Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 7

This continues what I started in Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 1. The previous installment was Part 6.

I am reading Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam. A Reader, edited by Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof, and published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2002. All citations refer to that book, unless otherwise stated.

Now I continue reading "Part Two: Islamic Fundamentalism". The second section of this part is about "Islam and Politics".

Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) begins this section with an article on "War, Peace, and Islamic Jihad". He attacks the Modernists' interpretation of Jihad, and continues to reveal goals of his militant, fundamentalist type of Islam:

It is the result of this defeatist mentality that these people maintain that "Islam only believes in defensive war." On top of that, they are laboring under the misconception that they have rendered some good to the religion by this discovery, although by this incorrect deduction they want religion to surrender its distinctive method. In other words, religion should relinquish its ideal of destroying all the Satanic forces from the face of the earth and making human beings bow down their heads before one God, relieving them from the servitude of the servants and making them enter the servitude of the Lord and Creator of the servants. But Islam, in order to translate this ideal into reality, does not corcibly compel people to accept its faith but provides them with a free atmosphere to exercise their choice of faith. It either completely dynamites the regning political systems or, subjugating them, forces them into submission to and acceptance of Jizyah. Thus it does not allow any impediment to remain in the way of accepting the belief. Thereafter it allows complete freedom to people to accept or reject belief. (p. 226.)

It would be interesting to know what exactly are the "Satanic forces" alluded to here. I wonder if any critic of this form of Islam can avoid being placed into that category? The notion that destroying such forces and making everyone bow to God are ideals of the religion Qutb clearly promotes is horrible and scary. It shows how little he has learned from history. It clearly implies the use of force to convert people, which he seems to quickly backtrack from, as if only realizing a bit late how disgusted his readers must feel at that point.

It seems clearly hypocritical of Qutb to claim that his religion qould not forcibly compel others to accept it if it were in power: there certainly would be a lot of incentive to do so, and at least social cost to not doing so. It doesn't seem to bother the Islamist fanatic that other people might actually prefer their non-Islamic political systems, which he is eager to "dynamite" (how metaphorically this can be taken at this time, I am not sure). Qutb manages to show that like some others, Fundamentalist Islamists can also play the "Liberator card" in politics, and use double talk about removing obstacles "from accepting the faith". Even if other religions besides Islam would be tolerated in Qutb's ideal Islamic state, I suspect there would be no such freedom to refuse to accept any faith.

It is especially ironic that a proponent of a religion the very name of which means "submission (to God)" pretends it to be a liberator of mankind. Of course, he cannot hide very long what this "liberation" really means:

This means that religion is an all-embracing and total revolution against the sovereignty of man in all its types, shapes, systems, and states, and completely revolts against every system in which authority may be in the hands of man in any form or in other words, where he may have usurped sovereignty under any shape. [...] In short, proclamation of the sovereignty of Allah and the declaration of His authority connotes the wiping out of human kingship from the face of the earth and establishing thereon the rule of the Sustainer of the world. [...] The establishment of God's rule means that the laws of God whould reign supreme and all the affairs should finally be decided accordingly. (p. 228.)

The idea here is that instead of man-made political systems, an Islamic state would be based on a God-made political system. That is, it would be a theocracy, with some sort of priest class ruling by divine mandate. Just exactly how this differs from the medieval European idea that kings rule by divine mandate. Oh yes, of course, that belief was false. But this Islamist idea is obviously true. No need to prove it, except by a show of force. How enlightened.

It matters little to such Islamists that the actual rulers in a theocracy would be those who get to interpret God's allegedly revealed will, those who get to decide for everyone else, what reality is like. And those people would be humans, just like everyone else, and presumably fallible as well, unless he wants to claim that religious authorities are infallible in matters of religion. But I thought only the Pope of the Catholic church could be that silly. And no one in their right minds believes that piece of Catholic dogma. The fact is, achieving the Islamist goal would (and has) put a tremendous power in the hands of a few humans, exactly the situation Qutb claimed his religion would liberate people from. The only way people could be liberated from the rule of a few humans is if the chosen political system and the policies of the government are based on frequently checked consensus (or something near enough). Religion that cannot exist within such a political system cannot be accepted at all. It follows in a pluralist society that the society must be secular, i.e. there will have to be a separation of State and Mosque. But this Qutb would not accept:

Whatever system of governance may be established in the world, it should be based on the worship of God, and the source of authority for the laws of life should be God alone, so that under the shade of this universal system every one may be free to embrace any faith one likes. (p. 231.)

