheme has a perpetual effect which is concerned with the defense of the borders. (p. 234.)

One could answer by asking, how can anyone read the Quran and take suitable quotes from it out of context to justify one's own violent fantasies? This obviously is what Qutb has done in this article, but unfortunately, it must be left for scholars of Quran to provide Muslims with a better, more accurate, and more acceptable interpretation of Islam. Here it is enough to show where the violent interpretations of Jihad come from, and that they do exist and must be refuted, if Islam is ever to co-exist peacefully with other worldviews. Qutb doesn't hide the aggressive nature of his interpretation of Islam, which is quite contrary to to views recently and frequently presented about Islam being "a (or even the) religion of peace":

It is the inevitable demand of the nature of Islam that it takes strides from the very beginning to pull mankind out from the servitude of others than God. Hence it is impossible for it to abide by geographical boundaries and bind itself within racial limitations. It cannot be brooked to leave the entire sprawling mankind from East to West to be devoured by vice and corruption and servitude to others than God, and, leaving it, take to seclusion.

It may happen with the opponents of Islam that, deeming it expedient, they may not commit aggression against Islam provided it allows them to continue the leadership of human beings over others within their geographical limits, leaves them to their lot and does not force them to follow its message and its declaration of freedom. But Islam cannot declare a "cease-fire" with them unless they surrender before the authority of Islam and they will no more place impediments in its way by virtue of any political power. Exactly this is the nature of this religion and, being a declaration of the universal lordship of God and a message of deliverance from the servitude to others than God for the people living in the East and West, it is also the inevitable duty of Islam. (p. 243.)

It seems to this reader, at least, that Qutb is advocating an interpretation of Islam, according to which it is the duty of Islam to wage war against all countries that do not submit to it, in order to "liberate" their peoples. He could be understood, perhaps, as saying that this only applies to countries that use "political power" to "place impediments" in the way of Islam. But it seems likely to be referring to impediments on the way of the unified Islamic State becoming the only state in the world.

Imam Ruhullah Khomeini (1902-89) writes about "The Pillars of an Islamic State". He states that "the head of the Islamic State must know the Law thoroughly" (p. 248), referring presumably not only to the Quran, but also the shari'ah. It seems a bit redundant in my view, for the head to know every single law himself, rather than just the laws that deal with governing the people. But it is just one of his strange ideas for an Islamic State. He also states that the Islamic state would "enforce an Islamic character, Islamic prayers, and an Islamic penal code so that Muslims can remain as Muslims and their next generations also" (p. 249). As Qutb before, Khomeini is also using the double-talk some of us have learned to associate with cults (and others perhaps with politics): he uses the word "can", when in fact he means something far more constrictive.

It is strange to say this, but even Qutb seemed liberal when compared to Khomeini's views, for the former at least spoke of religious freedom, whereas the latter seems to be opposed to it. Khomeini wants the State to enforce Islam on the people, and make sure following generations will remain Muslims as well. This is totalitarian control. Precisely what theocracy leads to. Those who hold power to define the truths of religion become the masters everyone else must serve. There is no room in the world for interpretations of religion like this.

The same author continues with another article, on "The Necessity of Islamic Government". In this one, he reveals just how totalitarian his interpretation of Islam is:

First, the laws of the shari'ah embrace a diverse body of laws and regulations, which amounts to a complete social system. In this system of laws, all the needs of man have been met: his dealings with his neighbors, fellow citizens, and clan, as well as children and relatives; the concerns of private and marital life; regulations concerning war and peace and intercourse with other nations; penal and commercial law; and regulations pertaining to trade and agriculture. Islamic law contains provisions relating to the preliminaries of marriage and the form in which it should be contracted, and others relating to the development of the embryo in the womb and what food the parents should eat at the time of conceptiopn. It further stipulates the duties that are incumbent upon them while the infant is being suckled, and specifies how the child should be reared, and how the husband and the wife should relate to each other and to their children. Islam provides laws and instructions for all of these matters, aiming, as it does, to produce integrated and virtuous human beings who are walking embodiments of the law, or to put it differently, the law's voluntary and instinctive executors. (p. 253 - 254.)

In other words, this form of Islam seeks to control every aspect of every individual's life, destroying their individuality and making them all brainwashed clones. They also become a "militia" eager to point out anyone who fails to conform as they have, and to punish them -- and not just with social punishments, I'm sure.

Khomeini doesn't seem to think that Muslims could differ in their aspirations, or their political views. In fact, all Muslims must clearly think alike, which greatly reduces the need for separate Muslim countries:

In order to attain unity and freedom of the Muslim peoples, we must overthrow the oppressive governments installed by the imperialists and bring into existence an Islamic government [...]. (p. 257.)

At this point the irony of an Islamist such as Khomeini writing about "imperialists" is no longer funny. It is easy to accept that the populations of the countries he speaks of do indeed need liberation, but merely replacing one form of imperialism with another is hardly good enough for them. They deserve something better. Khomeini's hostility to Western culture is not shared by all Muslims, as he acknowledges (p. 261). One can then only wonder at his audacity at claiming a position from which to tell these other people how and what they should behave, believe, and like.

Next in turn is "The Political Theory of Islam" by Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi (1903-79). He writes much about the evil of "domination of man by man" and how "the effect of godhood is so intoxicating that one who tastes this powerful drink can never keep himself under control" (p. 268), but clearly fails to see that theocracy is no safeguard against these, quite the contrary. He opposes men making commands in their own right (p. 270), but fails to see that men can very easily make commands in the name of God. History (and the present) provides depressingly many examples of precisely that. As long as the final authority is placed upon God, it follows that the interpreters of God's alleged will are placed above all others and they will become the new tyrants.

There are three more articles in this section, but each of them of little concern here. The first of them is "All-Encompassing Program of an Islamic State" by The Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria, originally published in 1989. I will leave the analysis of the viability of that program to those better qualified for it, except for one single, saddening point about the education:

A reassessment of educational content to remove any ideologies and concepts that have contrary values to those of Islam; this is to preserve our personality, realize authenticity, and stimulate creativity. (p. 290.)

It is unbelievable how censorship of unwanted ideas can be combined with the stimulation of creativity in one sentence. Also, it is far too obvious that the purpose of this censorship is actually to rear uniform citizens, no matter what kind of euphemisms they want to use to say so. One can only hope that contemporary Muslims see value freedom, individuality, and creativity more than this Salvation Front.

Second to last in this section is an article on "Boycotting the 1997 Election in Jordan" by the Society of Muslim Brothers, published in 1997. It seems irrelevant now, so I will skip it except for one curious note. In the very end they mention "the policies of the New World Order" (p. 307). "NWO" was not mentioned anywhere else in the article, and one is left wondering if this is intented as just as referring to the political economic powers of the present, or whether it should be taken as an indication that the Brothers actually believe in Grand Conspiracy theories involving NWO. The latter, unfortunately, seems somewhat more likely to me, for reasons I will not go into here. But if that is the case, one can only hope such paranoia to be rare and receding among other Muslims.

This section ends with an interview of Dr. Ishaq A. Farhan by Mansoor Moaddel, conducted in 1997 and titled "Islamic Action Front Party". The only point of interest in the interview is when (p. 311) Dr. Farhan is forced to accept, though he of course won't do so directly, that the Islamic injunctions against usury have to be "worked around" in modern society. This implies that the Quran is not such a perfect book of advice for all situations and times, as fundamentalists claim. The placement of this interview in Part II of this book seems a little strange, actually, since Dr. Farhan does not seem to be a fundamentalist.

Continue to Part 8.

Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 6

2011-02-15T13:33:00.008+02:00

This continues what I started in Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 1. The previous installment was Part 5.

I am reading Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam. A Reader, edited by Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof, and published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2002. All citations refer to that book, unless otherwise stated.

Now I begin reading "Part Two: Islamic Fundamentalism". It begins with section "I. Jurisprudence, Bases of Law, and Rational Sciences".

The first of the two articles in this section was written by Sayyid Qutb (1906-66), and is translated tellingly as "Islam as the Foundation of Knowledge". Qutb is clearly an Islamist of the fundamentalist type, as his article shows:

What Islam calls Divine Law, covers the entire scheme that God has devised for regulating human life. It includes within its sphere the regulation of thoughts and views, fundamentals of statecraft, principles of ethics and culture, laws of transactions, and regulations of knowledge and the arts. The Divine code of law circumscribes every angle of human thought and opinion. (p. 198.)

I think it's appropriate to call this view absolute totalitarianism. Qutb and his brethren would have all Muslims bow in absolute servitude to God's will as interpreted by the fundamentalists. This would, in practise, make the fundamentalist leaders the absolute and totalitarian rulers of Muslims, in the name of God, of course. To make sure no Muslim would stray from the path of "true religion", Qutb does what cult leaders usually do, i.e. restricts inquiry to "acceptable" sources:

A Muslim has not the authority to seek guidance and light from any other source and well-head except the Divine one in any matter that pertainst to faith, the general concept of life, rituals, morals and dealings, values and standards, politics, and assemply, principles of economics, or the explanation of human history. (p. 199.)

According to Qutb, a Muslim is not allowed to consult non-Muslims (actually, non-fundamentalist Muslims, I'm sure) about any of those things. It is acceptable in some other things, with limitations, of course:

[A] Muslim is allowed to imbide abstract learnings from all the Muslims and non-Muslims alike, for example, Chemistry, Physics, Biology, Astronomy, Medicine, Industry, Agriculture, Administration (to the extent of technical aspects only), Technology, Arts of warfare (from their technical aspect only), and other like learnings, arts, and technology. (p. 199 - 200.)

The main reason why he allows the consultation of non-Muslims in these areas is obviously the fact that Muslims don't have (did not have at the time of his writing at least) enough knowledge of these things themselves, yet such knowledge is required to govern a society. He also makes it clear that he is interested in such things only for their "profitable results", not merely for the ske of knowledge, for example.

The most significant limitation to the study of any subject is that it must not have anything to do with anything covered by Islam, as interpreted by Qutb -- which does cover a lot, as seen above. Qutb of course has to believe that things like the natural sciences, social sciences, history or philosophy "do not pertain to matters related to Muslims concepts about life and the universe or discuss man's responsibility and the nature of man's relations with the universe and his relations with the Creator of life. [...] They are also not connected with morals and manners, customs and traditions [...]" (p. 200). This is certainly not very plausible: even the natural sciences now have much to say about things like morality, while customs and traditions, as well as beliefs can be critically evaluated in the light of social sciences and history. It follows that whenever and wherever science intrudes on religious ground, the devout (fundamentalist) Muslim must ignore science and stick to Islamic dogma. The more advances are made by the rational approach, the clearer the contradiction between that and the fundamentalist interpretation of Islam becomes. The following quote makes this pretty obvious:

But as regards reason of human struggle, whether it is individual or collective in form -- and this sturggle is directly connected with human self and concepts of human history -- similarly as regards the reason for the beginning of the universe, inception of life and man's own beginning and its interpretation, since all these matters pertain to Metaphysics (and are not related to Chemistry, Physics, Astronomy, and Medicine) they have as such the same position as the principles and regulations, laws and canons organizing the human life and human efforts. They are indirectly related to faith and concept [sic]. It is, therefore, not permissible for a Muslim to acquire these learnings from anyone else except a Muslim; rather it should be acquired from only such a Muslim in whose religion and righteousness he may have full confidence. He should have the thorough conviction that he seeks guidance from God alone in all these matters. (p. 200.)

Of course, God does not talk to people, so one is left with "holy" (or rather, holey) texts, and those who claim to have the True interpretation of those texts. This attitude about the limits of human abilities is truly detrimental to honest truth-seeking, which should never be limited by taboos and dogma. There is not even hope of progress if one denies out of hand the possibility that man could progress. Qutb's negative and pessimistic (and anti-humanistic) attitude is certainly not limited to the natural sciences: he believes that philosophy, history, and the social sciences have been influenced by non-Islamic "beliefs and fetishes" in such a way that they have caused these fields to be "at loggerheads with religion in their fundamental principles, and nurse an explicit or implicit grudge against the concept of religion ordinarily and Islamic concept particularly" (p. 201). It is unthinkable, of course, that they might instead have had valid reasons behind their criticisms of religion in general and Islam in particular. Unthinkable, because the devout Muslim must deny such possibilities as a requirement of faith, in order to properly be a Muslim, as shown above.

After limiting all acceptable rational activity to the pursuit of profit (for Muslim society, I presume), as long as it in no way contradicts religious dogma, Qutb shows his anti-Jewish paranoia:

But this concept of culture [as common human heritage] is, in fact, one of the many contrivances of world Zionism whose purpose is to demolish all limits and bounds on top of which is the list of the bindings and limitations of religion -- so that the position of Jewry may easily pervade within the body of the enrire world when it has become lethargic, intoxicated and half-alive, and the Jews should have full liberty to pursue their diabolic activities in the world. Topping the list among these activities are their dealings in usury and moneylending, whose purpose is to channel the hard earning got out of the sweat and blood of the entire mankind into Jewish institutions rund on the basis of usury and interest. (p. 201 - 202.)

I fear this kind of ridiculous propaganda is still common among Muslims. It is very much the same as what Christians used to say about Jews over the centuries -- leading to the horrible suffering of the Jews in many cases, of which the Holocaust is only the most recent. It does not matter how stupid and baseless the accusations are when a people is being demonized. Because of certain passages in the Quran, the Jews are an easy target. Add to it the notorious hoax known as "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion", and you have Qutb's dangerous beliefs about the Jews.

Quoting a passage of the Quran and another of the hadith, Qutb argues why a Muslim should only trust Muslims when seeking knowledge:

When God [...] had explicitly and categorically stated this hazardous determination of the Jews and the Christians about the Muslims, it would be a peak of foolishness and short-sightedness to nurse this good-will even for a moment that the discussions made by them about Islamic faith or Islamic history or proposals offered about the system of Muslim society or Muslim politics or Muslim economics could be based on any good intention, or they have Muslim's wellbeing in view, or in fact they are sincerely in search of guidance and light. Those wro entertain this good opinion about them after the clear declaration and categorical verdict of God, their reason and intellect are worth lamenting. (p. 204.)

The strong distinction between ingroup (true believers) and the outgroup (non-Muslims, especially Jews) is usually a bad sign. It is used to create cohesion within one's group by creating mistrust and even fear of the outsiders. The group's leaders obviously benefit from this, as the underlings are less likely to think for themselves, seek more objective views, or even acquaint themselves with the views of outsiders.

