Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 4

This continues what I started in Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 1. The previous installment was Part 3.

I am reading Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam. A Reader, edited by Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof, and published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2002. All citations refer to that book, unless otherwise stated.

Now I continue reading the book's "Part One: Islamic Modernism", specifically that part's section "III. Islam and Western Civilization".

This section consists of only two articles. The first is "Social Liberalism and Laissez-Faire Capitalism" by an "anonymous Mu'tazilite Muslim". It was originally published 1877-1880. The author of the article argues for changes in Muslim societies that would mimic the so-called Western culture. He is clearly worried about the economic situation of Muslims, and blames it on Islamic customs and the Islamic (Common) Law.

It has never been understood by the great majorit of the people that the apparent benefits that the poorer classes get from a rich man's expensive style of living are only temporary and, in the end, wholly illusive. They do not understand that the fund, which goes to the remuneration of labor, is the result only of saving and economy, and that profuse expenditure is therefore in the end injurious to the laboring classes. [...] And Mahomedan theologians and moralists, while they say nothing against extravagance in expenditure, have invariably held up thrifty and economical habits to contempt and derision. So that, from a desire to deserve and preserve the respect of their neighbours, Mahomedansa have, in the course of time, acquired the character of spendthrifts. (p. 125.)

In Muslim culture, if I have correctly understood it, spending lots of money on lavish parties, gifts, and charity, as well as other similar things, has been seen as a way of distributing wealth to the poor, the workers, and the community in general. This was the customary expectation also in medieval Christendom. Unfortunately, it was bad for business, as that requires capital. The article's writer is making a case for long-sighted capitalism, as an improvement on the culture that short-sightedly opposes saving.

Wherever there is a Musalman [sic] family possessing wealth from the time of the Moslem government, the wealth was originally either a religious or a political grant. It was never acquired by havits of economy: in the one case the wealth was acquired by administrative, political, or military activity; in the other, it was gained by selfish piety and pompous ascetism. (p. 126.)

In other words, Muslims have not been businessmen. They have not been investors. They have simply acquired grants from those in power, and presumably the wealth from those grants has been fundamentally tied to the productivity of cultivated land, or some other basic production.

Our habits of listlessness and inactivity are also partly due to the peculiar belief in predestination that we hold. This doctrine prevails amonts other people and in other countries, but owing to moral and historical causes its hold is not so strong as among Musalmans. (p. 126.)

The lack of (economic) activity, innovation, capitalistic hoarding of wealth, and in general lack of a business-oriented attitude seem to be the author's targets. What exactly is meant by predestination here is unclear, but I would guess it more likely means something like determinism in mundane matters, rather than something like the doctrine of the predestination of the soul, such as in Calvinism. Those Christian protestants, after all, were well suited for business, were they not?

[O]ne large source of wealth is entirely closed to the Mahomedans -- I mean interest on money lent. [...] When we see how the business of banking facilitates commerce and how it renders possible the creation of new trades and industries, it becomes apparent how, amongst the Mahomedans, the connection of religion purely so-called with subjects altogether foreign to it -- with criminal law, civil law, laws of inheritance, laws of property, laws of contracts, laws of bequests -- has acted most injuriously on their material interests. And as material interests act as well as depend largely upon mental and moral interests, it follows therefore that we have suffered mentally and morally as well as in a wordly point of view from the connection of our Religion with law. (p. 126.)

The Medieval Christians had the same problem, because of the condemnation of "usury" in the Bible. They circumvented that with in my opinion amounts to sensible rhetoric. The anonymous writer of the article argues for interests rates by appeal to basically the same things the Christians appealed to -- because it clearly makes sense:

The capitalist of trader must obtain a recompense for his abstinence -- for having refrained from spending away the capital on his own gratification. Every trade has some or other risk incidental to it; the capitalist must indemnify himself for this risk. Lastly the capitalist must be recompensed for the labor and inconvenience that her undertoes in conducting and managing the business. Reward of abstinence, insurance against risk, and wages of superintendence make up the profits of a trade. (p. 127.)

It is my understanding that the Biblical condemnation of usury was based on the understanding that only the poor have to borrow money, and even they only borrowed because they needed to feed themselves and there was no alternative. Thus demanding that they pay interest in addition to paying it back was a way of taking an unfair advantage of the weak, a despicable thing to do. The morally excellent thing to do would have been to simply give the poor what they needed, without requiring any kind of compensation for it.