I cannot resist to urge to phrase Qutb's wish a little differently: One religion to rule them all, and to darkness bind them. That captures rather well, I think, what any theocracy would amount to (at best). It is incredible that someone not completely ignorant of world history could even desire such a regress in the 20th Century. That some people still want the same in the 21st, is incomprehensible. How can anyone fail to see how disastrous the rule of religion has been throughout the middle ages, or better yet, thoughout all history? Progress in thinking and in society has only come from freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and freedom of inquiry, the latter two being impossible without the first. It simply follows that society must be secular, or it will regress rather than progress. Religions, if they wish to survive, must find a way to adapt to and exist within secular states.

The militant nature of Qutb's Islamism is shown in its imperialism, as seen in the following quote:

The peace Islam desires is that the religion should be established in its entirery in the world. All the peopole should bow in submission before One God, and should not take their fellow men as lords in place of God. [...] Thus the entire people of the world stood classified under three categories: first, the Muslims who had reposed belief in [Muhammad]; second, those peace-loving who had been granted peace by the Holy Prophet [...], and third, the opponents who were afraid of him. (p. 233.)

For Qutb, Islam would bring peace to the world by dominating it. This is such a stupid view that it doesn't deserve a response. It is just another form of imperialism, and just as any other, the only justification for it is that happens to be the proponent's own style of imperialism. It cannot be taken seriously, except as a violent threat. Clearly the modernist interpretations of Jihad do not fit this imperialist form of Islam very well, so Qutb attacks them and supports a far more dangerous interpretation:

Thus according to the explanation by Imam Ibne Qayyim, first all Muslims were restrained from fighting against the polytheists and unbelievers, then permission was accorded them to fight, then they were commanded to fight against the aggressors and, ultimately, they were commanded to fight all the polytheists and the unbelievers. These verses of the Holy Quran, the traditions of the Holy Prophet [...] prompting and inciting to Jihad, the Islamic wars of the early period, rather the entire Islamic history replete with the description of Jihad, are eloquent testimonies in the presence of which every Muslim's heart will abhor to accept the commentary about Jihad conceived by minds having been defeated by the pressure of unfavorable conditions and the treacherous propaganda [of] the orientalists. Can such a person claim to be an intellectual who may have listened to the clear commandments of God, pursued the distinct sayings of the Prophet of God [...] and seen the historical records full of Islamic victories, but still labor under the misconception that the scheme of Jihad is a temporary injunction, related to changing conditions and transient circumstances and only that aspect of the scheme has a perpetual effect which is concerned with the defense of the borders. (p. 234.)

One could answer by asking, how can anyone read the Quran and take suitable quotes from it out of context to justify one's own violent fantasies? This obviously is what Qutb has done in this article, but unfortunately, it must be left for scholars of Quran to provide Muslims with a better, more accurate, and more acceptable interpretation of Islam. Here it is enough to show where the violent interpretations of Jihad come from, and that they do exist and must be refuted, if Islam is ever to co-exist peacefully with other worldviews. Qutb doesn't hide the aggressive nature of his interpretation of Islam, which is quite contrary to to views recently and frequently presented about Islam being "a (or even the) religion of peace":

It is the inevitable demand of the nature of Islam that it takes strides from the very beginning to pull mankind out from the servitude of others than God. Hence it is impossible for it to abide by geographical boundaries and bind itself within racial limitations. It cannot be brooked to leave the entire sprawling mankind from East to West to be devoured by vice and corruption and servitude to others than God, and, leaving it, take to seclusion.

It may happen with the opponents of Islam that, deeming it expedient, they may not commit aggression against Islam provided it allows them to continue the leadership of human beings over others within their geographical limits, leaves them to their lot and does not force them to follow its message and its declaration of freedom. But Islam cannot declare a "cease-fire" with them unless they surrender before the authority of Islam and they will no more place impediments in its way by virtue of any political power. Exactly this is the nature of this religion and, being a declaration of the universal lordship of God and a message of deliverance from the servitude to others than God for the people living in the East and West, it is also the inevitable duty of Islam. (p. 243.)

It seems to this reader, at least, that Qutb is advocating an interpretation of Islam, according to which it is the duty of Islam to wage war against all countries that do not submit to it, in order to "liberate" their peoples. He could be understood, perhaps, as saying that this only applies to countries that use "political power" to "place impediments" in the way of Islam. But it seems likely to be referring to impediments on the way of the unified Islamic State becoming the only state in the world.