Qutb also ridiculously claims that "Europe's empirical sciences are the product of the Islamic period", but since little in the way of history is offered, I will ignore the claim, and move on to the next article.

Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi (1903-79) is the source of the latter half of this section, called "Fallacy of Rationalism". The rationalism under attack here is "Western rationalism", the idea that humans could use their own reasoning to decide what to do, even which religious beliefs to uphold.

When our new generation completed their studies in western-oriented educational institutions they came out fully trained and groomed in the western way of thinking and with their minds totally changed. Their hears were no doubt Muslim, but their minds had turned secular. (p. 209.)

The problem with this kind of rationalism is that it's not really rational, according to Maududi:

Speaking on Islam, one is either a Muslim or a nin-Muslim. If he speaks as a Muslim, may he be orthodox, a liberal thinker, or a reformer, whatever be the case, he is expected to talk within the orbit of Islam with the Quran as the final authority and within the fundamentals of religion and the laws of Shari'ah as enunciated in the holy Quran. Whoever does not believe in the holy Quran as the final authority, and considers its injunctions as open to discussion, automatically goes out of the pale of Islam and thus loses every right to speak as a Muslim. [...] But, speaking as a non-Muslim, he will have no right to pose himself as a Muslim and try to explain to the Muslims the meanings of Islam and the ways and means to promote Islam. (p. 210.)

Maududi defines Muslims as those who believe the basic tenets of Islamic fundamentalism. The problem, from the point of view of my project here, is that it makes too much sense. It is much easier to deny the authority of the Bible in Christianity, than it is to deny the authority of the Quran in Islam. It's easier with the Shari'ah, as seen in the previous articles by the Modernist Muslims. But the Quran is a tougher nut. It would require Quranic exegetics, and I don't know if that would help either. If it can be shown that the Quranic texts were plausibly handed down by Muhammed, then the non-fundamentalist has to justify his way of reading and use of the Quran; that he doesn't take it as the infallible, perfect word of God for all times.

If you do not see eye to eye with the Divine book, you are free to differ but only after denouncing faith in Islam. Whoever feels dissatisfied with the teachings and injunctions of a religion and soubts its veracity, fails to understand its logic and needs, and considers its views and concepts objectionable, has only two options. Either he may clearly denounce and disown it and then criticize its tenets and teachings as bitterly as he likes or, if he does not want to say good-bye to his religion in spite of his doubts and apprehensions, he must avoid projection of his disagreement. (p. 211.)

This kind of dichotomous, black and white, view is appealing in its simplicity, of course. It hardly makes sense to speak of a holy book if one doesn't believe the contents of the book to be of divine origin. One can dilute the divinity of the words, reducing the status of the book, for example by appealing to the human fallibility of the medium (prophet) used in putting the words in writing. Or one could find reason to doubt the early phase of the tradition: perhaps there were miscommunications at some point? But where to draw the line? How far can one go in this and still consider the text holy in any meaningful sense?

Still, the dichotomy between fundamentalists, and non-fundamentalists, is dangerous. The certainty that one's interpretation of religion is the only true interpretation, coupled with clear hostility towards those who disagree and hold different interpretations to be true, is a cause for worry. "The West" especially is something Fundametalists Islamists seem to despise pretty generally. Maududi certainly doesn't seem to have a very good opinion of it:

[A] critical study of western civilization shows, beyond doubt, that it is based on either rationalism nor naturalism. On the contrary, its entire structure stands on feelings, lust, and urges. The western renaissance was nothing but a revolt against reason and nature. Discarding logic and reason, it turned toward whims and feelings and material urges. It relied on moods instead of reason, rejected rational guidance, logical reasoning, and innate intuition, and made perceptible material results its real criterion. Rejecting nature's guidance, it preferred to be guided by desires and urges, regarded everything as baseless that cannot be measured and weighed, condemned everything as negligible and worthless that did not produce any perceptible material gain. (p. 215.)

Since no argument for all this is provided by the author, I will not be bothered to refute it. I will just note that Maududi seems to think that ever since the renaissance, western culture has been corrupted and irrational, being controlled by feelings, lust, and urges. I can only assume that this has something to do with the rise of modern empirical science, and the secularization of Europe (and academic culture in general). I suppose he thought it better when Christianity ruled the West. I think his views are ahistorical, and in any case too vaguely expressed (and without arguments and evidence) to warrant further comment. It is unfortunate that such hostility toward whole cultures exists, but other Muslims can disagree with him, as there is nothing in Islam that would require such an attitude. It is thus an obstacle among the fundamentalists that can be overcome.

The worst thing about religiosity, in my opinion, is the dogmatic nature of religious beliefs. Maududi provides good examples of dogmatic thinking, when he argues why it is necessary for a Muslim to submit to the authority of religion (or, as the case will actually be, although he of course fails to say it, religious authorities). He mistakenly implies that a person who practises law (or perhaps he means only a person who is a judge at a court of law) will not criticize the legal system within which he works. Even worse, he thinks that a person within a school of thought would not criticize the fundamentals of that school. (p. 210.)

Perhaps the translation here is inadequate. Perhaps he means more than criticize, for the claim does make sense if we replace "criticize" with "discard": a person who has discarded the fundamentals of a school of thought is no longer a proponent of that school of thought. But then the analogy with moderate and liberal Modernist Muslims might fail. They don't necessarily discard any "fundamentals" of Islam, although what they consider those fundamentals to be might differ from what the Fundamentalists think. This is a question of interpretation of religion.

For Maududi, Islam is clearly something similar to a country's government, and even more chillingly, an army:

No government can stay even for a moment if every person starts demanding rational justification for its orders and refuses to submit to any order without getting its satisfactory justification. No army can be called an army if every soldier starts seeking the reason for his commander's orders and demanding his satisfaction before compliance.

Anybody who joins a system or organization does so only when he accepts and believes in the authority of that system as supreme authority, and as loing as he is a part of that system, he is duty bound to obey its supreme authority, may he be convinced and satisfied with any order or not(p. 217.)

This kind of authoritarian "thinking" is not what democracies are about. Speaking of religious believers as unthinking, uncritical soldiers who simply follow orders is especially telling, and shows why Maududi's brand of Islam is so compatible with terrorism.

Unconditional faith is the first and foremost requirement of Islam. It calls people to believe in Allah and His Prophet first, instead of issuing injunctions. (p. 218.)

In order to make Islam compatible with the global human society, non-fundamentalist Muslims must change this. As long as one follows Maududi's thinking this far, it becomes impossible for one's religion to progress. Once one submits to this cult, and accepts that from that point onward the dogma of the cult cannot be criticized, but simply obeyed, one has made also progress impossible. Closedmindedness like this will guarantee the ridicule of future generations, while the "true believers" will remain medieval in their thinking. I hope reformers will keep coming, and that they will have minds sharp and open enough to recognize the mind-numbing propaganda of the likes of Maududi, and to discard it, in favour of more intellectually friendly interpretations of their religion.

Continue to Part 7.

Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 5

2011-02-12T17:37:00.006+02:00

This continues what I started in Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 1. The previous installment was Part 4.

I am reading Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam. A Reader, edited by Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof, and published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2002. All citations refer to that book, unless otherwise stated.

Now I continue reading the book's "Part One: Islamic Modernism", specifically that part's section "IV. Islamic Modernism and the Issue of Women".

This section begins with an article on "Polygamy" by Moulawi Chiragh Ali (1844-95). According to Ali, the "general tenor of the Quran is to establish a perfect equality between the male and female sex, in their legal, social, and spiritual positions, except in physical strenght, and possession of wealth" (p. 149). That exception aside, this interpretation of the Quran seems useful. Ali also usefully notes that if in "Western" countries women have more liberty and have been elevated to a higher social status, it is not due to religion:

It is only the influence of the codes of the Roman Law, and the innate respect felt by the Teutonic nations for the female sex, and centuries of civilization, that have raised women to their proper position [...]. (p. 149.)

As for the alleged acceptance of domestic abuse in Islam, Ali has this to say:

(1) That Muhammad had authorized the corporal punishment of refractory wives by their husbands in extreme cases (Sura iv. 38), is true, but it is also a fact worthy of note that this had been the case only during the early stage of the patriarchal form of government at Medina, when there were no established tribunals of justice or judges, and the head of the family was the only domestic judge. But as soon as the form was changed, when tribunals were created, and when a systematic administration of justice was carried on, the power given to the husband was abolished, and the contending parties, ie.e, husband and wife, were required to appeal to the judges, prohibiting the former from taking the law into his own hands. The very next verse, 39, abolishes the former system of husbands having power of beating their wives. [...]

This is then one of those things that show how the Quran is not an eternal book for all times, but a collection of texts intimately connected to the time of their writing. Beating one's wife was accepted at one time, but prohibited the next. A Muslim should obey the prohibition, as the Prophet did not change that part anymore, thus leaving it valid. Good enough.

Ali contains on another form of abuse of women common in Muslim societies:

(2) Muhammadi did not allow or enjoin seclusion of women. He made some improvements in their general dress and demeanor, giving them greater honor and respectability; and he made provisions to save them from the insults of the rude and uncultured common folk, while going out in the streets. [...]

The Muhammadan Common Law also takes particular care as to leave the face and hands of respectable females open and unmasked; for these parts of the body are not called "Aurah," or nakedness. The whole person of a female, except the face and hands, as well as the feet according to some, are "Aurah," and ought to be decently covered. (p 151 - 152.)

Here the issue is obviously the veil, and other forms of hiding women from sight. A later article will continue on this. Here it is enough to note that Ali's interpretation of the religion precludes the seclusion of women, and it does not require of women the wearing of a completely concealing garb (burqa). What he does not emphasize, though, is that this the Muhammadan Common Law he is talking about, so this it can be modified without having to contradict Islam.

The article on "The Rights of Women" by Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-98) is unfortunately just un outdated piece of apologetics of Islam based on dubious claims about the superiority of Islamic culture with regard to the status of females. I will comment on it no more.

"The Liberation of Women" by Qasim Amin (1865-1908) is much better. Amin discusses the issue of the veil in detail, and connects it to broader social issues:

Among the most important [causes of criticism] are the firmly established tradition of veiling among the majority of the population, and the inadequate socialization of women. Were women's socialization effected in accordance with religious and moral principles, and were the use of the veil terminated at limits familiar in most Islamic schools of belief, then these criticisms would be dropped and our country would benefit from the active participation of all its citizens, men and women. (p. 169.)

Amin states that the "revealed law of God indicates that women were endowed with minds in the same manner as men", implying that the status of each gender in society should be equal as well. Curiously, he still defends the use of the veil by females. But he adds:

I would recommend, however, that we adhere to its use according to Islamic Law, which differes from our present popular traditions. Our people are ostentatious in their caution and in their interpretations of what they velieve to be the application of the law, to the extent that they presently exceed the limits of the shari'ah and have harmed the nation's interests. (p. 173.)

Amin would like to see a compromise between how Western women dress, and how his contemporary Egyptian women were veiled. He is, unfortunately, dogmatic about obeying "heavenly orders", but gladly this does not prevent him from suggesting an improvement. This is because the contemporary custom of veiling he would reform is not based on religion:

Muslims were attracted to the use of the veil, approved it, exaggerated its use, and dressed it up in religious raiment, just other harmful customs have become firmly established in the name of religion, but of which religion is innocent. (p. 174 - 175.)

He points to verses XXIV, 30-31 to show that Islam "permits a woman to expose some parts of her body to strangers, even though the specific situations are not spelled out" (p. 175). At least the face and hands, possibly also arms and feet are parts of her body she is allowed to show, according the religious leaders Amin quotes. He argues that because Islamic law gives women the same rights as men (such as the right to take care of their own finances), and makes them equally responsible in civil and criminal cases, women must also be allowed to reveal themselves as necessary for these situations, such as in a court of law, or when doing business, or even during manual labor (p. 176 - 177). He continues further on the issue of segregation of the sexes:

God created this world and gave human beings mastery over it so that they could enjoy the benefits according to what they can achieve. God granted human beings privileges for administering this world, but He also placed limitations on them. Thus God established equality between men and women regarding their obligations and privileges. God did not divide the universe, making one part of it to be enjoyed by women alone and another to be enjoyed by men, working in it segregated from women. In fact, He created the burdens of life to be shared and controlled by both men and women. How can a woman enjoy all the pleasures, feelings, and power that God created for her, and how can she work in the universe if she is banned from the sight of any man except a blood relative or some other man to whom she cannot be married according to Islamic law? Undoubtedly, this is not what the shari'ah meant, and it should not be allowed by either law or reason. (p. 177.)

This is something Muslims living in "Western" countries must agree with. Back on the use of the veil, Amin writes:

Furthermore, I do not believe that the veil is a necessary part of desirable behaviour for women. There is no basis for such a claim. What is the relation between desirable behaviour and exposing or veiling the face of a woman? What is the basis for discriminating against women? Is not good behaviour in reality the same for both men and women? Is it not a product of an individual's intentions and work rather than of external appearances and clothes?

[...] The instructions that appear in the precious verses about averting one's gaze apply to both men and women. This proves clearly that it is no more appropriate for a woman to cover her face than for a man to cover his.

[...] If men feared that women would be tempted, why were not men ordered to wear the veil and conceal their faces from women? Is a man's will considered weaker than a woman's? Are men to be regarded as weaker than women in controlling their desires? Is a woman considered so much stronger than a man that men have been allowed to show their faces to the eyes of women, regardless of how handsome or attractive they are, while women are forbidden to show their faces to men, from the fea that men's desires may escape the control of their minds, and they may thus be tempted by any woman they see, however ugly or disfigured she be? Any man who claims this viewpoint must then admit that women have a more perfect disposition than men; why then should women always be placed under the protection of men? If, however, this viewpoint is incorrect, what justifies the this traditional control over women's lives? (p. 178.)

Clearly, as has been alluded to before, many Muslims make a big show of their faith, instead of keeping it a private matter, as would better suit a secular society -- or one where religious faith is genuine. This is most obvious in the daily prayers, but can of course be done with clothing.

It is reprehensible for the men of a family force the women of the family to be segregated from other men, or even from society in general. In my opinion Amin argues well against such behaviour here: the veiling of women seems at least to be in contradiction with the segregation and "protection" of women. If women needed such "protection" (rule) by men who allegedly had superior strenght of will, then it would be the men who should be veiled in order to protect the women from lust. But if women indeed need to be veiled in order to restrain men's lust, then perhaps it is men who need to be supervised by women, who then apparently have the stronger mental faculties?