Possibly this kind of social situation is behind traditional Islamic views on the matter as well. But in the present era, it is not only the poor who want to borrow money. In order to start a business (or buy a house), you usually need more capital than you own, so you have to get a loan. This way, economic activity often requires loans. But, as the author points out, "if lending money or any trade offered comparatively inadequate returns to the abstinence, risk, and exertion, persons engaging in it would give up their business and invest their capital in trades that yielded better returns" (p. 127). In other words, the one giving the loan must also benefit from doing so, or else no one will do so. Which in turn will stiffle economic activity.

We have seen how the prohibition of interest, instead of relieving those classes for whose benefit it is intended, does actually injure them; but what is much more serious is that it retards the formation of the habit of abstinence and economy and that of postponing immediate gratification to future happiness, and prevents the development of the spirit of self-denial and self-control and that of prudence and self-responsibility. (p. 128.)

Instead of protecting the poor from exploitation by the rich, the prohibition seems to actually be a major cause of poverty for Muslim societies, according to the anonymous writer. There is another religious reason for that poverty:

Another and a more active cause of our poverty is to be found in our laws of inheritance -- both testamentary and intestate. A large estate is under our laws of intestate succession so divided and subdivided that in two or three generations each share comes to represent the barest subsistence. And, what is worse, there is no proper law of testamentary disposition of property to control and modify operatin of this minute subdivision. (p. 128.)

Again, this situation is reminiscent of that of Early Medieval Europe, especially the Franks. But primogeniture was adopted throughout Christendom (as far as I know) by the High Middle Ages. It was pretty much continued to the 19th Century, unless I'm mistaken, although along with the use of legally valid "last will and testaments" to ensure some controll of one's property after one's passing in the way of all flesh. Of course, the majority of people have always been so poor that there has been little point in trying to divide one's property among one's survivors.

The existing laws of inheritance are practically unjust. For when a person dies, some of his children may be old and educated enough to earn a respectable livelyhood; others may be too young or inexperienced to be able to earn anything -- to give equal shares to both is decidedly an unjust apportionment. (p. 128.)

The writer could have added to this the inequal treatment of females under that same law, but what he does mention already seems clearly unjust.

And, what is worse than all, these and all other similar laws have been taken out of the domain of progress by being improperly connected with Religion. They have been made part and parcel of Revealed Religion and are believed on the authority of an ignorant, superstitious, and intolerant priesthood to lie beyond the limits of progress. In truth, however, there is no real connection between Religion and the laws, social, civil, or political, under which a community lives. Religious truths transcend the powers of human understanding, while laws, being phenomenal relations, are amenable to experience. (p. 129.)

I readily agree that religion will prevent or at least hinder progress in social issues as in other areas, if it claims to tell the absolute truth about matters related to those areas. Laws must be amenable, and chosen in accordance to the best arguments available -- in other words secular.

The writer continues to argue that the law of bequest must be altered not only into a more just form, but also to enable to creation of larger properties, instead of forcing their subdivisions into minute portions:

There are thus three ways in which a larger property acts favorably. First, by strenghtening habits of diligence and economy and developing the sense of self-responsibility, in other words by raising the character and elevating the moral nature of man. Second, by increasing the desire for wealth and therefore by increasing wealth and establishing a high standard of comfort and living. And, third, by increasing the resources available for education and therefore by diffusing knowledge and establishing a high standard of education and mental attainment. (p. 130.)

To some extent this is easy to agree with, but in the present era one can ask if this really works out quite as nicely as imagined by the anonymous writer? I believe there is much greed involved with large property and wealth. It is surely not a sign of elevated morality. It seems that education is not at all of interest to the contemporary affluent, who only see it as a means to economic gain. It seems that education is considered an intrinsic value only by academic professionals these days.

In any case, the writer believes that wealth is key for the benefit of society, and Muslims desperately need to change their attitudes, customs, and laws, in order to achieve economic progress. This is quite possibly true even now, 130 years after the article was first published. This requires the severing of religion from such political and economic matters. (p. 132 - 133.)


The second article in this section is "Islam and Civilization" by Muhammad Fard Wajdi (1875-1954). I cannot comprehend the choice of including this article anymore than I can comprehend its title. It is some of the worst religious apologetics on the subject of science & religion that I have seen, and completely useless. And not only because it is so badly outdated. Because my desire in this project is to find common ground with Muslims, I will let this useless article pass without further comment.