Imam Ruhullah Khomeini (1902-89) writes about "The Pillars of an Islamic State". He states that "the head of the Islamic State must know the Law thoroughly" (p. 248), referring presumably not only to the Quran, but also the shari'ah. It seems a bit redundant in my view, for the head to know every single law himself, rather than just the laws that deal with governing the people. But it is just one of his strange ideas for an Islamic State. He also states that the Islamic state would "enforce an Islamic character, Islamic prayers, and an Islamic penal code so that Muslims can remain as Muslims and their next generations also" (p. 249). As Qutb before, Khomeini is also using the double-talk some of us have learned to associate with cults (and others perhaps with politics): he uses the word "can", when in fact he means something far more constrictive.

It is strange to say this, but even Qutb seemed liberal when compared to Khomeini's views, for the former at least spoke of religious freedom, whereas the latter seems to be opposed to it. Khomeini wants the State to enforce Islam on the people, and make sure following generations will remain Muslims as well. This is totalitarian control. Precisely what theocracy leads to. Those who hold power to define the truths of religion become the masters everyone else must serve. There is no room in the world for interpretations of religion like this.


The same author continues with another article, on "The Necessity of Islamic Government". In this one, he reveals just how totalitarian his interpretation of Islam is:

First, the laws of the shari'ah embrace a diverse body of laws and regulations, which amounts to a complete social system. In this system of laws, all the needs of man have been met: his dealings with his neighbors, fellow citizens, and clan, as well as children and relatives; the concerns of private and marital life; regulations concerning war and peace and intercourse with other nations; penal and commercial law; and regulations pertaining to trade and agriculture. Islamic law contains provisions relating to the preliminaries of marriage and the form in which it should be contracted, and others relating to the development of the embryo in the womb and what food the parents should eat at the time of conceptiopn. It further stipulates the duties that are incumbent upon them while the infant is being suckled, and specifies how the child should be reared, and how the husband and the wife should relate to each other and to their children. Islam provides laws and instructions for all of these matters, aiming, as it does, to produce integrated and virtuous human beings who are walking embodiments of the law, or to put it differently, the law's voluntary and instinctive executors. (p. 253 - 254.)

In other words, this form of Islam seeks to control every aspect of every individual's life, destroying their individuality and making them all brainwashed clones. They also become a "militia" eager to point out anyone who fails to conform as they have, and to punish them -- and not just with social punishments, I'm sure.

Khomeini doesn't seem to think that Muslims could differ in their aspirations, or their political views. In fact, all Muslims must clearly think alike, which greatly reduces the need for separate Muslim countries:

In order to attain unity and freedom of the Muslim peoples, we must overthrow the oppressive governments installed by the imperialists and bring into existence an Islamic government [...]. (p. 257.)

At this point the irony of an Islamist such as Khomeini writing about "imperialists" is no longer funny. It is easy to accept that the populations of the countries he speaks of do indeed need liberation, but merely replacing one form of imperialism with another is hardly good enough for them. They deserve something better. Khomeini's hostility to Western culture is not shared by all Muslims, as he acknowledges (p. 261). One can then only wonder at his audacity at claiming a position from which to tell these other people how and what they should behave, believe, and like.


Next in turn is "The Political Theory of Islam" by Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi (1903-79). He writes much about the evil of "domination of man by man" and how "the effect of godhood is so intoxicating that one who tastes this powerful drink can never keep himself under control" (p. 268), but clearly fails to see that theocracy is no safeguard against these, quite the contrary. He opposes men making commands in their own right (p. 270), but fails to see that men can very easily make commands in the name of God. History (and the present) provides depressingly many examples of precisely that. As long as the final authority is placed upon God, it follows that the interpreters of God's alleged will are placed above all others and they will become the new tyrants.


There are three more articles in this section, but each of them of little concern here. The first of them is "All-Encompassing Program of an Islamic State" by The Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria, originally published in 1989. I will leave the analysis of the viability of that program to those better qualified for it, except for one single, saddening point about the education:

A reassessment of educational content to remove any ideologies and concepts that have contrary values to those of Islam; this is to preserve our personality, realize authenticity, and stimulate creativity. (p. 290.)

It is unbelievable how censorship of unwanted ideas can be combined with the stimulation of creativity in one sentence. Also, it is far too obvious that the purpose of this censorship is actually to rear uniform citizens, no matter what kind of euphemisms they want to use to say so. One can only hope that contemporary Muslims see value freedom, individuality, and creativity more than this Salvation Front.