Amin also explains how women may actually use veils to attract men (to flirt and in fact improve their appearance), rather than to conceal what men might find attactive in them. He makes another good argument to show that in fact the use of the veil enables her to behave in ways that I guess I can call immoral here, without getting caught, as no one can recognize her. Thus it follows that those who are afraid of the potential immoral behaviour of women should rather demand that they show their faces in public, so that they will be recognized. This will keep them under social control. (p. 178 - 179.)

From the point of religion the more important point, though, is that the use of the veil is actually just a non-religious tradition predating Islam. There are verses in the Quran that speak of the veiling of the Prophet's wives, but Amin emphasizes (and appeals to Islamic scholars) that they were considered very special, and that the rules relating to them do not apply to other women (p. 179 - 180).

* * *

Section "V. Style of Living" is useless for this project. The content of the short articles therein are obsolete. Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-98) writes about "The Way of Life" and "The Way to Eat a Meal". Rifa'ah Rifa al-Tahtawi (1801-73) writes about "Civil Rights" in France, and the Revolution of 1830 there. None of these articles seem to contain anything of relevance now.

This means that I have finished Part I, and will next get into what could be more relevant to the present. That is, Part II - Islamic Fundamentalism. Continue to Part 6.

Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 4

2011-02-10T21:42:00.004+02:00

This continues what I started in Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 1. The previous installment was Part 3.

I am reading Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam. A Reader, edited by Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof, and published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2002. All citations refer to that book, unless otherwise stated.

Now I continue reading the book's "Part One: Islamic Modernism", specifically that part's section "III. Islam and Western Civilization".

This section consists of only two articles. The first is "Social Liberalism and Laissez-Faire Capitalism" by an "anonymous Mu'tazilite Muslim". It was originally published 1877-1880. The author of the article argues for changes in Muslim societies that would mimic the so-called Western culture. He is clearly worried about the economic situation of Muslims, and blames it on Islamic customs and the Islamic (Common) Law.

It has never been understood by the great majorit of the people that the apparent benefits that the poorer classes get from a rich man's expensive style of living are only temporary and, in the end, wholly illusive. They do not understand that the fund, which goes to the remuneration of labor, is the result only of saving and economy, and that profuse expenditure is therefore in the end injurious to the laboring classes. [...] And Mahomedan theologians and moralists, while they say nothing against extravagance in expenditure, have invariably held up thrifty and economical habits to contempt and derision. So that, from a desire to deserve and preserve the respect of their neighbours, Mahomedansa have, in the course of time, acquired the character of spendthrifts. (p. 125.)

In Muslim culture, if I have correctly understood it, spending lots of money on lavish parties, gifts, and charity, as well as other similar things, has been seen as a way of distributing wealth to the poor, the workers, and the community in general. This was the customary expectation also in medieval Christendom. Unfortunately, it was bad for business, as that requires capital. The article's writer is making a case for long-sighted capitalism, as an improvement on the culture that short-sightedly opposes saving.

Wherever there is a Musalman [sic] family possessing wealth from the time of the Moslem government, the wealth was originally either a religious or a political grant. It was never acquired by havits of economy: in the one case the wealth was acquired by administrative, political, or military activity; in the other, it was gained by selfish piety and pompous ascetism. (p. 126.)

In other words, Muslims have not been businessmen. They have not been investors. They have simply acquired grants from those in power, and presumably the wealth from those grants has been fundamentally tied to the productivity of cultivated land, or some other basic production.

Our habits of listlessness and inactivity are also partly due to the peculiar belief in predestination that we hold. This doctrine prevails amonts other people and in other countries, but owing to moral and historical causes its hold is not so strong as among Musalmans. (p. 126.)

The lack of (economic) activity, innovation, capitalistic hoarding of wealth, and in general lack of a business-oriented attitude seem to be the author's targets. What exactly is meant by predestination here is unclear, but I would guess it more likely means something like determinism in mundane matters, rather than something like the doctrine of the predestination of the soul, such as in Calvinism. Those Christian protestants, after all, were well suited for business, were they not?

[O]ne large source of wealth is entirely closed to the Mahomedans -- I mean interest on money lent. [...] When we see how the business of banking facilitates commerce and how it renders possible the creation of new trades and industries, it becomes apparent how, amongst the Mahomedans, the connection of religion purely so-called with subjects altogether foreign to it -- with criminal law, civil law, laws of inheritance, laws of property, laws of contracts, laws of bequests -- has acted most injuriously on their material interests. And as material interests act as well as depend largely upon mental and moral interests, it follows therefore that we have suffered mentally and morally as well as in a wordly point of view from the connection of our Religion with law. (p. 126.)

The Medieval Christians had the same problem, because of the condemnation of "usury" in the Bible. They circumvented that with in my opinion amounts to sensible rhetoric. The anonymous writer of the article argues for interests rates by appeal to basically the same things the Christians appealed to -- because it clearly makes sense:

The capitalist of trader must obtain a recompense for his abstinence -- for having refrained from spending away the capital on his own gratification. Every trade has some or other risk incidental to it; the capitalist must indemnify himself for this risk. Lastly the capitalist must be recompensed for the labor and inconvenience that her undertoes in conducting and managing the business. Reward of abstinence, insurance against risk, and wages of superintendence make up the profits of a trade. (p. 127.)

It is my understanding that the Biblical condemnation of usury was based on the understanding that only the poor have to borrow money, and even they only borrowed because they needed to feed themselves and there was no alternative. Thus demanding that they pay interest in addition to paying it back was a way of taking an unfair advantage of the weak, a despicable thing to do. The morally excellent thing to do would have been to simply give the poor what they needed, without requiring any kind of compensation for it.

Possibly this kind of social situation is behind traditional Islamic views on the matter as well. But in the present era, it is not only the poor who want to borrow money. In order to start a business (or buy a house), you usually need more capital than you own, so you have to get a loan. This way, economic activity often requires loans. But, as the author points out, "if lending money or any trade offered comparatively inadequate returns to the abstinence, risk, and exertion, persons engaging in it would give up their business and invest their capital in trades that yielded better returns" (p. 127). In other words, the one giving the loan must also benefit from doing so, or else no one will do so. Which in turn will stiffle economic activity.

We have seen how the prohibition of interest, instead of relieving those classes for whose benefit it is intended, does actually injure them; but what is much more serious is that it retards the formation of the habit of abstinence and economy and that of postponing immediate gratification to future happiness, and prevents the development of the spirit of self-denial and self-control and that of prudence and self-responsibility. (p. 128.)

Instead of protecting the poor from exploitation by the rich, the prohibition seems to actually be a major cause of poverty for Muslim societies, according to the anonymous writer. There is another religious reason for that poverty:

Another and a more active cause of our poverty is to be found in our laws of inheritance -- both testamentary and intestate. A large estate is under our laws of intestate succession so divided and subdivided that in two or three generations each share comes to represent the barest subsistence. And, what is worse, there is no proper law of testamentary disposition of property to control and modify operatin of this minute subdivision. (p. 128.)

Again, this situation is reminiscent of that of Early Medieval Europe, especially the Franks. But primogeniture was adopted throughout Christendom (as far as I know) by the High Middle Ages. It was pretty much continued to the 19th Century, unless I'm mistaken, although along with the use of legally valid "last will and testaments" to ensure some controll of one's property after one's passing in the way of all flesh. Of course, the majority of people have always been so poor that there has been little point in trying to divide one's property among one's survivors.

The existing laws of inheritance are practically unjust. For when a person dies, some of his children may be old and educated enough to earn a respectable livelyhood; others may be too young or inexperienced to be able to earn anything -- to give equal shares to both is decidedly an unjust apportionment. (p. 128.)

The writer could have added to this the inequal treatment of females under that same law, but what he does mention already seems clearly unjust.

And, what is worse than all, these and all other similar laws have been taken out of the domain of progress by being improperly connected with Religion. They have been made part and parcel of Revealed Religion and are believed on the authority of an ignorant, superstitious, and intolerant priesthood to lie beyond the limits of progress. In truth, however, there is no real connection between Religion and the laws, social, civil, or political, under which a community lives. Religious truths transcend the powers of human understanding, while laws, being phenomenal relations, are amenable to experience. (p. 129.)

I readily agree that religion will prevent or at least hinder progress in social issues as in other areas, if it claims to tell the absolute truth about matters related to those areas. Laws must be amenable, and chosen in accordance to the best arguments available -- in other words secular.

The writer continues to argue that the law of bequest must be altered not only into a more just form, but also to enable to creation of larger properties, instead of forcing their subdivisions into minute portions:

There are thus three ways in which a larger property acts favorably. First, by strenghtening habits of diligence and economy and developing the sense of self-responsibility, in other words by raising the character and elevating the moral nature of man. Second, by increasing the desire for wealth and therefore by increasing wealth and establishing a high standard of comfort and living. And, third, by increasing the resources available for education and therefore by diffusing knowledge and establishing a high standard of education and mental attainment. (p. 130.)

To some extent this is easy to agree with, but in the present era one can ask if this really works out quite as nicely as imagined by the anonymous writer? I believe there is much greed involved with large property and wealth. It is surely not a sign of elevated morality. It seems that education is not at all of interest to the contemporary affluent, who only see it as a means to economic gain. It seems that education is considered an intrinsic value only by academic professionals these days.

In any case, the writer believes that wealth is key for the benefit of society, and Muslims desperately need to change their attitudes, customs, and laws, in order to achieve economic progress. This is quite possibly true even now, 130 years after the article was first published. This requires the severing of religion from such political and economic matters. (p. 132 - 133.)

The second article in this section is "Islam and Civilization" by Muhammad Fard Wajdi (1875-1954). I cannot comprehend the choice of including this article anymore than I can comprehend its title. It is some of the worst religious apologetics on the subject of science & religion that I have seen, and completely useless. And not only because it is so badly outdated. Because my desire in this project is to find common ground with Muslims, I will let this useless article pass without further comment.

Continue to Part 5.

Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 3

2011-02-07T13:32:00.007+02:00

This continues what I started in Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 1 and continued in Part 2.

I am reading Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam. A Reader, edited by Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof, and published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2002. All citations refer to that book, unless otherwise stated.

Now I turn to the book's "Part One: Islamic Modernism", and that part's section "II. Islam and Politics".

The first chapter in this section is "War and Peace: Popular Jihad" by Moulavi Chiragh Ali (1844-95).

All the defensive wars, and the verses of the Quran relating to the same, were strictly temporary and transitory in their nature. They cannot be made an example of, or be construed into a tenet or injunction for aggressive wars, nor were they intended to be. Even they cannot be an example or instruction for a defensive war to be waged by the Muhammadan community or commonwealth, because all the circumstances under which Muhammad waged his defensive wars were local and temporary. (p. 72.)

Nice. Let's hope all Muslims agree: the Quran can in no way be used to support any kind of war. All mentions of war were temporary, none were meant for future guidance.

[I]n the first place, Jihad does not literally and classically mean warfare or fighting in a war. It means, as used by the classical poets as well as by the Quran, to do one's utmost; to labor; to toil; to exert oneself or his power, efforts, endeavors, or ability; to employ oneself vigorously, diligently, studiously, sedulously, earnestly, or with energy; to be diligent or studious, to take pains or extraordinary pains. (p. 80.)

This definition has been cropping up after 2001-09-11. It makes jihad sound like something good, a commendable attitude, something more of us good use in our own lives. Nothing violent or aggressive about it. Wether or not that really is a historically and linguistically accurate definition, one can at least hope that it would be the definition adopted by Muslims.

There is neither such a division of the world in the Quran, nor are such words as "Dar-ul-Islam" and "Dar-ul-Harb" to be found anywhere in it. There is no injunction in the Quran to the True Believers to fight against the infidels till they accept Islam, failing which they are to be put to death. The words "Dar-ul-Islam" and "Dar-ul-Harb" are only to be found in the Muhammadan Common Law, and are only used in the question of jurisdiction. No Moslem magistrate will pass a sentence in a criminal case against a criminal who had committed an offense in a foreign country. The same is the case in civil courts. All inhabitants of Dar-Harb are not necessarily infidels. Muhammadans, either permanently or temporarily by obtaining permission from the sovereign of the foreign land, can be inhabitants of a Dar-ul-Harb, a country out of the Moslem jurisdiction, or at war with it. (p. 91.)

Among other important things here is the point about jurisdiction which I take to be reciprocal in nature: a "Muhammadan" outside of Moslem jurisdiction is under the jurisdiction of the local rule - she cannot expect to be judged by Muslem law. This is a very important point. It can (and should) readily be understood as saying that acting against local laws in countries outside the Moslem jurisdiction (and even customs, matters of civil courts) is actually against the teaching of Islam.

The Muhammadan Common Law is by no means divine or superhuman. It mostly consists of uncertain traditions, Arabian usage and customs, some frivolous and fortuitous analogical deductions from the Quran, and a multitudinous array of casuistical sophistry of the canonical legists. It has not been held sacred or unchangeable by enlightened Muhammadans of any Moslem country and in any age since its compilation in the fourth century of the Hejira. (p. 92.)

This is an important point all Islamists should take to heart. The Common Law, at least, should definitely be open to criticism and change, even by devout Muslims, even by those who believe the Quran to be the infallible word of God, because it is not based on, or even derived from the Quran. In fact, given the sources of the Common Law, there really is no reason to hold onto it. The laws of any community should of course be reasonable, the ones with the best arguments in their favour. Therefore, whatever laws that are seen to surpas those of the traditional Common Law should be adopted. Surely there can be no disagreement on this?

Ali Abd al-Raziq (1888-1966) has made two interesting remarks that I can quote from his excerpts published under the title "The Problem of Caliphate". The first is the claim that "Islam would never favor one community over another, one language over another, one region over another, one time over another, or one generation over another except according to their piety" (p. 95).

Clearly many disagree with that. I believe most Muslims are taught to believe that the Quran must be read in Arabic, because all translations are less perfect. I agree with them to a point. Going to the orginal sources is necessary for historians, surely, but not without a good deal of knowledge about exegetics and the relevant languages. I'm almost certain that very few even of Muslim scholars actually have that requisite knowledge. But the fact remains that Arabic certainly seems to be an important language for Islam, unlike say, Finnish. Same goes for the rest of the claim, mutatis mutandis.