Continue to Part 5.

Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 3

This continues what I started in Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 1 and continued in Part 2.

I am reading Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam. A Reader, edited by Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof, and published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2002. All citations refer to that book, unless otherwise stated.

Now I turn to the book's "Part One: Islamic Modernism", and that part's section "II. Islam and Politics".

The first chapter in this section is "War and Peace: Popular Jihad" by Moulavi Chiragh Ali (1844-95).

All the defensive wars, and the verses of the Quran relating to the same, were strictly temporary and transitory in their nature. They cannot be made an example of, or be construed into a tenet or injunction for aggressive wars, nor were they intended to be. Even they cannot be an example or instruction for a defensive war to be waged by the Muhammadan community or commonwealth, because all the circumstances under which Muhammad waged his defensive wars were local and temporary. (p. 72.)

Nice. Let's hope all Muslims agree: the Quran can in no way be used to support any kind of war. All mentions of war were temporary, none were meant for future guidance.

[I]n the first place, Jihad does not literally and classically mean warfare or fighting in a war. It means, as used by the classical poets as well as by the Quran, to do one's utmost; to labor; to toil; to exert oneself or his power, efforts, endeavors, or ability; to employ oneself vigorously, diligently, studiously, sedulously, earnestly, or with energy; to be diligent or studious, to take pains or extraordinary pains. (p. 80.)

This definition has been cropping up after 2001-09-11. It makes jihad sound like something good, a commendable attitude, something more of us good use in our own lives. Nothing violent or aggressive about it. Wether or not that really is a historically and linguistically accurate definition, one can at least hope that it would be the definition adopted by Muslims.

There is neither such a division of the world in the Quran, nor are such words as "Dar-ul-Islam" and "Dar-ul-Harb" to be found anywhere in it. There is no injunction in the Quran to the True Believers to fight against the infidels till they accept Islam, failing which they are to be put to death. The words "Dar-ul-Islam" and "Dar-ul-Harb" are only to be found in the Muhammadan Common Law, and are only used in the question of jurisdiction. No Moslem magistrate will pass a sentence in a criminal case against a criminal who had committed an offense in a foreign country. The same is the case in civil courts. All inhabitants of Dar-Harb are not necessarily infidels. Muhammadans, either permanently or temporarily by obtaining permission from the sovereign of the foreign land, can be inhabitants of a Dar-ul-Harb, a country out of the Moslem jurisdiction, or at war with it. (p. 91.)

Among other important things here is the point about jurisdiction which I take to be reciprocal in nature: a "Muhammadan" outside of Moslem jurisdiction is under the jurisdiction of the local rule - she cannot expect to be judged by Muslem law. This is a very important point. It can (and should) readily be understood as saying that acting against local laws in countries outside the Moslem jurisdiction (and even customs, matters of civil courts) is actually against the teaching of Islam.

The Muhammadan Common Law is by no means divine or superhuman. It mostly consists of uncertain traditions, Arabian usage and customs, some frivolous and fortuitous analogical deductions from the Quran, and a multitudinous array of casuistical sophistry of the canonical legists. It has not been held sacred or unchangeable by enlightened Muhammadans of any Moslem country and in any age since its compilation in the fourth century of the Hejira. (p. 92.)

This is an important point all Islamists should take to heart. The Common Law, at least, should definitely be open to criticism and change, even by devout Muslims, even by those who believe the Quran to be the infallible word of God, because it is not based on, or even derived from the Quran. In fact, given the sources of the Common Law, there really is no reason to hold onto it. The laws of any community should of course be reasonable, the ones with the best arguments in their favour. Therefore, whatever laws that are seen to surpas those of the traditional Common Law should be adopted. Surely there can be no disagreement on this?


Ali Abd al-Raziq (1888-1966) has made two interesting remarks that I can quote from his excerpts published under the title "The Problem of Caliphate". The first is the claim that "Islam would never favor one community over another, one language over another, one region over another, one time over another, or one generation over another except according to their piety" (p. 95).

Clearly many disagree with that. I believe most Muslims are taught to believe that the Quran must be read in Arabic, because all translations are less perfect. I agree with them to a point. Going to the orginal sources is necessary for historians, surely, but not without a good deal of knowledge about exegetics and the relevant languages. I'm almost certain that very few even of Muslim scholars actually have that requisite knowledge. But the fact remains that Arabic certainly seems to be an important language for Islam, unlike say, Finnish. Same goes for the rest of the claim, mutatis mutandis.