Second to last in this section is an article on "Boycotting the 1997 Election in Jordan" by the Society of Muslim Brothers, published in 1997. It seems irrelevant now, so I will skip it except for one curious note. In the very end they mention "the policies of the New World Order" (p. 307). "NWO" was not mentioned anywhere else in the article, and one is left wondering if this is intented as just as referring to the political economic powers of the present, or whether it should be taken as an indication that the Brothers actually believe in Grand Conspiracy theories involving NWO. The latter, unfortunately, seems somewhat more likely to me, for reasons I will not go into here. But if that is the case, one can only hope such paranoia to be rare and receding among other Muslims.


This section ends with an interview of Dr. Ishaq A. Farhan by Mansoor Moaddel, conducted in 1997 and titled "Islamic Action Front Party". The only point of interest in the interview is when (p. 311) Dr. Farhan is forced to accept, though he of course won't do so directly, that the Islamic injunctions against usury have to be "worked around" in modern society. This implies that the Quran is not such a perfect book of advice for all situations and times, as fundamentalists claim. The placement of this interview in Part II of this book seems a little strange, actually, since Dr. Farhan does not seem to be a fundamentalist.

Continue to Part 8.

Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 6

This continues what I started in Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 1. The previous installment was Part 5.

I am reading Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam. A Reader, edited by Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof, and published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2002. All citations refer to that book, unless otherwise stated.

Now I begin reading "Part Two: Islamic Fundamentalism". It begins with section "I. Jurisprudence, Bases of Law, and Rational Sciences".


The first of the two articles in this section was written by Sayyid Qutb (1906-66), and is translated tellingly as "Islam as the Foundation of Knowledge". Qutb is clearly an Islamist of the fundamentalist type, as his article shows:

What Islam calls Divine Law, covers the entire scheme that God has devised for regulating human life. It includes within its sphere the regulation of thoughts and views, fundamentals of statecraft, principles of ethics and culture, laws of transactions, and regulations of knowledge and the arts. The Divine code of law circumscribes every angle of human thought and opinion. (p. 198.)

I think it's appropriate to call this view absolute totalitarianism. Qutb and his brethren would have all Muslims bow in absolute servitude to God's will as interpreted by the fundamentalists. This would, in practise, make the fundamentalist leaders the absolute and totalitarian rulers of Muslims, in the name of God, of course. To make sure no Muslim would stray from the path of "true religion", Qutb does what cult leaders usually do, i.e. restricts inquiry to "acceptable" sources:

A Muslim has not the authority to seek guidance and light from any other source and well-head except the Divine one in any matter that pertainst to faith, the general concept of life, rituals, morals and dealings, values and standards, politics, and assemply, principles of economics, or the explanation of human history. (p. 199.)

According to Qutb, a Muslim is not allowed to consult non-Muslims (actually, non-fundamentalist Muslims, I'm sure) about any of those things. It is acceptable in some other things, with limitations, of course:

[A] Muslim is allowed to imbide abstract learnings from all the Muslims and non-Muslims alike, for example, Chemistry, Physics, Biology, Astronomy, Medicine, Industry, Agriculture, Administration (to the extent of technical aspects only), Technology, Arts of warfare (from their technical aspect only), and other like learnings, arts, and technology. (p. 199 - 200.)

The main reason why he allows the consultation of non-Muslims in these areas is obviously the fact that Muslims don't have (did not have at the time of his writing at least) enough knowledge of these things themselves, yet such knowledge is required to govern a society. He also makes it clear that he is interested in such things only for their "profitable results", not merely for the ske of knowledge, for example.

The most significant limitation to the study of any subject is that it must not have anything to do with anything covered by Islam, as interpreted by Qutb -- which does cover a lot, as seen above. Qutb of course has to believe that things like the natural sciences, social sciences, history or philosophy "do not pertain to matters related to Muslims concepts about life and the universe or discuss man's responsibility and the nature of man's relations with the universe and his relations with the Creator of life. [...] They are also not connected with morals and manners, customs and traditions [...]" (p. 200). This is certainly not very plausible: even the natural sciences now have much to say about things like morality, while customs and traditions, as well as beliefs can be critically evaluated in the light of social sciences and history. It follows that whenever and wherever science intrudes on religious ground, the devout (fundamentalist) Muslim must ignore science and stick to Islamic dogma. The more advances are made by the rational approach, the clearer the contradiction between that and the fundamentalist interpretation of Islam becomes. The following quote makes this pretty obvious:

But as regards reason of human struggle, whether it is individual or collective in form -- and this sturggle is directly connected with human self and concepts of human history -- similarly as regards the reason for the beginning of the universe, inception of life and man's own beginning and its interpretation, since all these matters pertain to Metaphysics (and are not related to Chemistry, Physics, Astronomy, and Medicine) they have as such the same position as the principles and regulations, laws and canons organizing the human life and human efforts. They are indirectly related to faith and concept [sic]. It is, therefore, not permissible for a Muslim to acquire these learnings from anyone else except a Muslim; rather it should be acquired from only such a Muslim in whose religion and righteousness he may have full confidence. He should have the thorough conviction that he seeks guidance from God alone in all these matters. (p. 200.)