The other remark is longer:

[...] all that Islam has made lawful and that the prophet has made the Muslims observe included conduct, manners, and customs that had nothing at all to do with methods of political rule nor anything to do with a civil government. After all, if we put all of these together, they do not amount to more than a very small fraction of what is necessary for a civil state as regards political principles and laws. (p. 97.)

It clearly follows that there can be no such thing as a purely Islamic State. The necessary laws have to be devised somehow, and that means human decision making, also known as secular politics. (It could also be pointed out that the usefulnes of the Quran as a guidance for us mortals is obviously questionable, but let's forget about that for now. As long as Muslims accept that secular politics are necessary for a functioning State.)

I will have to pass over "Authority and the Problem of Succession" by Amir Ali (1849-1928) in silence, as I can find little of interest or relevance to "Western" states in it at present. I might return to it, if I change my mind about it later.

This section ends with Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-98) defending "Intellectual Pluralism and Freedom of Opinion", but unfortunately his article is of general nature, and he does not argue from a specifically Islamic point of view, or in a way that would especially appeal to Muslims. He does not provide an interpretation of Islam that would be of use for us in convincing the Muslims that adopting such "Western" notions would be in accordance with their religion. His arguments, of course, are such that any sensible person will accept them, but that is not enough at this point, so I will have to ignore the article here.

Continue to Part 4.

Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 2

2011-02-04T12:33:00.011+02:00

This continues what I started in Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 1. I am reading Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam. A Reader, edited by Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof, and published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2002. All citations refer to that book, unless otherwise stated.

Now I turn to the book's "Part One: Islamic Modernism", and that part's section "I. Jurisprudence, Rational Sciences, and Differentiation of Knowledge".

Some excerpts from Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-97) follow, concerning "Religion versus Science":

All religions are intolerant, each one in its way. (p. 24.)

In truth, the Muslim religion has tried to stifle science and stop its progress. It has thus succeeded in halting the philosophical or intellectual movement and in turning minds from the search for scientific truth. A similar attempt, if I am not mistaken, was made by the Christian religion, and the venerated leaders of the Catholic church have not yet disarmed so far as I know. (p. 25.)

It is permissible, however, to ask oneself why Arab civilization, after having thrownsuch a live light on the world, suddenly became extinguished; why this torch has not been relit since; and why the Arab world still remains buried in profound darkness.

Here the responsibility of the muslim religion appears complete. It is clear that wherever it became established, this religion tried to stifle the sciences and it was marvelously served in its designs by despotism. (p. 27.)

Religions, by whatever names they are called, all resemble each other. No agreement and no reconciliation are possible between these religions and philosophy. Religion imposes on man its faith and its belief, whereas philosophy frees him of it totally or in part. [...] It will always be thus. Whenever religion will have the upper hand, it will eliminate philosophy; and the contrary happens when it is philosophy that reigns as sovereign mistress. So long as humanity exists, the struggle will not cease between dogma and free investigation, between religion and philosophy; a desperate struggle in which, I fea, the triumph will not be for free thought, because the masses dislike reason, and its teachings are only understood by some intelligences of the elite, and because, also, science, however beautiful it is, does not completely satisfy humanity, which thirsts for the ideal and which likes to exist in dark and distant regions that the philosophers and scholars can neither perceive nor explore. (p. 28.)

The Enlightenment has clearly influenced al-Afghani. It is very easy to adopt such a pessimistic view of mankind, but I believe recent history shows there is still hope. Certainly Europe has become very secularized. With the help of the Internet, knowledge is spreading faster and more widely than ever before. The great challenge at present is how to reach the Muslim masses, and to convince them of the superiority of the modernist version of Islam? This is no time to lose nerve and give up.

The following are excerpts from Maulavi Cheragh Ali (1844-95) on "Islamic Revealed Law versus Islamic Common Law":

The Muhammadan states are not usually considered theocratic in their system of government. The first four or five khalifates were of a republican nature, and after them, the system of government was changed with the Ommiade dynasty into monarchy and despotism. (p. 29.)

The common code of Islam, or the Muhammadan system of jurisprudence, is the unwritten law of the Muhammadan community, compiled at a very late period, so that it cannot be considered as essentially and eternally unchangeable; nor can it be binding on any other nation than the Arabs, whose customs, usages, and traditions it contains, and upon which it is based. The Muhammadan Common Law is not to be confounded with the Muhammadan Revealed Law. The Muhammadan Common Law is the unwritten law that has been compiled from a avery few verses of the Quran, as well as from the customs and usages of the country, supported by traditions contradictory in themselves, and based on the Ijmaa, or the unanimous consent of the Moslems. (p. 31.)

Those writers are greatly mistaken who either confound the Quran, the Muhammadan Revealed Law, with Fiquah or Cheriat (Cheri), the Muhammadan Common or Civil Law; or think that the Quran contains the entire code of Islam; or that the Muhammadan Law, by which is invariably meant the Muhammadan Common Law, is infallible and unalterable. The Muhammadan law books, the fundamental codes of Islam, take very little or nothing from the Quran, and all the Muhammadan jurists, casuists, mooftis, and moojtahids, have by a tacit consent removed the law points from the text of the sacred book to the jurisdiction of the canon or civil law. Muhammadans rely principally on the latre lego-religious books instead of the Quran. (p. 31 - 32.)

As I see it, Ali makes there a historical case for the separation of the Mosque and State in the so-called Islamic countries. He argues against theocracy, and the idea that Islamic laws could be unchaning. What he fails to note is the interesting admission that the Quran actually is pretty useless, or I should say irrelevantwhen it comes to morals and laws. This is good news for the project of secularizing the Islamic countries, because it allows the moderates to keep revering the Quran while adopting (more) secular morals and laws.

Ali then makes these encouraging claims about his religion:

Islam is capable of progress, and possesses sufficient elasticity to enable it to adapt itself to the social and political changes going on around it. The Islam, by which I mean the pure Islam as taught by Muhammad in the Quran, and not that Islam as taught by the Muhammadan Common Law was itself a profress and a change for the better. It has the vital principles of rapid development, of progress, of rationalism, and of adaptability to new circumstances. (p. 33.)

There's, among others, that mention of rationalism in Islam that I have mentioned. I can only hope that this kind of progressive attitude becomes ever more popular among Muslims. It is sad, though, that in Ali's article it is followed by this dogmatic statement:

The only infallible law is Leges Scripta, or the Quran. (p. 33.)

One can hope that this dogmatism will fade and Ali's view on the acceptability (from the point of view of Islam) of changing laws to fit the times wins over the stupid, dogmatic traditionalism still prevalent in some countries. He argues that:

[...] the fact that Muhammad did not compile a law, civil or canonical, for the conduct of the believers, nor did he enjoin them to do so, shows that he left to the believers in general to frame any code, civil or canon law, and to found systems which would harmonize with the times, and suit the political and social changes going on around them. (p. 33.)

Sayyid Amir Ali (1849-1928) is trying to present a case for "The Rationalistic and Philosophical Spirit of Islam", but this is all he really has to offer (in the excerpted article published in the book):

Like all other nations of antiquity, the pre-islamic Arabs were stern fatalists. The remains of their ancient poetry, sole record of old Arab thought and manners, show that before the promulgation of Islam the people of the Peninsula had absolutely abandoned themselves to the idea of an irresistible and blind fatality. Man was but a sport in the hands of Fate. This idea bred a reckless contempt of death, and an utter disregard for human life. The teachings of Islam created a revolution in the Arab mind; with the recognition of a supreme Intelligence governing the universe, they received the conception of self-dependence and of moral responsibility founded on the liberty of human volition. (p. 35.)

Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) writes about "The Necessity of Religious Reform" but is even less useful: he is mainly doing so in the context of Egypt at the end of the 19th Century; also, he seems uninterested in actual secularization of the state. Rather, he is merely interested in purging the people of harmful beliefs promoted by such groups as the Sufis:

Sufis have introduced one of these opinions: faith in God [...] is in contradiction with saving and making money, seeking work, and utilizing modern medical care. The believer in God, they would have us accept, would not be a true believer until he "cut off all means of livelihood." Faith in God is also in contradiction with precaution, prevention, and carefulness. In their opinion, faith in God implies a disregard for the consequences of one's worldly actions and a rejection of carefulness. (p. 48.)

It is clear that Abduh admires the West, and wants to (re)vitalize the Muslim people(s) by what to him at least would probably be a return to orthodoxy. He is, unfortunately, of the opinion that religion is necessary for the people, so he is not interested in reforming society by the separation of religion and state, the from the public sphere. On the contrary, he merely seeks to purifying Islam from harmful superstitious. In reading about this, I got a chilling feeling when I thought of what this might entail to minority groups. But he seems to trust that his reform would succeed through merely the education of judges, teachers, social workers, and other key people.

The next piece is on the "Methodology of Historical Writing", by 'Allama Shibli Nu'mani (1851-1914). This writer seems to have issues with European history, and a very high opinion of traditional Muslim history. While amusing, I will not dwell on these. He has some of the methodology right, but he should have been more critical. He is far too biased to see some glaring problems with the methods. Also, I think the article is outdated, because it deals with the Hadith and similar texts, with the purpose of pointing out that much of this tradition is false - but surely this is common knowledge among Muslims by now? The good thing about this kind of approach then, and one that I wholeheartedly recommend, is the embracing of critical, historical exegesis of the important texts of Islam. If (moderate, or modernist) Muslims can agree with this, then we are clearly on the same track.

Continue to Part 3.

Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 1

2011-02-03T14:09:00.008+02:00

I am fairly ignorant of recent history (from the 19th Century onward), and of social issues in general. That's not self pity - I'm trying to fix that bit by bit by reading what I can. I'm just stating this upfront so I wouldn't be thought of as some sort of an authority on the issues I'm about to write about. For the same reason, I want to state that I'm even more ignorant when it comes to Islam and the social issues connected to that religion.

I did read the Quran some years ago, in a Finnish translation, and I have read some books about the history of Islam, so I'm not totally ignorant of these issues. But to get to the point, I just picked up a book titled Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam. A Reader from the library. Edited by Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof, and published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2002, it seemed like a book I should read.

After all, Islam is a very popular religion on a global scale, and (so far) since at least the beginning of this millenium, it has been the subject of news headlines almost daily. And usually not in what might be called "a positive light". Most of what I've heard about the religion and its adherents has been scary and/or depressing. Yet, it is a popular religion. If the religion is really as bad as it seems, it sounds like getting rid of it altogether would be a good idea. But also, a very implausible one.

So, if all the Muslims of the world are not going to discard their religion, and that religion seems to be hindrance to the development of their societies, and a global threat to the security of individuals and even to world peace, is there something we could more realistically strive to achieve to remedy the situation? Well, at least according to some defenders of Islam, it is a rational religion. I am unwilling to go as far as to accept that oxymoron, but I want to grasp on the hope that at least it could be more reasonable than it often seems in the depictions of the various media, and possibly it could even be compatible with reason and science somehow. The same way that the most common form of religion in Europe, i.e. (very much secularized) moderate, liberal Christianity can, when cleaned up of the most blatant irrationality usually associated with that religion.

Wanting to understand Islam and hoping to find interpretations of the religion more suitable for this global era and for a better future than the versions of the religion usually presented in the media, I decided to start reading this book and blogging about what I found in it. What follows should be a series of short blog texts based almost completely on this one book. If I choose to use any other sources, I will make that clear. If not otherwise indicated, references will be to Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates. In fact, I will begin by quoting the very first lines of the introduction:

This book presents a series of articles, treatises, and exposés on historically significant issues written by prominent theologians, scholars, and academics in the Islamic world from the last quarter of the nineteenth centyry to the late twentieth. (p. 1)

The articles were selected "to represent two distinct and contrasting episodes in Islam's historical development". The first period (from the late nineteenth century to early twentieth century) covers discourses that "sought to bridge Islam with modernity". This work was done mostly by Muslim theologians in India and Egypt. I think I'll just have to quote at lenght this next bit, because it's fairly important:

These scholars critically examined the classical conceptions and methods of jurisprudence and decised a new approach to Islamic theology and Quranic exegesis. This new theological movement, which was nothing short of an outright rebellion against the Islamic orthodoxy, displayed an astonishing compatibility with the nineteenth-century [sic] Enlightenment. The central theological problem that engaged its thinkers revolved around the question of the validity of the knowledge derived from soureces external to Islam and the methodological adequacy of the four traditional sources of jurisprudence: the Quran, the dicra attributed to the Prophet (hadith), the consensus of the theologians (ijma), and juristic reasoning by analogy (qiyas). They resolved to reinterpret the first two sources and transform the last two in order to formulate a reformist project in light of the prevailing standards of scientific rationality and modern social theory. Such prominent intellectuals and theologiansa as Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Chiragh Ali, Muhammad Abduh, Amir Ali, and Shibli Nu'mani, and their associates and disciples presented Islamic theology in a manner consistent with modern rationalist ideas and deist religion. These theologians were impressed by the achievements of the West, ranging from scientific and technological progress, the Newtonian conception of the universe, Spencer's sociology, and Darwinian evolutionism, to Western style of living. They all argued that Islam as a world religion was thoroughly capable of adapting itself to the changing conditions of every age, the hallmarks of the perfect Muslim community being law and reason. (p. 1 - 2.)

As you might guess, I was happy to finally hear that such ideas actually had been advanced more than a century ago. There are those who still try to present interpretations of Islam along those lines, and possibly the majority of Muslims actually adhere to views similar to those. But there are those other views too, the opposite views held by terrorists, radical islamist organizations and preachers that usually make it over the threshold of what qualifies as newsworthy in "Western" media. They are the offsprings of what the editors of the book call the "second period" (from between 1930s and 1950s depending on the country to at least the end of that century). It was connected to the decline of liberal nationalism and usually came about "through right- or left-wing military coups".

In marked contrast with the previous ideologies, this new discourse categorically rejected the Western model and outlook. Such precursors of fundamentalism as Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Motahhari from Iran, Hasan al-Bana and Sayyid Qutb from Egypt, Abul Ala Maududi from Pakistan, Mustafa as-Siba'i from Syria, Abbasi Madani, Shaikh Nahnah, and Ali Belhaj from Algeria insisted on unconditional fealty ti Islam and questioned the validity of any sources of learning that were outside the Islamic cosmological doctrine. Ayatollah Khomeini advanced a theory of Islamic State based on the governance of the jurisprudent. While Islamic modernism aimed at rationalizing religious dogma to show its consonance with modernity, fundamentalism aimed at Islamizing all social institutions. And, while Islamic modernism had a predominantly social orientation, a distinctive feature of the fundamentalist movement was a high level of political activism aiming to seize state power. In fundamentalism, the political reorganization of society is the necessary step in its overall Islamization project. (p. 2.)