The other remark is longer:

[...] all that Islam has made lawful and that the prophet has made the Muslims observe included conduct, manners, and customs that had nothing at all to do with methods of political rule nor anything to do with a civil government. After all, if we put all of these together, they do not amount to more than a very small fraction of what is necessary for a civil state as regards political principles and laws. (p. 97.)

It clearly follows that there can be no such thing as a purely Islamic State. The necessary laws have to be devised somehow, and that means human decision making, also known as secular politics. (It could also be pointed out that the usefulnes of the Quran as a guidance for us mortals is obviously questionable, but let's forget about that for now. As long as Muslims accept that secular politics are necessary for a functioning State.)


I will have to pass over "Authority and the Problem of Succession" by Amir Ali (1849-1928) in silence, as I can find little of interest or relevance to "Western" states in it at present. I might return to it, if I change my mind about it later.


This section ends with Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-98) defending "Intellectual Pluralism and Freedom of Opinion", but unfortunately his article is of general nature, and he does not argue from a specifically Islamic point of view, or in a way that would especially appeal to Muslims. He does not provide an interpretation of Islam that would be of use for us in convincing the Muslims that adopting such "Western" notions would be in accordance with their religion. His arguments, of course, are such that any sensible person will accept them, but that is not enough at this point, so I will have to ignore the article here.


Continue to Part 4.

Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 2

This continues what I started in Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 1. I am reading Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam. A Reader, edited by Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof, and published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2002. All citations refer to that book, unless otherwise stated.

Now I turn to the book's "Part One: Islamic Modernism", and that part's section "I. Jurisprudence, Rational Sciences, and Differentiation of Knowledge".

Some excerpts from Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-97) follow, concerning "Religion versus Science":

All religions are intolerant, each one in its way. (p. 24.)

In truth, the Muslim religion has tried to stifle science and stop its progress. It has thus succeeded in halting the philosophical or intellectual movement and in turning minds from the search for scientific truth. A similar attempt, if I am not mistaken, was made by the Christian religion, and the venerated leaders of the Catholic church have not yet disarmed so far as I know. (p. 25.)


It is permissible, however, to ask oneself why Arab civilization, after having thrownsuch a live light on the world, suddenly became extinguished; why this torch has not been relit since; and why the Arab world still remains buried in profound darkness.

Here the responsibility of the muslim religion appears complete. It is clear that wherever it became established, this religion tried to stifle the sciences and it was marvelously served in its designs by despotism. (p. 27.)


Religions, by whatever names they are called, all resemble each other. No agreement and no reconciliation are possible between these religions and philosophy. Religion imposes on man its faith and its belief, whereas philosophy frees him of it totally or in part. [...] It will always be thus. Whenever religion will have the upper hand, it will eliminate philosophy; and the contrary happens when it is philosophy that reigns as sovereign mistress. So long as humanity exists, the struggle will not cease between dogma and free investigation, between religion and philosophy; a desperate struggle in which, I fea, the triumph will not be for free thought, because the masses dislike reason, and its teachings are only understood by some intelligences of the elite, and because, also, science, however beautiful it is, does not completely satisfy humanity, which thirsts for the ideal and which likes to exist in dark and distant regions that the philosophers and scholars can neither perceive nor explore. (p. 28.)

The Enlightenment has clearly influenced al-Afghani. It is very easy to adopt such a pessimistic view of mankind, but I believe recent history shows there is still hope. Certainly Europe has become very secularized. With the help of the Internet, knowledge is spreading faster and more widely than ever before. The great challenge at present is how to reach the Muslim masses, and to convince them of the superiority of the modernist version of Islam? This is no time to lose nerve and give up.


The following are excerpts from Maulavi Cheragh Ali (1844-95) on "Islamic Revealed Law versus Islamic Common Law":

The Muhammadan states are not usually considered theocratic in their system of government. The first four or five khalifates were of a republican nature, and after them, the system of government was changed with the Ommiade dynasty into monarchy and despotism. (p. 29.)