Of course, God does not talk to people, so one is left with "holy" (or rather, holey) texts, and those who claim to have the True interpretation of those texts. This attitude about the limits of human abilities is truly detrimental to honest truth-seeking, which should never be limited by taboos and dogma. There is not even hope of progress if one denies out of hand the possibility that man could progress. Qutb's negative and pessimistic (and anti-humanistic) attitude is certainly not limited to the natural sciences: he believes that philosophy, history, and the social sciences have been influenced by non-Islamic "beliefs and fetishes" in such a way that they have caused these fields to be "at loggerheads with religion in their fundamental principles, and nurse an explicit or implicit grudge against the concept of religion ordinarily and Islamic concept particularly" (p. 201). It is unthinkable, of course, that they might instead have had valid reasons behind their criticisms of religion in general and Islam in particular. Unthinkable, because the devout Muslim must deny such possibilities as a requirement of faith, in order to properly be a Muslim, as shown above.

After limiting all acceptable rational activity to the pursuit of profit (for Muslim society, I presume), as long as it in no way contradicts religious dogma, Qutb shows his anti-Jewish paranoia:

But this concept of culture [as common human heritage] is, in fact, one of the many contrivances of world Zionism whose purpose is to demolish all limits and bounds on top of which is the list of the bindings and limitations of religion -- so that the position of Jewry may easily pervade within the body of the enrire world when it has become lethargic, intoxicated and half-alive, and the Jews should have full liberty to pursue their diabolic activities in the world. Topping the list among these activities are their dealings in usury and moneylending, whose purpose is to channel the hard earning got out of the sweat and blood of the entire mankind into Jewish institutions rund on the basis of usury and interest. (p. 201 - 202.)

I fear this kind of ridiculous propaganda is still common among Muslims. It is very much the same as what Christians used to say about Jews over the centuries -- leading to the horrible suffering of the Jews in many cases, of which the Holocaust is only the most recent. It does not matter how stupid and baseless the accusations are when a people is being demonized. Because of certain passages in the Quran, the Jews are an easy target. Add to it the notorious hoax known as "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion", and you have Qutb's dangerous beliefs about the Jews.

Quoting a passage of the Quran and another of the hadith, Qutb argues why a Muslim should only trust Muslims when seeking knowledge:

When God [...] had explicitly and categorically stated this hazardous determination of the Jews and the Christians about the Muslims, it would be a peak of foolishness and short-sightedness to nurse this good-will even for a moment that the discussions made by them about Islamic faith or Islamic history or proposals offered about the system of Muslim society or Muslim politics or Muslim economics could be based on any good intention, or they have Muslim's wellbeing in view, or in fact they are sincerely in search of guidance and light. Those wro entertain this good opinion about them after the clear declaration and categorical verdict of God, their reason and intellect are worth lamenting. (p. 204.)

The strong distinction between ingroup (true believers) and the outgroup (non-Muslims, especially Jews) is usually a bad sign. It is used to create cohesion within one's group by creating mistrust and even fear of the outsiders. The group's leaders obviously benefit from this, as the underlings are less likely to think for themselves, seek more objective views, or even acquaint themselves with the views of outsiders.

Qutb also ridiculously claims that "Europe's empirical sciences are the product of the Islamic period", but since little in the way of history is offered, I will ignore the claim, and move on to the next article.


Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi (1903-79) is the source of the latter half of this section, called "Fallacy of Rationalism". The rationalism under attack here is "Western rationalism", the idea that humans could use their own reasoning to decide what to do, even which religious beliefs to uphold.

When our new generation completed their studies in western-oriented educational institutions they came out fully trained and groomed in the western way of thinking and with their minds totally changed. Their hears were no doubt Muslim, but their minds had turned secular. (p. 209.)

The problem with this kind of rationalism is that it's not really rational, according to Maududi:

Speaking on Islam, one is either a Muslim or a nin-Muslim. If he speaks as a Muslim, may he be orthodox, a liberal thinker, or a reformer, whatever be the case, he is expected to talk within the orbit of Islam with the Quran as the final authority and within the fundamentals of religion and the laws of Shari'ah as enunciated in the holy Quran. Whoever does not believe in the holy Quran as the final authority, and considers its injunctions as open to discussion, automatically goes out of the pale of Islam and thus loses every right to speak as a Muslim. [...] But, speaking as a non-Muslim, he will have no right to pose himself as a Muslim and try to explain to the Muslims the meanings of Islam and the ways and means to promote Islam. (p. 210.)