The editors note the problem with using the term 'fundamentalism' in this context (as opposed to the Christian context, where it is obvious at least to those familiar with the relevant discourse), but stick to it for lack of a better term. For, as they point out, other suggested terms have their problems as well. For example, 'Islamist' can equally refer to pro-West and anti-West Islamic thinkers. I suppose we'll have to just use the terms 'modernist' and 'fundamentalist' here, even if we only have a vague idea (based on the above quotations and what follows) of what they mean, instead of a clear-cut definition. That is how it is with most things anyway (to the chagrin of philosophers). Some further elucidation of what the ideas of these two opposed views espoused is provided by the following quote:

Generally, the Islamic modernists: accepted an evolutionary view of history with the West being at the pinnacle of th eworld civilization; praised the Western model; in varying degrees subscibed to the Newtonian conception of the universe; reformulated Islamic methodology in a manner congruent with the standards of nineteenth-century social theory; and affirmed the validity of the scientific knowledge, even though it was not based on Islam; favored democracy and constitutionalism, and the de facto separation of religion from politics; and formulated a modernist discourse on women by rejecting polygamy and male domination. The Islamic fundamentalists, in contrast, rejected the notion of social evolution and portrayed the West as having an aggressive political system, exploitative and materialistic economic institutions, and decadent culture. Rather than attempting to reform and modernize Islam, they aimed at Islamizing virtually all social institutions. They rejected the separation of religion from politics, defended Islamic political hierarchy in society, and male domination and polygamy in the family. (p. 3 - 4.)

Islamic modernism originated with the breakdown of traditional order of the old regime, and the formation of modern states in India, Egypt, and Iran. "It involved the integration into the world economu, the development of capitalism, and the emergence of the modern social institutions" (p. 5). Islamic fundamentalism was produced in Egypt, Syria, Iran, and Pakistan "following the military coups that effectively ended the period of somewhat liberal nationalism" (p. 6). Those countries were now authoritarian states. The exception to the revolution model is Jordan, where the Society of Muslim Brothers was kept peaceful by a government that maintained a working relationship with them, instead of blocking their political participation, as happened in other countries, with violent repercussions (p. 7).

The Introduction also contains short introductions for the books "contributors in context" that should be useful for anyone with more than passing interest in this subject. I will continue writing about what I learn from this book as I read on, unless it gets too boring.

Continue to Part 2.

Ohjeita elämään

2010-10-10T12:38:00.007+03:00

Aloin tehdä mentoroitavalleni ("kummipojalleni") listaa elämänohjeista, mutta kaipa se voisi olla kaikille lapsille ja nuorille hyödyllinen. Miksei aikuisillekin. Listaamani ohjeet eivät ole missään tarkoituksellisessa järjestyksessä, vaikka jonkin verran tärkeysjärjestystä tällaisiin listoihin väkisinkin tietysti syntyy.

Ole esimerkki muille.
Opi muiden virheistä.
Opi myös muiden hyvästä esimerkistä, mutta älä ole kenenkään seuraaja. Ole oma johtajasi.
Ole niin hyvä kuin voit olla - älä tuhlaa mahdollisuuksiasi.
Pyydä anteeksi, kun siihen on syy.
Ole ystävällinen kaikille, paitsi niille jotka väkisin osoittavat, etteivät ole sen arvoisia. Sivuuta ja unohda heidät. Niin luultavasti kaikki muutkin tekevät.
Älä kiusaa ketään, edes kostoksi.
Lue historiaa laajasti ja filosofian perusteita jonkin verran. Tällainen yleissivistys on hyväksi, mutta älä tee niistä elämäsi tärkeimpiä asioita.
Tutustu erilaisiin asioihin, kunnes innostut jostain ja löydät intohimosi. Panosta siihen enemmän.
Tunnusta tietämättömyytesi.
Muista että voit aina olla väärässä - älä omaksu liian jyrkkiä kantoja tai uskomuksia.
Vältä äärimmäisyyksiä.
Jos jokin asia on sinulle tärkeä, ota siitä selvää mahdollisimman puolueettomasti ja rehellisesti. Muuten helposti petät itseäsi ja sorrut toiveajatteluun.
Kerro tarinat tarinoina. Vain huono (ja epäeettinen) tarinankertoja väittää tarinansa olevan totta tai "perustuvan tositapahtumiin".
Älä ryyppää. Jos juot alkoholia, juo sivistyneesti. Jos se ei onnistu, älä juo ollenkaan.
Pukeudu asianmukaisesti, mutta siistististi.
Huolehdi hygieniastasi.
Kuntoile säännöllisesti, jotta pysyt terveenä vanhanakin.
Venettele säännöllisesti.
Opettele kaatumaan oikein.
Harrasta jotain taistelulajia, se kohentaa itsetuntoa. (Ja sen ohella opit myös em. kaatumisen taidon.)
Syö hyvin, siis oikeat määrät oikeita asioita.
Nuku ja lepää riittävästi. Se on kehityksesi ja terveytesi kannalta tärkeää. Se voi myös olla nautinto. Nautintokin voi olla tärkeää. Mutta älä laiskottele turhaan.
Varo lihomista, sillä laihduttaminen on paljon vaikeampaa kuin laihana pysyminen. Älä usko ihmedieetteihin.
Opettele soittamaan jotain soitinta. Siinä ei tarvitse olla hyvä saadakseen siitä iloa ja hyötyä.
Älä turhaan sulje itseltäsi mahdollisuuksia. Ei ole tarpeen polttaa siltoja takanaan, voittaakseen edessä olevat haasteet.
Älä kadu ja murehdi menneitä liikaa, vaan opi niistä.
Pidä hauskaa, nauti elämästäsi, äläkä murhehdi asioita joille et mitään mahda.
Vaikuta parhaan tietosi mukaan niihin asioihin, joihin voit vaikuttaa (ja jotka ovat vaivasi arvoisia - valitse taistelusi järkevästi). Hyvät pyrkimyksesi tekevät elämästäsi entistä merkittävämmän myös muiden kannalta.
Huomaa, että sinulle pieni asia voi olla toiselle paljon suurempi.
Jos et voi muuttaa jotain häiritsevää epäkohtaa tai ärsyttävää asiaa, yritä hyötyä siitä jollain tavalla. Näin voit kääntää ikävän asian edes jossain määrin hyväksi.
Sinulla on ehkä noin sata vuotta aikaa. Aikaisintaan 20-vuotiaana (ja luultavammin vasta 30-vuotiaana) alat saada tähän aikaskaalaan jokseenskin uskottavan näkökulman. Älä siis kiirhedi, mutta älä myöskään tuhlaa aikaasi.
Älä tuhlaa aikaasi roskaan: huonoon kirjallisuuteen, surkeisiin elokuviin, jne. Pyri löytämään vain parhaat ja niistäkin vain ne joista pidät itse. (Toisaalta, roskasta eli toisten virheistä voi oppia, mutta sellaista oppia tarvitset vain jos haluat itse kirjailijaksi, elokuvan tekijäksi, tms.)
Lue hyviä matkakertomuksia ja elämäkertoja (ainakin jonkin verran), sekä kohtuullisen laajoja ja syvällisiä katsauksia asioihin. Seuraa uutisia vain riittävästi, älä niin paljon että ne masentavat sinut.
Päiväkirjan käyttö voisi olla hyvä idea. Siihen tietysti kirjoitat vain itsellesi tärkeimmistä asioista, tapahtumista, ajatuksista, jne. Se saattaa osoittautua hyödylliseksi joskus paljon myöhemmin, joten älä heitä sitä menemään. Säästä myös muut keskeiset dokumentit elämästäsi.
Älä luule että tämä lista on täydellinen. Voit itsekin laajentaa sitä.

Symphony of Science

2010-09-18T10:09:00.006+03:00

"The Symphony of Science is a musical project headed by John Boswell, designed to deliver scientific knowledge and philosophy in musical form."
http://www.symphonyofscience.com/

I only just learned about this project, and immediately thought to myself, what a remarkable project! I've never heard of someone trying this. And listening to the music, I can say they also pulled it off beautifully! This is certainly the kind of pop-science that just about anyone should be able to appreciate.

New website location / Uusi kotisivun osoite

2010-07-16T18:40:00.002+03:00

I moved my website to the following address:

http://personal.inet.fi/koti/jouni_vilkka/

Yllä olevasta osoitteesta saa kotisivuani kurkistaa siitä kiinnostuneet.

Filosofian opiskelua harkitsevalle

2010-01-21T14:00:00.004+02:00

Alla on kopio viestistä, jonka kirjoitin vastaukseksi filosofian opiskelua harkitsevalle henkilölle, joka kyseli aiheesta neuvojani ja mielipiteitäni. Ajattelin sen ehkä kiinnostavan muitakin, joten kopioin sen tänne.

***********

En haluaisi masentaa, mutta...

Oikeastaan suosittelen, että mietit oikein tarkkaan, mitä muuta voisit opiskella, ennen kuin haet yliopistoon filosofiaa (pääaineena) opiskelemaan. Ylipäätään mitään humanistista tai yhteiskuntatieteellistä alaa ei kannata opiskella pääaineena, ellei ole valmiiksi oikeasti rikas tai muuten kykenevä itsensä työllistämään. Paitsi - kuten minun tapauksessani - jos se on ainoa vaihtoehto.

Nämä alat yleensä nimittäin kouluttavat melkein ainoastaan tutkijan uraa kohti, eikä se ole mikään mukava vaihtoehto: monen vuoden koulutus, että voi yrittää päästä hankkimaan jatkokoulutusta, että voi sitten saada surkeita apurahoja joskus kun onnistaa, ja parhaassa tapauksessa määräaikaisen viran joiksikin vuosiksi, eikä muuten senkään palkka ole huima. Monet hankkivat opettajan pätevyyden saadakseen edes jostain koulusta joskus ehkä pysyvämmän opettajan paikan, mutta niidenkin hakijoita onkin sen takia etenkin isompien kaupunkien tienoilla paljon enemmän kuin työpaikkoja...

Kannattaa miettiä ja etsiä oikeita ammattivaihtoehtoja. Esim. voisiko sosiaalityö kiinnostaa? Ns. perusammatin hankkiminen olisi varmaan ollut useimmille yliopisto-opiskelijoille parempi vaihtoehto. Itseään voi sivistää työnsä ohella esim. saittini itsenäisen opiskelun ohjetta noudattamalla. Filosofiaa (tai muita humanistisia tai yhteiskuntatieteellisiä aloja) voi toki opiskella sivuaineena jonkun järkevämmän pääaineen ohella. Esim. tulevalle asianajajalle filosofian opiskelusta voisi olla hyötyä, kuten myös tulevalle lääkärille. Kauppatieteilijät varmaan menestyvät tässä maailmassa paljon filosofeja paremmin. Tekniset alat (ks. teknilliset yliopistot) ovat hyvin työllistäviä, tietääkseni. Poliiseja ja vartijoitakin tarvitaan varmaan enenevässä määrin. Ammattikorkeasta voi saada jonkun mukavaan toimistotyöhön pätevöittävän diplomin, joka ei tee omistajastaan "ylikoulutettua" useimpiin niistä töistä. Eikä ole myöhäistä lähteä ammattikouluunkaan, sillä päteviä putkimiehiä, sähkömiehiä, yms. tarvitaan jotakuinkin aina.

Ja lisää koulutustahan voi aina hankkia, kun on ensin saanut työkokemusta, ehkä jopa melko pysyvän työpaikan.

*

Jos nyt vielä haluat tietää, niin yritän vastata kysymyksiisi. :)

Filosofiaa (kuten muitakin humanistisia aineita) opetetaan kaikkialla melko samalla tavalla. Kursseja voi suorittaa käymällä luennoilla (ja tekemällä luentotentin tai useammin kirjoitelman), seminaarimuotoisena (niissä jokainen kirjoittaa artikkelin, josta yhdessä keskustellaan), tekemällä kirjatenttejä, tai kirjoittamalla kirjoitelmia. Pro gradu -tutkielma yleensä yllättää opiskelijat vaativuudellaan. Kannattaa harjoitella sitä varten kirjoittamalla kirjoitelmia ja vaikka osallistumalla keskusteluun jollain netin hieman tavallista fiksummilla keskustelualueilla (jos semmoisia löytää ja niihin riittää aikaa).
Lisää tietoa esim. täällä:
http://www.uta.fi/laitokset/historia/filosofia/opiskelu/index.php
Kaikissa yliopistoissa on suurin piirtein samat systeemit.

Opiskelu yliopistossa on varsin itsenäistä. Ainejärjöstöjä ja muita opiskelijajärjestöjä on kyllä olemassa, kuten myös lukupiirejä, mutta on itsestä kiinni, kuinka näitä mahdollisuuksia hyödyntää. Monet (kuten minä) opiskelevat lähes täysin yksin. Mainitsin tästä, koska olen kuullut useiden opiskelijoiden kärsivän yksinäisyydestä ja tuen puutteesta, yms. Täällä ei ole sellaisia rakenteita kuin ehkä lukiossa, eikä sosiaalisia suhteita ole ehkä yhtä helppo luoda täällä kuin muualla. (Esim. ammattikorkeat ovat paljon koulumaisempia ja tässä mielessä ehkä mukavampia paikkoja.)

Olen nyt jatko-opiskelija (eli tarkoitukseni on valmistua joskus tohtoriksi, eli oikeaksi tutkijaksi), mutta erinomaisista opintosuorituksistani huolimatta tämä vaihe on todella vaikea. On hyvin todennäköistä, että epäonnistun, enkä koskaan valmistu tohtoriksi. Ja vaikka valmistuisinkin, voin silti joutua tekemään raksahommia yms. lopun ikääni. Olisin voinut valmistua ammattikorkeasta (jossa opiskelin jonkin aikaa) koodin vääntäjäksi ja tehdä nyt hyväpalkkaista työtä jossain toimistossa...

Jos varoituksistani huolimatta teet sen todennäköisen virheen, että opiskelet yliopistossa (etkä esim. teknillisessä yliopistossa), hanki työkokemusta vähintään joka kesä. Sillä on työmarkkinoilla enemmän arvoa kuin humanistisella maisterin tutkinnolla.

Onnea nyt kuitenkin, minkä tahansa tien valitsetkin!