The common code of Islam, or the Muhammadan system of jurisprudence, is the unwritten law of the Muhammadan community, compiled at a very late period, so that it cannot be considered as essentially and eternally unchangeable; nor can it be binding on any other nation than the Arabs, whose customs, usages, and traditions it contains, and upon which it is based. The Muhammadan Common Law is not to be confounded with the Muhammadan Revealed Law. The Muhammadan Common Law is the unwritten law that has been compiled from a avery few verses of the Quran, as well as from the customs and usages of the country, supported by traditions contradictory in themselves, and based on the Ijmaa, or the unanimous consent of the Moslems. (p. 31.)

Those writers are greatly mistaken who either confound the Quran, the Muhammadan Revealed Law, with Fiquah or Cheriat (Cheri), the Muhammadan Common or Civil Law; or think that the Quran contains the entire code of Islam; or that the Muhammadan Law, by which is invariably meant the Muhammadan Common Law, is infallible and unalterable. The Muhammadan law books, the fundamental codes of Islam, take very little or nothing from the Quran, and all the Muhammadan jurists, casuists, mooftis, and moojtahids, have by a tacit consent removed the law points from the text of the sacred book to the jurisdiction of the canon or civil law. Muhammadans rely principally on the latre lego-religious books instead of the Quran. (p. 31 - 32.)

As I see it, Ali makes there a historical case for the separation of the Mosque and State in the so-called Islamic countries. He argues against theocracy, and the idea that Islamic laws could be unchaning. What he fails to note is the interesting admission that the Quran actually is pretty useless, or I should say irrelevantwhen it comes to morals and laws. This is good news for the project of secularizing the Islamic countries, because it allows the moderates to keep revering the Quran while adopting (more) secular morals and laws.

Ali then makes these encouraging claims about his religion:

Islam is capable of progress, and possesses sufficient elasticity to enable it to adapt itself to the social and political changes going on around it. The Islam, by which I mean the pure Islam as taught by Muhammad in the Quran, and not that Islam as taught by the Muhammadan Common Law was itself a profress and a change for the better. It has the vital principles of rapid development, of progress, of rationalism, and of adaptability to new circumstances. (p. 33.)

There's, among others, that mention of rationalism in Islam that I have mentioned. I can only hope that this kind of progressive attitude becomes ever more popular among Muslims. It is sad, though, that in Ali's article it is followed by this dogmatic statement:

The only infallible law is Leges Scripta, or the Quran. (p. 33.)

One can hope that this dogmatism will fade and Ali's view on the acceptability (from the point of view of Islam) of changing laws to fit the times wins over the stupid, dogmatic traditionalism still prevalent in some countries. He argues that:

[...] the fact that Muhammad did not compile a law, civil or canonical, for the conduct of the believers, nor did he enjoin them to do so, shows that he left to the believers in general to frame any code, civil or canon law, and to found systems which would harmonize with the times, and suit the political and social changes going on around them. (p. 33.)

Sayyid Amir Ali (1849-1928) is trying to present a case for "The Rationalistic and Philosophical Spirit of Islam", but this is all he really has to offer (in the excerpted article published in the book):

Like all other nations of antiquity, the pre-islamic Arabs were stern fatalists. The remains of their ancient poetry, sole record of old Arab thought and manners, show that before the promulgation of Islam the people of the Peninsula had absolutely abandoned themselves to the idea of an irresistible and blind fatality. Man was but a sport in the hands of Fate. This idea bred a reckless contempt of death, and an utter disregard for human life. The teachings of Islam created a revolution in the Arab mind; with the recognition of a supreme Intelligence governing the universe, they received the conception of self-dependence and of moral responsibility founded on the liberty of human volition. (p. 35.)

Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) writes about "The Necessity of Religious Reform" but is even less useful: he is mainly doing so in the context of Egypt at the end of the 19th Century; also, he seems uninterested in actual secularization of the state. Rather, he is merely interested in purging the people of harmful beliefs promoted by such groups as the Sufis:

Sufis have introduced one of these opinions: faith in God [...] is in contradiction with saving and making money, seeking work, and utilizing modern medical care. The believer in God, they would have us accept, would not be a true believer until he "cut off all means of livelihood." Faith in God is also in contradiction with precaution, prevention, and carefulness. In their opinion, faith in God implies a disregard for the consequences of one's worldly actions and a rejection of carefulness. (p. 48.)