Maududi defines Muslims as those who believe the basic tenets of Islamic fundamentalism. The problem, from the point of view of my project here, is that it makes too much sense. It is much easier to deny the authority of the Bible in Christianity, than it is to deny the authority of the Quran in Islam. It's easier with the Shari'ah, as seen in the previous articles by the Modernist Muslims. But the Quran is a tougher nut. It would require Quranic exegetics, and I don't know if that would help either. If it can be shown that the Quranic texts were plausibly handed down by Muhammed, then the non-fundamentalist has to justify his way of reading and use of the Quran; that he doesn't take it as the infallible, perfect word of God for all times.

If you do not see eye to eye with the Divine book, you are free to differ but only after denouncing faith in Islam. Whoever feels dissatisfied with the teachings and injunctions of a religion and soubts its veracity, fails to understand its logic and needs, and considers its views and concepts objectionable, has only two options. Either he may clearly denounce and disown it and then criticize its tenets and teachings as bitterly as he likes or, if he does not want to say good-bye to his religion in spite of his doubts and apprehensions, he must avoid projection of his disagreement. (p. 211.)

This kind of dichotomous, black and white, view is appealing in its simplicity, of course. It hardly makes sense to speak of a holy book if one doesn't believe the contents of the book to be of divine origin. One can dilute the divinity of the words, reducing the status of the book, for example by appealing to the human fallibility of the medium (prophet) used in putting the words in writing. Or one could find reason to doubt the early phase of the tradition: perhaps there were miscommunications at some point? But where to draw the line? How far can one go in this and still consider the text holy in any meaningful sense?

Still, the dichotomy between fundamentalists, and non-fundamentalists, is dangerous. The certainty that one's interpretation of religion is the only true interpretation, coupled with clear hostility towards those who disagree and hold different interpretations to be true, is a cause for worry. "The West" especially is something Fundametalists Islamists seem to despise pretty generally. Maududi certainly doesn't seem to have a very good opinion of it:

[A] critical study of western civilization shows, beyond doubt, that it is based on either rationalism nor naturalism. On the contrary, its entire structure stands on feelings, lust, and urges. The western renaissance was nothing but a revolt against reason and nature. Discarding logic and reason, it turned toward whims and feelings and material urges. It relied on moods instead of reason, rejected rational guidance, logical reasoning, and innate intuition, and made perceptible material results its real criterion. Rejecting nature's guidance, it preferred to be guided by desires and urges, regarded everything as baseless that cannot be measured and weighed, condemned everything as negligible and worthless that did not produce any perceptible material gain. (p. 215.)

Since no argument for all this is provided by the author, I will not be bothered to refute it. I will just note that Maududi seems to think that ever since the renaissance, western culture has been corrupted and irrational, being controlled by feelings, lust, and urges. I can only assume that this has something to do with the rise of modern empirical science, and the secularization of Europe (and academic culture in general). I suppose he thought it better when Christianity ruled the West. I think his views are ahistorical, and in any case too vaguely expressed (and without arguments and evidence) to warrant further comment. It is unfortunate that such hostility toward whole cultures exists, but other Muslims can disagree with him, as there is nothing in Islam that would require such an attitude. It is thus an obstacle among the fundamentalists that can be overcome.

The worst thing about religiosity, in my opinion, is the dogmatic nature of religious beliefs. Maududi provides good examples of dogmatic thinking, when he argues why it is necessary for a Muslim to submit to the authority of religion (or, as the case will actually be, although he of course fails to say it, religious authorities). He mistakenly implies that a person who practises law (or perhaps he means only a person who is a judge at a court of law) will not criticize the legal system within which he works. Even worse, he thinks that a person within a school of thought would not criticize the fundamentals of that school. (p. 210.)

Perhaps the translation here is inadequate. Perhaps he means more than criticize, for the claim does make sense if we replace "criticize" with "discard": a person who has discarded the fundamentals of a school of thought is no longer a proponent of that school of thought. But then the analogy with moderate and liberal Modernist Muslims might fail. They don't necessarily discard any "fundamentals" of Islam, although what they consider those fundamentals to be might differ from what the Fundamentalists think. This is a question of interpretation of religion.

For Maududi, Islam is clearly something similar to a country's government, and even more chillingly, an army:

No government can stay even for a moment if every person starts demanding rational justification for its orders and refuses to submit to any order without getting its satisfactory justification. No army can be called an army if every soldier starts seeking the reason for his commander's orders and demanding his satisfaction before compliance.