Links to Scientific Skepticism

2010-01-03T14:00:00.004+02:00

http://www.csicop.org/

http://www.skeptic.com/downloads/WhatDoIDoNext.pdf
http://www.skeptic.com/downloads/WhereDoWeGoFromHere.pdf

http://radio.seti.org/
http://www.skeptics.com.au/
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/badastronomy/
http://www.badscience.net/
http://www.skeptic.org.uk/
http://www.quackwatch.com/
http://www.cbc.ca/quirks/
http://scienceblogs.com/
http://www.scientificamerican.com/podcast/podcasts.cfm?id=science-talk
http://www.sciencebasedmedicine.org/
http://docartemis.com/sciencepodcasters/
http://www.skeptic.com/
http://www.skepticwiki.org
http://www.snopes.com/
http://www.randi.org/
http://www.museumofhoaxes.com/
http://www.skepdic.com/
http://www.straightdope.com/
http://www.whatstheharm.net/

Podcasts:
http://www.yrad.com/cs/
http://www.geologicpodcast.com/
http://www.infidelguy.com/
http://www.logicallycritical.net/
http://www.logicallycritical.net/
http://www.youngausskeptics.com/
http://www.quackcast.com/
http://www.ottawaskeptics.org/the-reality-check
http://skepticzone.tv
http://www.skepticality.com/
http://skeptoid.com/

Started a new blog and a name change for this one

2009-11-30T22:02:00.003+02:00

I've just started a new blog at http://rpgandboardgaming.blogspot.com/

I don't have a good name for it, so for now I'll just call it "RPGs, boardgames, and gaming". I've copied my texts on those subjects (and close to them) from this blog to that one, and intend to keep these subjects in their own, separate blogs (both bilingual - mostly in English, but partly in Finnish).

For that reason, this blog was renamed simply (also for lack of better title) "Jouni Vilkka's Philosophy". I will write here anything at least remotely philosophical, or intellectual. I might write about academic philosophy, history, the human sciences, or the natural sciences. Or I might write about my own political views (if any), or about things that important in my personal life, such as working out, or Secular Humanism, Scientific Skepticism, things like that. Time will tell what (if anything) I actually end up publishing here. :)

Don't shake hands - learn to bow like the Chinese!

2009-08-10T12:40:00.003+03:00

For years I've hoped we stupid Westerners would finally learn to bow instead of shaking hands (thus exchanging some of our germs with other people). Now I'm glad to note that at least here in Tampere, Finland, city officials seem to have adapted a policy of not shaking hands with customers. Unfortunately, nobody there seems to have thought of replacing that (bad) habit with another one, such as a simple bow. (I mentioned this to the officials I met, but don't expect that to have any effect, as I'm not a consultant hired by the city.) But I hope they'll learn - I hope we'll all learn.

Of course it's possible that it will just take a long time. The officials here, according to a sign I read, have stopped shaking hands for the duration of the "current threat" or something, apparently believing that this is an unusual situation that will soon change as everything returns to normal. I doubt this will happen. Instead, I'm pretty sure that there will be more and more viral threats, especially as long as people keep shaking hands. And cultural things like that are hard to change rapidly. The farming methods in Asia should be changed much more urgently than our custom of shaking hands, but that doesn't seem to be happening.

I can only hope people all over the world start learning new customs and habits, instead of just panicking about the most recent case of flu or other candidate for the next Black Death.

How I Would Throw a Funeral

2009-07-06T16:44:00.000+03:00

Yes, I meant "throw", as in "throw a party". After all, a funeral is really just one type of party (albeit, not necessarily a happy one - although in my humble opinion, it should be). For that reason, any general advice for throwing parties should be considered. Such as on this page: http://www.ehow.com/how_135180_throw-party.html

I don't pretend to have any great insight into this subject (or any other), but I have been forced to participate in several funerals that left me with the feeling they were badly executed. For a big part, this was because they were traditional, Finnish funerals, with the Lutheran church's representatives taking care of most of the practical issues. What apparently hasn't occured to many people, is to ask the simple questions "What is the purpose of the funeral?" and "Whom is the funeral for?" - and then to follow this reasoning to question all the tradition that goes with it.
Most of this, as well as the following meager advice, applies to other kinds of parties as well, such as weddings, for example - mutatis mutandis, of course.

The following is some more specific advice I've thought of.

I would have no actual burial as part of the funeral, unless really needed. In that case, I'd either do it afterwards with the select, small group only, or before the guests arrive to the memorial service. Of course, cremation in the presence of the family might be one option. If at all possible, I'd have the dead buried in the most ecological way possible, which usually means burial in cloth, not casket.

But I would prefer to have the remains in a coffin or an urn present during the memorial service. It would be as if the person is still there, and people could rhetorically address speeches to him or her, if they wish.

Of course, funerals are in reality held for the living, not the dead. The dead no longer suffer. That is something to be glad about. Nor do they care what sort of funerals they get. The living may still suffer, and the funeral may be necessary to alleviate their emotional suffering. Funerals serve several purposes, such as giving "closure" to those who knew and possibly loved the deceased, bringing together such people, and providing an opportunity to celebrate a life that's ended. In this grim world just the opportunity to have a party should not be looked down upon either. An important thing in all this is to remember that there may be several different kinds of people who all need the same closure. When planning and executing a funeral, co-operation with all these people is well adviced. Participation in the procedings may be important for some, unimportant for others. It seems common sensical to at least ask the people who were close to the deceased, what they think. If possible, a meeting for planning the event might be good, but with contemporary information technlogy, and "postmodern" life style separating people from each other by great distances, it might be unnecessary and impractical.

It's not possible to give universally useful practical advice, except this: do what seems best. Personally, I'd have no religious service with its empty rituals. I'd rather skip such pointless things and move straigh to the memorial service. This would allow one to remove the problems associated with travelling between the different places, like from a chappel & cemetary to a restaurant. Often it's hard to find parking spaces, and the whole process of moving from one place to another takes time that could be spent doing something more meaningful. And the empty rituals are for most people just boring waste of time anyway.

The memorial "service" should have a structure planned out beforehand, at least if it involves any performances. A eulogy, or several, could be presented, and they should be announced in the invitation card along with other possible performances, so everyone would know what to expect. I in general would avoid formalities, but professional speakers could be hired . There are secular humanists who practice that for a living, but undoubtedly even some priests, with proper instructions, could pull it off.

There you have it. In short, it's all about asking why the funeral is to be held, for whom, and what is it supposed to achieve. Throwing away useless tradition and reaching into the common human emotions and allowing them to be expressed is probably the most important aspect for each individual participant. To celebrate the life that ended, the achievements of the deceased, is a way to honour that person, and our common humanity. No superstitious trappings are needed, and for a growing majority, such things are more of a hindrance than any sort of benefit by now. In the end, a funeral is just one type of party, where people with something - or someone - in common can come together and celebrate.

Mikael el-Hakim (i.e. Waltari) uskonnosta

2009-06-19T16:56:00.003+03:00

Seuraava lainaus on odotellut pöydälläni jotain käyttöä jo varsin kauan. Kun en kerran sille muutakaan keksinyt, päätin kopioida sen tänne.

"Todellinen uskovainen pitää omaa uskoaan ainoana oikeana, olipa hän kristitty, juutalainen tai muslim, ja tapuminen kunnioittamaan toisten uskoa tahtomatta tappaa heitä sen tähden merkitsee vain ihmisen sydämessään luopuneen uskostaan. Epäilemättä maailmassa on jo koko joukko valistuneita ihmisiä, jotka ajattelevat kuten sinä, mutta heidän lukumääränsä on aina pysyvä pienenä ja heidän on pakko pysyä pysyä viisaasti vaiti, koska vain ahdasrajainen, kiihkoileva usko kannustaa ihmisen tekoihin eikä suinkaan valistunut viisaus.
[...]
Uskonsa menettäneen on aina varminta pysyä vaiti, koska ihmisten suuri joukko haluaa ikuisesti uskoa ja uskon väistämättömänä seurauksena on toisten tappaminen uskon eroavaisuuksien vuoksi."
- Mikael el-Hakim suurvisiirille
Mika Waltarin teoksessa Mikael Hakim (s. 338; WSOY, 1949)

Deathlands - elokuvan lyhyt arvio

2009-02-07T12:20:00.001+02:00

Toivottavasti ette tuhlanneet aikaanne elokuvaan nimeltä Deathlands, joka tuli telkusta eilen. Uskomattoman huono pätkä, ehkä pilotti TV-sarjalle jota ei koskaan (ymmärrettävistä syistä) tehty. Mitään hyvää siinä ei tainnut olla. Kliseitä, naurettavaa veren lotraamista (mitä en suinkaan vastusta jos se tehdään humoristisesti tai realistisesti, mutta tämä ei ollut kumpaakaan), typeriä leikkauksia ja huonoa ohjaamista, kameran käytössäkin vähintään parannettavaa. Maiseman värittäminen punaisen linssin läpi kuvaamalla ei nyt hirveesti vakuuttanut ja lavastus oli muutenkin haitarista. Kässäriä ei tarvinne mainita. Näyttelijöitä (edes sitä entistä pornotähteä) en syyllistä, koska varmaan vaatii tekemistä että kestää läpi tuon roskan edes normaalilla keskinkertaisella TV-näyttelemisen tasolla.

Oli siinä sentään yksi tahattomasti hauska kohta: Päähenkilö, joka oli vähän aiemmin ampunut rynkyllään, huomasi auton lähestyvän ja viritti aseensa (siis turhaan, mutta tätähän elokuvissa usein tehdään). Sitten leikattiin lähikuvaan kun hän tähtäsi pyssynsä (M16) kohti autoa. Silloin repesin. Aseessa ei nimittäin ollut lipasta! :D Leikkaus oli kyllä tehty nin, että periaatteessa se olis voinut ladata piippuun suoraan yhden kuulan, mutta miksei tätä sitten näytetty, ja miksi ihmeessä se tekis nin, kun sillä oli varmasti niitä lippaita?! Yksi pieni naurahdus on aivan liian vähän elokuvasta, jonka jaksoin katsoa enimmäkseen vain kuvakelauksella ja oli se aika tuskaa ninkin.

Birthday poem

2008-11-28T19:54:00.003+02:00

This is a poem I originally wrote in the mid 1990s (perhaps 1995, but I can't be sure) as a birthday greeting for a friend. I've used it repeatedly for the same purpose afterwards.
As another personal note, I haven't really celebrated my birthdays since I was 13, but it's not for a fear of death. It's because birth, in my more or less humble opinion, is not something worth celebrating.

Happy birthday?

Each day we live
each taken breath
is taking a step
'wards sooner death

That was the short little poem. You could take it in several ways I guess. Drop me a line if you think it was any good, or stopped you to think. Or if you want to comment on it in any way. Otherwise I'll keep thinking that I'm only blogging for myself. :-)

Oh, and if you think it's good enough to be used (as a birthday greeting, for non-commercial uses, of course), you're free to do so, including the proper credit (i.e. "by Jouni Vilkka"). Not that you'd actually think it's that good, but one can dream. :-)

Believers categorized

2008-05-13T17:16:00.004+03:00

Having spent more time on this subject than is healthy, I think I can put down some of what I've learned about people.

Religious believers can be divided into four categories. The same applies to any other superstitious people as well, but to keep things simple, I'll talk about the religious. I think I can list them in order from the most common to the least common type. The categories are as follows:

1. The indifferent. For these people, religion is just a part of tradition. They probably rarely go to church, except for wedding, funerals, and the like. They do not care much about intellectual matters, and they don't care to think much about religious matters either. They are fine with what they've been taught as kids.

2. The dogmatic. These people do care about religion, a lot. I think much of their loud defending of the religion's most ridiculous dogma (creationism, the Shroud of Turin, biblical history, the Deluge...) is actually more about showing or proving that they are part of the flock, more than it is about the dogma itself. For this reason they are often apologists for their religion. They don't care much about the truth and have very little or no intellectual honesty in them. They will never discard their faith, so it's pointless to waste time debating with them. The worst of this kind will resort to terrorism.

3. The rational. These are the few who it is worth debating with, or to whom information should be given. They will quickly discard their false beliefs when they have learned enough. When they have discarded their religion, they often become angry because of the lies and propaganda that they now recognize, but with time and experience become more moderate.

4. The rational but reluctant. Strongly attached to their religion, but unable to indefinitely fool themselves, they go through a lenghty and often painful struggle that can last for decades. This process is caused when their intellectual honesty and reason attempt to overcome the non-epistemic causes of their faith and the power of the virus of the mind. One can and should help reason triumph, by offering help and support.

I'm sure many of the religious will object to this list. Some may be from the first category, in which case they object, because they don't want to face the subject - at least not with intellectual honesty and the research it requires. The most vocal will come from the second category, which is only to be expected. They will behave in typically irrational ways, showing extremely bad manners as well. Those from the third and fourth category will be more intrigued, and are directed toward the lists of literature and weblinks on my blog and website. For them, I wish courage and strenght in the endeavour.

How religion enslaves your mind in seven short steps

2008-04-26T20:57:00.005+03:00

The following is how Christianity works to enslave the minds of people, explained in few simple steps, but probably most religions do it pretty much the same way.

1. It convinces that you're afflicted by Primal Sin. In other words, it tells you there's something wrong with you (everybody). This and other sins will damn you terribly. Much is often made of just how bad your fate will be unless you get Saved.

2. It tells you that it is the only way to salvation, because it's the only religion that washes away your sins. That is, cures you of the illness it first claimed you're aflicted with. These first two points are basically all that's needed, but other points follow to "close the deal". And your mind too, while it's at it.

3. Christianity especially, but certainly not uniquely, emphasizes the importance of belief itself. Only if you believe the dogma of religion will you be saved. This clever trick forces you to hesitate to even think about questioning the basic claims of the religion, such as the first two points above. It is designed to shut down your naturally inquiring, skeptical mind, and block any internal criticism of the religion. The next two points are designed against external criticism.

4. You are told from a very early age that, among other things, morality comes from the god of your religion. Allegedly (and by the time you reach the age of reason, this will sound extremely stupid) without god or religion, there is no morality and everyone could do just anything they please, causing society to fall into anarchy. The real purpose of this preposterous lie is to label (by libel) all critics of religion (in general, or your religion in particular) as immoral, anti-social, and dangerous people, thus attempting (and - sadly - often succeeding) to ostracise them from society, or at least seriously diminishing the effectiveness of external criticism of the religion.