It is clear that Abduh admires the West, and wants to (re)vitalize the Muslim people(s) by what to him at least would probably be a return to orthodoxy. He is, unfortunately, of the opinion that religion is necessary for the people, so he is not interested in reforming society by the separation of religion and state, the from the public sphere. On the contrary, he merely seeks to purifying Islam from harmful superstitious. In reading about this, I got a chilling feeling when I thought of what this might entail to minority groups. But he seems to trust that his reform would succeed through merely the education of judges, teachers, social workers, and other key people.


The next piece is on the "Methodology of Historical Writing", by 'Allama Shibli Nu'mani (1851-1914). This writer seems to have issues with European history, and a very high opinion of traditional Muslim history. While amusing, I will not dwell on these. He has some of the methodology right, but he should have been more critical. He is far too biased to see some glaring problems with the methods. Also, I think the article is outdated, because it deals with the Hadith and similar texts, with the purpose of pointing out that much of this tradition is false - but surely this is common knowledge among Muslims by now? The good thing about this kind of approach then, and one that I wholeheartedly recommend, is the embracing of critical, historical exegesis of the important texts of Islam. If (moderate, or modernist) Muslims can agree with this, then we are clearly on the same track.


Continue to Part 3.

Modernism and Fundamentalism in Islam. Part 1

I am fairly ignorant of recent history (from the 19th Century onward), and of social issues in general. That's not self pity - I'm trying to fix that bit by bit by reading what I can. I'm just stating this upfront so I wouldn't be thought of as some sort of an authority on the issues I'm about to write about. For the same reason, I want to state that I'm even more ignorant when it comes to Islam and the social issues connected to that religion.

I did read the Quran some years ago, in a Finnish translation, and I have read some books about the history of Islam, so I'm not totally ignorant of these issues. But to get to the point, I just picked up a book titled Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam. A Reader from the library. Edited by Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof, and published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2002, it seemed like a book I should read.

After all, Islam is a very popular religion on a global scale, and (so far) since at least the beginning of this millenium, it has been the subject of news headlines almost daily. And usually not in what might be called "a positive light". Most of what I've heard about the religion and its adherents has been scary and/or depressing. Yet, it is a popular religion. If the religion is really as bad as it seems, it sounds like getting rid of it altogether would be a good idea. But also, a very implausible one.

So, if all the Muslims of the world are not going to discard their religion, and that religion seems to be hindrance to the development of their societies, and a global threat to the security of individuals and even to world peace, is there something we could more realistically strive to achieve to remedy the situation? Well, at least according to some defenders of Islam, it is a rational religion. I am unwilling to go as far as to accept that oxymoron, but I want to grasp on the hope that at least it could be more reasonable than it often seems in the depictions of the various media, and possibly it could even be compatible with reason and science somehow. The same way that the most common form of religion in Europe, i.e. (very much secularized) moderate, liberal Christianity can, when cleaned up of the most blatant irrationality usually associated with that religion.

Wanting to understand Islam and hoping to find interpretations of the religion more suitable for this global era and for a better future than the versions of the religion usually presented in the media, I decided to start reading this book and blogging about what I found in it. What follows should be a series of short blog texts based almost completely on this one book. If I choose to use any other sources, I will make that clear. If not otherwise indicated, references will be to Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates. In fact, I will begin by quoting the very first lines of the introduction:

This book presents a series of articles, treatises, and exposés on historically significant issues written by prominent theologians, scholars, and academics in the Islamic world from the last quarter of the nineteenth centyry to the late twentieth. (p. 1)

The articles were selected "to represent two distinct and contrasting episodes in Islam's historical development". The first period (from the late nineteenth century to early twentieth century) covers discourses that "sought to bridge Islam with modernity". This work was done mostly by Muslim theologians in India and Egypt. I think I'll just have to quote at lenght this next bit, because it's fairly important:

These scholars critically examined the classical conceptions and methods of jurisprudence and decised a new approach to Islamic theology and Quranic exegesis. This new theological movement, which was nothing short of an outright rebellion against the Islamic orthodoxy, displayed an astonishing compatibility with the nineteenth-century [sic] Enlightenment. The central theological problem that engaged its thinkers revolved around the question of the validity of the knowledge derived from soureces external to Islam and the methodological adequacy of the four traditional sources of jurisprudence: the Quran, the dicra attributed to the Prophet (hadith), the consensus of the theologians (ijma), and juristic reasoning by analogy (qiyas). They resolved to reinterpret the first two sources and transform the last two in order to formulate a reformist project in light of the prevailing standards of scientific rationality and modern social theory. Such prominent intellectuals and theologiansa as Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Chiragh Ali, Muhammad Abduh, Amir Ali, and Shibli Nu'mani, and their associates and disciples presented Islamic theology in a manner consistent with modern rationalist ideas and deist religion. These theologians were impressed by the achievements of the West, ranging from scientific and technological progress, the Newtonian conception of the universe, Spencer's sociology, and Darwinian evolutionism, to Western style of living. They all argued that Islam as a world religion was thoroughly capable of adapting itself to the changing conditions of every age, the hallmarks of the perfect Muslim community being law and reason. (p. 1 - 2.)