Anybody who joins a system or organization does so only when he accepts and believes in the authority of that system as supreme authority, and as loing as he is a part of that system, he is duty bound to obey its supreme authority, may he be convinced and satisfied with any order or not(p. 217.)

This kind of authoritarian "thinking" is not what democracies are about. Speaking of religious believers as unthinking, uncritical soldiers who simply follow orders is especially telling, and shows why Maududi's brand of Islam is so compatible with terrorism.

Unconditional faith is the first and foremost requirement of Islam. It calls people to believe in Allah and His Prophet first, instead of issuing injunctions. (p. 218.)

In order to make Islam compatible with the global human society, non-fundamentalist Muslims must change this. As long as one follows Maududi's thinking this far, it becomes impossible for one's religion to progress. Once one submits to this cult, and accepts that from that point onward the dogma of the cult cannot be criticized, but simply obeyed, one has made also progress impossible. Closedmindedness like this will guarantee the ridicule of future generations, while the "true believers" will remain medieval in their thinking. I hope reformers will keep coming, and that they will have minds sharp and open enough to recognize the mind-numbing propaganda of the likes of Maududi, and to discard it, in favour of more intellectually friendly interpretations of their religion.


Continue to Part 7.

Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 1

I am fairly ignorant of recent history (from the 19th Century onward), and of social issues in general. That's not self pity - I'm trying to fix that bit by bit by reading what I can. I'm just stating this upfront so I wouldn't be thought of as some sort of an authority on the issues I'm about to write about. For the same reason, I want to state that I'm even more ignorant when it comes to Islam and the social issues connected to that religion.

I did read the Quran some years ago, in a Finnish translation, and I have read some books about the history of Islam, so I'm not totally ignorant of these issues. But to get to the point, I just picked up a book titled Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam. A Reader from the library. Edited by Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof, and published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2002, it seemed like a book I should read.

After all, Islam is a very popular religion on a global scale, and (so far) since at least the beginning of this millenium, it has been the subject of news headlines almost daily. And usually not in what might be called "a positive light". Most of what I've heard about the religion and its adherents has been scary and/or depressing. Yet, it is a popular religion. If the religion is really as bad as it seems, it sounds like getting rid of it altogether would be a good idea. But also, a very implausible one.

So, if all the Muslims of the world are not going to discard their religion, and that religion seems to be hindrance to the development of their societies, and a global threat to the security of individuals and even to world peace, is there something we could more realistically strive to achieve to remedy the situation? Well, at least according to some defenders of Islam, it is a rational religion. I am unwilling to go as far as to accept that oxymoron, but I want to grasp on the hope that at least it could be more reasonable than it often seems in the depictions of the various media, and possibly it could even be compatible with reason and science somehow. The same way that the most common form of religion in Europe, i.e. (very much secularized) moderate, liberal Christianity can, when cleaned up of the most blatant irrationality usually associated with that religion.

Wanting to understand Islam and hoping to find interpretations of the religion more suitable for this global era and for a better future than the versions of the religion usually presented in the media, I decided to start reading this book and blogging about what I found in it. What follows should be a series of short blog texts based almost completely on this one book. If I choose to use any other sources, I will make that clear. If not otherwise indicated, references will be to Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates. In fact, I will begin by quoting the very first lines of the introduction:

This book presents a series of articles, treatises, and exposés on historically significant issues written by prominent theologians, scholars, and academics in the Islamic world from the last quarter of the nineteenth centyry to the late twentieth. (p. 1)

The articles were selected "to represent two distinct and contrasting episodes in Islam's historical development". The first period (from the late nineteenth century to early twentieth century) covers discourses that "sought to bridge Islam with modernity". This work was done mostly by Muslim theologians in India and Egypt. I think I'll just have to quote at lenght this next bit, because it's fairly important:

These scholars critically examined the classical conceptions and methods of jurisprudence and decised a new approach to Islamic theology and Quranic exegesis. This new theological movement, which was nothing short of an outright rebellion against the Islamic orthodoxy, displayed an astonishing compatibility with the nineteenth-century [sic] Enlightenment. The central theological problem that engaged its thinkers revolved around the question of the validity of the knowledge derived from soureces external to Islam and the methodological adequacy of the four traditional sources of jurisprudence: the Quran, the dicra attributed to the Prophet (hadith), the consensus of the theologians (ijma), and juristic reasoning by analogy (qiyas). They resolved to reinterpret the first two sources and transform the last two in order to formulate a reformist project in light of the prevailing standards of scientific rationality and modern social theory. Such prominent intellectuals and theologiansa as Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Chiragh Ali, Muhammad Abduh, Amir Ali, and Shibli Nu'mani, and their associates and disciples presented Islamic theology in a manner consistent with modern rationalist ideas and deist religion. These theologians were impressed by the achievements of the West, ranging from scientific and technological progress, the Newtonian conception of the universe, Spencer's sociology, and Darwinian evolutionism, to Western style of living. They all argued that Islam as a world religion was thoroughly capable of adapting itself to the changing conditions of every age, the hallmarks of the perfect Muslim community being law and reason. (p. 1 - 2.)