5. Also, from a very early age you are brainwashed (if successful) into believing that god, and god alone, provides you and everyone with a "purpose of life" or a "meaning of life". So without god (or perhaps, without religion) nothing matters and you could just as well be dead. That's what the religion wants you and everyone else as well to believe, because once this meme is properly installed into your brain, it will serve two important functions: First is to strongly discourage you from every entertaining the notion that your god might not exist, thus keeping you in the fold. Second, should you ever succeed in ridding your mind and worldview of the superstitious notion of god, you may fail to realize that this meme was also a lie promoted by the religious propaganda machine. Thus, once you've "lost" religious faith, you may believe that nothing matters and you could as well be dead - perhaps leading to suicide, but more likely at least causing you to become demoralized. Either way, it reduces the likelihood of you becoming a nuisance to the religion by criticising it. It is possible that a great number of people who otherwise could have become important thinkers, have instead committed suicide because of this insidious piece of evil propaganda. It effectively reduces the number of external critics of the religion.

(If you only analyze the notions of meaning or purpose of life, you will see that there is no reason why you should allow anyone to treat you like an object by forcing a purpose on you; an individual guides himself in life, making it meaningful by creating his own goals and purposes. Others may also find his life meaningful and important, but that is merely an unnecessary, although beneficial, sideproduct.)

6. The last two points contribute to this sixth point, which is the detrimental claim or assertion that religion is so good as to be called holy and to be treated as taboo. That is, everyone - regardless of their religious views or lack thereof, are to treat (this) religion with respect, whether it truly deserves it or not. At the very least, criticising it in any way - even by making truthful and well-grounded arguments against it - is considered "politically incorrect" behaviour and strongly frowned upon. It's amazing how completely even secular people have adopted this anti-rational policy. (This is also why some people strongly dislike being called atheists, although that also has to do with the defamation of that term that has been going on for centuries, or longer.) For an honest truth seeker, there are no taboos, and anything and everything can and should be a valid target of critical inquiry. Religions hate such inquiry for obvious reasons, so they do their best to incite the religious emotions of the masses against critics of religion by appealing to religious notions of holiness, as well as political correctness, which seems popular among certain politically (non-)thinking crowd.

7. Finally, religions demand sacrifices of various kinds, but mostly time and money. Silly - public - shows of obedience are also used. This not only benefits the religious hierarchy through the power and money they gain by this method, it also causes you to have a "vested interest" in your religion. If you've spent countless hours praying, and a significant portion of your income supporting a church, you would feel foolish if you were to realize that it was all for naught. So rather than "losing face" that way, you are more likely to continue practicing your religion. To the detriment of society and to the hindrance of human progress - and with the rising stakes of the present and imminent future, possibly even to the destruction of the greatest things mankind has achieved, and even of our species itself.

Työ tekee duunarin

2008-03-12T16:58:00.002+02:00

Teen rahaa ansaitakseni (enkä vain saadakseni) sekalaisia keikkahommia työläisiä kuin orjia vuokraavan firman palveluksessa. (Teen tosin myös opettajan sijaisuuksia, mutta se on vähän toinen asia...)

Tulin tänään raksalta väsyneenä kotiin ja heti ensimmäisenä korkkasin olutpullon ja avasin telkkarin. Hetken päästä nälkääni lievittääkseni paistoin pekonia ja munia ja hotkin ne ennen kuin ne ehtivät aivan kypsyäkään. (Valuvaa munan keltuaista... Nam!)

Täytyy tosin myöntää, että heti perään tein myös pastaa, mutta tässä vaiheessa aloin kyllä jo huomata uppoavani johonkin muottiin... Jos tällaista työtä jatkuisi yhtäjaksoisesti pitempäänkin, muuttuisin epäilemättä piankin kunnon duunariksi.

Mutta ehkä en ole siellä ihan vielä. Nyt juuri haluaisin mitä suurimmalla nautinnolla päästä maistamaan mainiota capucinoa.

'Bright' = 'Valoisa'?

2008-03-02T19:08:00.003+02:00

This one I have to write in both languages, but that's not a big problem, because what I've said doesn't take long to say (or write) and I've already written the main point in the title.

The term of the movement (one of the movements) for increasing awareness, acceptance, and political influence of the non-religious known commonly as the Brights' Movements has been subjected to criticism because of the well-intentioned but perhaps a bit failed choice of name. "Bright" is not intented to be understood to mean "smart", but rather something positive to do with light (due to the connection with the Enlightenment), such as "bright sunny day".

But there's a significant difficulty in translating that term to Finnish. My suggestion is to use the term "Valoisa", as in "valoisa huone", or better yet "valoisa mieli". It has none of the connotation of Välkky (Smart), and all the connotation of niceness, happiness, and optimism.

*

Tähän mennessä suomenkieliset lukijani (jos heitä on) ovat jo ymmärtäneet sanomani, sikäli kuin tietävät mistä on kyse. "Bright" voitaisiin kääntää "Valoisa", koska toisin kuin "Välkky", tuolla sanalla ei ole ylimielisen kuuloista, älykkyyteen viittaavaa konnotaatiota, vaan siitä tulee mieleen lähinnä optimistinen mieli, onnellisuus, sekä muuta mukavaa.

Tällä termillä siis viitattaisiin henkilöihin, jotka kuuluvat uskonnottomien Bright-liikkeeseen. Tämän liikkeen tavoite on parantaa uskonnottomista vallitsevaa mielikuvaa ja sitä kautta heidän yhteiskunnallista asemaansa.

Dark poetry from my past

2008-02-29T14:23:00.005+02:00

Besides short stories, I also used to write some (pretty damn dark) poetry when I was younger. Most of it was bad or really bad, but there were some exceptions. I nearly always wrote in English, which is why I'm posting this in English as well. It's one of the few exceptions, a not too crappy piece of poetry. Anyway, that's what I think.

The Spring has come ?

Birds are singing in the trees
The grass is green, trees are making leaves
Few clouds in the light-blue sky
Sun's gaze so warm, Summer must be nigh
I listen to the soft sounds of a stream
Last remnants of Winter - now a molten dream
I see joy, excitement, in people's faces
Happiness fills even the gloomiest places
I look at this world's emerging from the frost
It seems filled with something I've already lost
Remembering those dark Winter nights
I gaze upon Summer's praised midnight lights
There seems to be life where ever I turn my eyes
But inside my soul - just permafrost and ice...

Written in Spring 1998

I had been depressed for most of my life by then, but around the time I wrote this, I was slowly getting out of the worst low - the previous three years or so. A few years later I'd finally be out of it completely. But the downside is that I didn't much write poetry or even fiction afterwards - and it's been ten years! (The only fiction I've done since is with Role Playing Games.) Everything has a price, I guess.

Lapsiporno ja viranomaisten mielivalta

2008-02-24T21:35:00.008+02:00

Huolestuttavaa. Huomasin Iltalehden nettiversiossa uutisen, josta alla ote:

"Erityisesti nettivapauden puolustajat ovat närkästyneet siitä, että poliisi liitti suodatuslistalleen nettiaktivisti Matti Nikin sivut, joilla on julkaistu sekä Suomen KRP:n että ulkomaisten poliisien suodatuslistoja. Esimerkiksi nettivapautta ajava Effi ry on vaatinut poliisia selvittämään, miksi se suodattaa sensuurin vastaisia sivuja. [...]
Koska suodatus on vielä kaikkea muuta kuin kattavaa, suuri osa netin käyttäjistä pääsee halutessaan vapaasti tutustumaan Nikin listoihin ja myös linkkien takana oleviin pornosivustoihin, joilla esiintyjät ovat pitkälti teini-ikäiseltä vaikuttavia tyttöjä ja poikia.
Henriksson epäilee kritiikin voivan liittyä siihen, etteivät kaikki miellä teinipornoa lapsipornoksi. Suomessa suojaikäraja on pornossa 18 vuotta. Sillä ei ole merkitystä, että kuvat voivat olla laillisia maassa, jossa palvelin toimii."
- http://www.iltalehti.fi/uutiset/200802247292886_uu.shtml

Ylipäätään "suodattaminen" (tai sen yrittäminen) on epäilyttävää ja sensuurin vastaisten sivujen suodattaminen etenkin, mutta silmääni pisti kohta, jossa mainitaan että suodatetuilla sivuilla "esiintyjät ovat pitkälti teini-ikäiseltä vaikuttavia tyttöjä ja poikia".

Lapsipornoahan on kauhisteltu jo kauan ja siitä mielellään esitetään kaikenlaisia kauhukuvia. Niiden ansiosta useimmille tulee jo sanasta "lapsiporno" mieleen vauvojen tai alle kouluikäisten raiskaaminen. Ja se tietysti onkin tarkoitus, koska sillä saadaan aikaan haluttu reaktio yleisössä.

Mutta nyt ilmeisesti poliisi onkin yhdistänyt sanan "lapsiporno" teini-ikäisiin ja väittää jopa teini-ikäisiltä vaikuttavien esiintyjien käyttämisen pornossa olevan lapsipornoa. Kuka kumma arvioi, milloin joku vaikuttaa teini-ikäiseltä? Jos mummolla on lapsekkaat peppipitkätossu-letit, riittääkö se? Jos käsitteet eivät ole selviä ja tarkkoja, ollaan viranomaisten mielivallan armoilla, eikä siitä ole pitkä matka totalitarismiin.

Päätin yrittää löytää laista hieman tarkennusta (alla lyhentäen kopioitu ote):

Laki lapsipornografian levittämisen estotoimista 1.12.2006/1068

Tämän lain tarkoituksena on lasten ja heidän perusoikeuksiensa suojaamiseksi edistää toimenpiteitä, joiden avulla voidaan estää pääsy ulkomailla ylläpidettäviin lapsipornosivustoihin.

Tässä laissa tarkoitetaan
lapsipornosivustolla lasta esittävän sukupuolisiveellisyyttä loukkaavan kuvan levittämistä internetin kautta
Poliisi voi laatia, ylläpitää ja päivittää luetteloa lapsipornosivustoista.
Poliisin 4 §:n mukaisesti laatimat luettelot ovat salassa pidettäviä.
- http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/ajantasa/2006/20061068

Tästä otteesta selviää, että poliisi voi haluamallaan tavalla tehdä luetteloita, joiden sisältöä sen ei tarvitse paljastaa kenellekään. Kuka pitää huolta siitä, että luettelo sisältää vain ja ainoastaan lapsipornosivustojen osoitteita?

Entä mitä on "sukupuolisiveellisyys"? Yritin selvittää asiaa ja löysin seuraavaa (taas lyhentäen kopioitu ote):

Rikoslain 17 luvussa lapsipornografiaan liittyvistä rikoksista säädetty seuraavasti:

18 § (9.7.20047/650)

Sukupuolisiveellisyyttä loukkaavan kuvan levittäminen

Joka valmistaa, pitää kaupan tai vuokrattavana, vie maasta, tuo maahan tai Suomen kautta muuhun maahan taikka muuten levittää kuvia tai kuvatallenteita, joissa sukupuolisiveellisyyttä loukkaavasti esitetään

1) lasta,

2) väkivaltaa tai

3) eläimeen sekaantumista,

on tuomittava sukupuolisiveellisyyttä loukkaavan kuvan levittämisestä sakkoon tai vankeuteen enintään kahdeksi vuodeksi.

Yritys on rangaistava.

Lapsena pidetään kahdeksaatoista vuotta nuorempaa henkilöä sekä henkilöä, jonka ikää ei voida selvittää mutta jonka on perusteltua syytä olettaa olevan kahdeksaatoista vuotta nuorempi.

18 a § (9.7.2004/650)

Törkeä sukupuolisiveellisyyttä loukkaavan lasta esittävän kuvan levittäminen
Jos sukupuolisiveellisyyttä loukkaavan lasta esittävän kuvan levittämisessä

1) lapsi on erityisen nuori, [...]

19 § (9.7.2004/650)

Sukupuolisiveellisyyttä loukkaavan lasta esittävän kuvan hallussapito

Joka oikeudettomasti pitää hallussaan valokuvaa, videonauhaa, elokuvaa tai muuta todellisuudenmukaista kuvatallennetta, jossa esitetään 18 §:n 4 momentissa tarkoitettua lasta sukupuoliyhteydessä tai siihen rinnastettavassa seksuaalisessa kanssakäymisessä taikka muulla sukupuolisiveellisyyttä ilmeisen loukkaavalla tavalla, on tuomittava sukupuolisiveellisyyttä loukkaavan lasta esittävän kuvan hallussapidosta sakkoon tai vankeuteen enintään yhdeksi vuodeksi.
Rikoslaissa 20 luvussa lapsiin kohdistuvista rikoksista säädetty seuraavasti:

6 § (24.7.1998/563)

Lapsen seksuaalinen hyväksikäyttö

Joka

1) on sukupuoliyhteydessä kuuttatoista vuotta nuoremman lapsen kanssa [...]

on tuomittava lapsen seksuaalisesta hyväksikäytöstä [...]

Lapsen seksuaalisena hyväksikäyttönä ei kuitenkaan pidetä 1 momentissa tarkoitettua tekoa, jos osapuolten iässä tai henkisessä ja ruumiillisessa kypsyydessä ei ole suurta eroa.

- http://lugos.fv.fi:8001/Rikoslain_17_luku_
lapsipornografiaan_liittyvat.pdf

Laissa näyttää olevan useampiakin kyseenalaisia kohtia.
Lapsipornon pelkän hallussapidon tekeminen laittomaksi, kun kyseessä voi olla pelkkä tiedosto, saattaa olla vaarallista. En ole asiantuntija, mutta käsittääkseni esim. kuvatiedostoja voidaan kätkeä muihin tiedostoihin ja lisäksi hakkerit voivat käyttää pahaa-aavistamattomien, tavanomaisten netinkäyttäjien tietokoneita palvelimina tai kuviensa tallennuspaikkoina, ilman että tavallinen käyttäjä osaa sitä edes epäillä. Epämiellyttävä ajatus. Mutta vielä epämiellyttävämpää olisi joutua vankilaan lapsipornon hallussapitäjänä jonkun tuollaisen hakkerin toiminnan takia.
Olin kuitenkin etsimässä määritelmää sukupuolisiveellisyydelle...

Lainauksen perusteella "sukupuolisiveellisyyttä loukkaavasti esitettämällä"
1) lasta,
2) väkivaltaa tai
3) eläimeen sekaantumista
voi saada syytteen. Tästä ei selvinnyt, mitä tuo sukupuolisiveellisyyden loukkaaminen on, mutta voi olettaa sillä tarkoitettavan seksiaktien kuvaamista, jos näihin akteihin liittyy yksi tai useampi luetelluista asioista. Tarkoittaako tämä, että sadomasokistisen seksin kuvaaminen on myös laitonta?