As you might guess, I was happy to finally hear that such ideas actually had been advanced more than a century ago. There are those who still try to present interpretations of Islam along those lines, and possibly the majority of Muslims actually adhere to views similar to those. But there are those other views too, the opposite views held by terrorists, radical islamist organizations and preachers that usually make it over the threshold of what qualifies as newsworthy in "Western" media. They are the offsprings of what the editors of the book call the "second period" (from between 1930s and 1950s depending on the country to at least the end of that century). It was connected to the decline of liberal nationalism and usually came about "through right- or left-wing military coups".

In marked contrast with the previous ideologies, this new discourse categorically rejected the Western model and outlook. Such precursors of fundamentalism as Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Motahhari from Iran, Hasan al-Bana and Sayyid Qutb from Egypt, Abul Ala Maududi from Pakistan, Mustafa as-Siba'i from Syria, Abbasi Madani, Shaikh Nahnah, and Ali Belhaj from Algeria insisted on unconditional fealty ti Islam and questioned the validity of any sources of learning that were outside the Islamic cosmological doctrine. Ayatollah Khomeini advanced a theory of Islamic State based on the governance of the jurisprudent. While Islamic modernism aimed at rationalizing religious dogma to show its consonance with modernity, fundamentalism aimed at Islamizing all social institutions. And, while Islamic modernism had a predominantly social orientation, a distinctive feature of the fundamentalist movement was a high level of political activism aiming to seize state power. In fundamentalism, the political reorganization of society is the necessary step in its overall Islamization project. (p. 2.)

The editors note the problem with using the term 'fundamentalism' in this context (as opposed to the Christian context, where it is obvious at least to those familiar with the relevant discourse), but stick to it for lack of a better term. For, as they point out, other suggested terms have their problems as well. For example, 'Islamist' can equally refer to pro-West and anti-West Islamic thinkers. I suppose we'll have to just use the terms 'modernist' and 'fundamentalist' here, even if we only have a vague idea (based on the above quotations and what follows) of what they mean, instead of a clear-cut definition. That is how it is with most things anyway (to the chagrin of philosophers). Some further elucidation of what the ideas of these two opposed views espoused is provided by the following quote:

Generally, the Islamic modernists: accepted an evolutionary view of history with the West being at the pinnacle of th eworld civilization; praised the Western model; in varying degrees subscibed to the Newtonian conception of the universe; reformulated Islamic methodology in a manner congruent with the standards of nineteenth-century social theory; and affirmed the validity of the scientific knowledge, even though it was not based on Islam; favored democracy and constitutionalism, and the de facto separation of religion from politics; and formulated a modernist discourse on women by rejecting polygamy and male domination. The Islamic fundamentalists, in contrast, rejected the notion of social evolution and portrayed the West as having an aggressive political system, exploitative and materialistic economic institutions, and decadent culture. Rather than attempting to reform and modernize Islam, they aimed at Islamizing virtually all social institutions. They rejected the separation of religion from politics, defended Islamic political hierarchy in society, and male domination and polygamy in the family. (p. 3 - 4.)

Islamic modernism originated with the breakdown of traditional order of the old regime, and the formation of modern states in India, Egypt, and Iran. "It involved the integration into the world economu, the development of capitalism, and the emergence of the modern social institutions" (p. 5). Islamic fundamentalism was produced in Egypt, Syria, Iran, and Pakistan "following the military coups that effectively ended the period of somewhat liberal nationalism" (p. 6). Those countries were now authoritarian states. The exception to the revolution model is Jordan, where the Society of Muslim Brothers was kept peaceful by a government that maintained a working relationship with them, instead of blocking their political participation, as happened in other countries, with violent repercussions (p. 7).

The Introduction also contains short introductions for the books "contributors in context" that should be useful for anyone with more than passing interest in this subject. I will continue writing about what I learn from this book as I read on, unless it gets too boring.

Continue to Part 2.