Se ainakin selvisi, että lain mukaan todellakin lapsena pidetään kahdeksaatoista vuotta nuorempaa henkilöä sekä henkilöä, jonka ikää ei voida selvittää mutta jonka on perusteltua syytä olettaa olevan kahdeksaatoista vuotta nuorempi. Siis pakolainen, joka ei voi todistaa henkilöllisyyttään ja näyttää (kenen tahansa viranomaisen mielestä?) lapselta, on lain mukaan lapsi? Näinkö tämä pitäisi ymmärtää?

Vaikka siis lapsipornoa maalaillaan mahdollisimman synkillä väreillä, jotta kaikille syntyisi edellä mainitsemani mielikuva vauvojen raiskaamisesta, sen kuvaamat henkilöt ovatkin vain alle 18-vuotiaita, hyvinkin mahdollisesti itse vapaa-ehtoisia. Vasta törkeässä rikoksen versiossa on kyse "erityisen nuorista" lapsista. Mielestäni on varsin pelottavaa (ja törkeää!) jos viranomaiset tarkoituksellisesti johtavat kansalaisia harhaan tällaisilla käsitekikkailuilla. Mitä tässä usein naurettavaksikin menevässä lapsipornon metsästyksessä oikeasti on takana?

Laissa tulee esiin myös toinen ihmeellinen ikärajoihin liittyvä asia. Korkeintaan 15-vuotiaan kanssa sukupuoliyhteydessä (tms.) olemalla voi saada syytteen lapsen seksuaalisesta hyväksikäytöstä - paitsi jos osapuolten iässä tai henkisessä ja ruumiillisessa kypsyydessä ei ole suurta eroa. Taas arvion tekeminen jäänee viranomaisille; ainakaan tässä ei asiasta enempää mainita. Voisi kuvitella, että esim. psykiatri voisi olla tavallista kyttää parempi arvion tekemisessä, mutta jos muita kriteerejä ei ole, taitaa ratkaisu aina jäädä subjektiiviseksi.

Mutta tuosta tuli mieleeni tämän poikkeuksen yhdistäminen lapsipornoon. Entä jos sen käyttäjä on henkiseltä tai ruumiilliselta kypsyydeltään suurin piirtein samalla tasolla kuvissa esitettyjen (siis 18-vuotiasta nuoremman näköisten) henkilöiden kanssa? Laissa näitä asioita ei ole yhdistetty, mutta niiden välinen analogia on kuitenkin ilmeinen. 18-vuotias saa kyllä katsella pornoa, mutta jos viranomaisen mielestä siinä esitetään alle 18-vuotiaan näköisiä ihmisiä, teko muuttuu rikokseksi. Näin siis, vaikka sama 18-vuotias saa harrastaa seksiä vaikka 16-vuotiaan kanssa täysin laillisesti, kunhan he ovat yhtä mielivaltaisen viranomaispäätöksen mukaan kypsyydeltään suurin piirtein samalla tasolla.

Ovatkohan Suomen lait ylipäätään yhtä epämääräisiä ja viranomaisten mielivaltaa suosivia? Ainakin käsite "sukupuolisiveellisyys" jäi minulle edelleen epäselväksi, koska en siihen löytänyt määritelmää finlexistä. Olisin kiitollinen, jos joku asiasta paremmin tietävä selvittäisi asian minullekin.

Erityisesti minua ihmetyttää, kuinka sukupuolisiveellisyyttä voi loukata? Kyseessähän on ilmeisen abstrakti käsite. En tiennyt että sellaisia voi loukata tai että sellaiset voisivat loukkaantua. Kuka määrittelee sukupuolisiveellisyyden tai sen, milloin sitä on loukattu?

True Horoscope Signs / Todelliset Aurinkomerkit

2008-01-18T10:57:00.000+02:00

I just tried the Facebook application "Birthday Sky: My True Sign". It seemed like an unusually good application for Facebook, and because of the implications of the information it provides, it's unusual as a Facebook application in that I, a Scientific Skeptic, also like it. :-)

My only criticism of the application is that the box it created on my Profile now claims that I'm a Leo although I had previously mistakenly believed that I'm a Virgo. Not true! I've known for many years that I'm a Leo, even though tabloid horoscopes claim otherwise. :-)

Ok, that's not to be taken too seriously.

For those who don't want to, or cannot, use the application, here are the approximate dates for the various Sun Signs:

Capricorn - Jan 20 to Feb 16
Aquarius - Feb 16 to Mar 11
Pisces - Mar 11 to Apr 18
Aries - Apr 18 to May 13
Taurus - May 13 to Jun 21
Gemini - Jun 21 to Jul 20
Cancer - Jul 20 to Aug 10
Leo - Aug 10 to Sep 16
Virgo - Sep 16 to Oct 30
Libra - Oct 30 to Nov 23
Scorpius - Nov 23 to Nov 29
Ophiuchus - Nov 29 to Dec 17
Sagittarius - Dec 17 to Jan 20

Not that it much matters what one's Sun Sign is. Astrology is, as everyone should know, simply a stupid pseudo-science now. In other words, it's BS.

*

I'm attaching a copy of a page from an old issue Skeptikko, the Finnish magazine for Scientific Skepticism. I'm pretty sure I have the permission to do so.

Muslim Reform

2008-01-09T16:44:00.000+02:00

Irshad Manji For Muslim Reform and Moral Courage
( http://www.irshadmanji.com/ )

Finally there are signs of a possibility of Muslim reform, although not surprisingly the signs are mostly from "the West". Perhaps I shouldn't be surprised that the reformers (or at least the most well known of them) seem to be women.

Although I strongly welcome this movement, I think it too is fundamentally flawed in that it fails to recognize the problems with religion in general or Islam specifically. It refuses to asses the very foundation of the notion of reform, by failing to ask, should there be any religion at all. By simply starting - as all religious people seem to do - from the assumption that their religion has the right to exist and the justification to be participated in, these reformers fail to go full distance.

But in this case, even some distance is better than nothing. It took a long time for the Enlightenment to arise in Europe, and before this could happen, much internal dispute had to occur within religion and the religiously dominated continent. Only when enough people had come to know of the intellectual and ethical problems of religion, could criticism and free discussion of such things begin. Perhaps western "intellectual" muslims can smuggle some such freedom of thought into the religious discourse of the muslims in less well-off areas? Perhaps, after years of debate and the branching off of various "heretical" sects of Islam, enough muslims around the world will become more educated in their religion, thus allowing serious criticism of the religion to be heard, and opening the possibility of finally secularizing Islam and bringing the muslims out of the dark ages of religion into the 21st Century.

*

See also http://www.secularislam.org

Get in shape quickly, easily, and (almost) without sweating - and at low or no cost

2007-11-20T10:07:00.000+02:00

Mens sana in corpore sano. First, allow me to clarify that I'm not trying to sell you anything, except maybe an idea - and that one I'll give you for free. It's nothing new, but it's possible that you just haven't thought of it before.

If you're reading this, you probably want to get in shape, which means that you haven't been working out much recently, right? I've been studying for years and I didn't take care of my physical condition during that time, until I graduated with my first M.A. At about that time I realized two things: I was in a really bad shape, and stress can (at least to some extent) be controlled by physical exercise. And stress is a bitch - I've been trying my best to avoid it ever since.

Anyway, I was spending most of my time at home, reading and sometimes writing. So I came up with a method of exercising that suited me very well: I could do it at home, without buying any new equipment, and I could do it with very little need to sweat. And it turned out to be a surprisingly powerful method!

The first thing to do is to think of a motivator. Anything that can drive you to do the exercise should work. Eventually this can be replaced by just the desire to follow the method, or it can be changed to something else. I chose to use alcohol as my motivator.

The idea is then to draw a table with columns for date, daily total, and between them columns for all the exercises you're going to be doing. They can include just the basic pushups and stomach crunches, but the more variety, the better. They should include walking, and carrying, because these you will probably do daily anyway.

For each exercise you figure out what amount of effort will reward one point, and then you'll just mark the points in the table as you get them done. For example, walking to work could be one point, carrying a bag of groceries another, and doing 25 pushups a third. Then you need to have a goal for the amount of daily exercise. It can take a while to find a suitable amount, but for me it eventually turned out to be 15 points. It doesn't matter that much, if some days you can't get all the points done, you don't have to start from scracth the next day. Instead, you continue from the previous day and try to get the average effort per day to the same level.

When you have attained your daily goal, you can use that to reward yourself with your chosen kind of reward - for me it was a dose of alcohol (a shot of whiskey or a bottle of beer). When you take your reward, just mark one of the daily totals as used.

It also helps to have a routine for doing the exercises. I used to do them every hour, on the hour, usually in sets of two exercises, such as stomach crunches followed by dumbell curls.

You probably noticed that I'm talking about my method in the past tense. That's not because I had stopped using it (completely), but because I recently bought a barbell (cf. the picture) and new dumbells, and I've been using the work out courses in the booklet that came with them. I still use my own method, but the now most of the exercises I do are in the weight lifting courses, and I don't mark them in their separate columns. Instead, I added a column for the courses and another for chores I have to do, which includes cleaning the appartment and washing dishes, as well as studying.

I am already in better shape than I've ever been, and although I now sweat when doing the work out with the weights, I didn't have to, when I was doing the old method. Having some basic equipment, such as dumbells and some kind of bar for chinups helps, but they aren't necessary for that method to get you in shape. Just remember to do different kinds of exercises, for the stomach and the back especially, if you're normally doing some kind of sitting work (as opposed to manual labour). But I have to say, the barbell is a very good tool for excerices, probably the best along with the chin up bar (the name of which I actually don't know).

I'd like to hear if this method actually helps you!

My motto

2007-11-20T09:54:00.000+02:00

It is my duty to seek the truth and avoid falsehood as honestly as possible,
striving to promote fairness and justice in our world,
and to do good to the best of my abilities, or at least to do no evil.

These duties have I set for myself, for only thus do I justify my own existence
and make my life worth living.

*

Although it is my motto, I don't mind if others adopt it. IMHO, it might be a good idea for people to do so, or to devise their own, to help them steer their lives toward their own goals (which, hopefully, will not be totally selfish).

***

In Finnish:

Velvollisuuteni on tavoitella totuutta ja välttää epätotuutta mahdollisimman rehellisesti,
pyrkien reiluuden ja oikeudenmukaisuuden edistämiseen maailmassamme,
tehden hyvää kykyjeni mukaan tai ainakin ollen tekemättä pahaa.

Nämä velvollisuudet olen asettanut itselleni, sillä vain näin oikeutan olemassaoloni
ja teen elämästäni elämisen arvoisen.

*

Mottoni saa omaksua, jos ei keksi itselleen sopivampaa.

Bilingual Introduction

2007-11-19T23:08:00.000+02:00

I have for a long time thought about joining the masses of (more or less) intellectual exhibitionists on the web, who shamelesly parade their lives, thoughts and emotions in a public diary (as opposed to hiding and locking away their diaries, as people used to do). I'm not presumptuous enough to think that anyone besides myself will actually read what I post here, so I will use this blog as an opportunity perhaps to vent some steam and write less carefully than I might in a more traditional publication. I will doubtless offend many potential readers, but as the number of actual readers will probably remain low, I think that will be acceptable. In any case, I don't intend to provoke, offend, hurt, or cause anything negative to anyone who does not deserve it, so I can only hope that the readers will be wise enough to understand the purpose of this blog and so avoid such effects. I have a website for my more academic texts (among other things).

I'm a philosopher (a lover of wisdom, therefore a seeker of truth) and I hope much of the content of my blog will reflect this. I am a grad student working (very slowly) on my Ph.D. thesis, so I'm not a professional philosopher (yet).

I am also a student of history, working on my M.A. thesis. This will probably be reflected less by the content of my blog.

What I fear will take more space here, though, I fear will be my comments on boardgames and roleplaying games. These are my hobbies and they take much of my time and especially money, so I will probably often write about them here.

Other content will be whatever I happen to think of at a given time, and may vary considerably.

I will now mention that I am not a native English writer, because I hope to avoid accusations of slaughtering this fantastic language by doing so. :-)
I intend to write and publish these texts quickly (although infrequently and perhaps not very often), so this will likely excacerbate the flaws of my writing, as I may even forgo consulting a dictionary and therefore end up writing utter nonsense. But again, this blog is not intented as an academic podium, so it should matter very little.

One thing that I've been pondering lately, is whether to use English or my native Finnish in this blog. I will most likely end up using both (and who knows, perhaps even some other languages if I feel like it), but probably reserve Finnish posts only for subject matter that I assume will be of interest mostly or only for the Finnish readers out there.

And now a few words in my "mother tongue":

Jos ymmärsit tätä edeltävän tekstin, älä turhaan jatka lukemista. Toistan vain muutaman pääkohdan.

Olen tamperelainen filosofian (FM+ eli teen väitöskirjaa) ja historian (FM- eli teen gradua) opiskelija. Blogini tarkoitus on toimia vain julkisena päiväkirjana, johon kirjoitan milloin mitäkin. Tarkoitukseni ei ole provosoida, loukata, tai tehdä mitään pahaa sitä ansaitsemattomille. Aion kirjoittaa melkein mitä vain sylki suuhun tuo - tai siis tässä tapauksessa kai näppäimistölle? - joten voin vain toivoa, että lukijani, jos sellaisia on, ymmärtävät kirjoitukseni terapeuttisen tarkoituksen, eivätkä turhaan vedä hernettä nenäänsä.

Aihepiirini tulevat olevaan lähinnä filosofian ja harrastamieni lautapelien ja roolipelien suunnalla. Näiden lisäksi siis kuitenkin mitä tahansa mitä jostain syystä haluan sanoa, tulee olemaan täällä luettavana. Asiallisempia tai akateemisempia tekstejäni niistä kiinnostuneet voivat etsiä kotisivultani.

Kirjoituskieleni tullee olemaan lähinnä englanti laajemman potentiaalisen kiinnostuksen omaavissa aiheissa, mutta ainoastaan suomalaisia kiinnostavista asioista kirjoittanen suomeksi. Muitakin kieliä saatan mielijohteesta satunnaisesti käyttää, tehden varmasti siten kuvaannollista väkivaltaa kyseisille kielille.