As you might guess, I was happy to finally hear that such ideas actually had been advanced more than a century ago. There are those who still try to present interpretations of Islam along those lines, and possibly the majority of Muslims actually adhere to views similar to those. But there are those other views too, the opposite views held by terrorists, radical islamist organizations and preachers that usually make it over the threshold of what qualifies as newsworthy in "Western" media. They are the offsprings of what the editors of the book call the "second period" (from between 1930s and 1950s depending on the country to at least the end of that century). It was connected to the decline of liberal nationalism and usually came about "through right- or left-wing military coups".

In marked contrast with the previous ideologies, this new discourse categorically rejected the Western model and outlook. Such precursors of fundamentalism as Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Motahhari from Iran, Hasan al-Bana and Sayyid Qutb from Egypt, Abul Ala Maududi from Pakistan, Mustafa as-Siba'i from Syria, Abbasi Madani, Shaikh Nahnah, and Ali Belhaj from Algeria insisted on unconditional fealty ti Islam and questioned the validity of any sources of learning that were outside the Islamic cosmological doctrine. Ayatollah Khomeini advanced a theory of Islamic State based on the governance of the jurisprudent. While Islamic modernism aimed at rationalizing religious dogma to show its consonance with modernity, fundamentalism aimed at Islamizing all social institutions. And, while Islamic modernism had a predominantly social orientation, a distinctive feature of the fundamentalist movement was a high level of political activism aiming to seize state power. In fundamentalism, the political reorganization of society is the necessary step in its overall Islamization project. (p. 2.)

The editors note the problem with using the term 'fundamentalism' in this context (as opposed to the Christian context, where it is obvious at least to those familiar with the relevant discourse), but stick to it for lack of a better term. For, as they point out, other suggested terms have their problems as well. For example, 'Islamist' can equally refer to pro-West and anti-West Islamic thinkers. I suppose we'll have to just use the terms 'modernist' and 'fundamentalist' here, even if we only have a vague idea (based on the above quotations and what follows) of what they mean, instead of a clear-cut definition. That is how it is with most things anyway (to the chagrin of philosophers). Some further elucidation of what the ideas of these two opposed views espoused is provided by the following quote:

Generally, the Islamic modernists: accepted an evolutionary view of history with the West being at the pinnacle of th eworld civilization; praised the Western model; in varying degrees subscibed to the Newtonian conception of the universe; reformulated Islamic methodology in a manner congruent with the standards of nineteenth-century social theory; and affirmed the validity of the scientific knowledge, even though it was not based on Islam; favored democracy and constitutionalism, and the de facto separation of religion from politics; and formulated a modernist discourse on women by rejecting polygamy and male domination. The Islamic fundamentalists, in contrast, rejected the notion of social evolution and portrayed the West as having an aggressive political system, exploitative and materialistic economic institutions, and decadent culture. Rather than attempting to reform and modernize Islam, they aimed at Islamizing virtually all social institutions. They rejected the separation of religion from politics, defended Islamic political hierarchy in society, and male domination and polygamy in the family. (p. 3 - 4.)

Islamic modernism originated with the breakdown of traditional order of the old regime, and the formation of modern states in India, Egypt, and Iran. "It involved the integration into the world economu, the development of capitalism, and the emergence of the modern social institutions" (p. 5). Islamic fundamentalism was produced in Egypt, Syria, Iran, and Pakistan "following the military coups that effectively ended the period of somewhat liberal nationalism" (p. 6). Those countries were now authoritarian states. The exception to the revolution model is Jordan, where the Society of Muslim Brothers was kept peaceful by a government that maintained a working relationship with them, instead of blocking their political participation, as happened in other countries, with violent repercussions (p. 7).

The Introduction also contains short introductions for the books "contributors in context" that should be useful for anyone with more than passing interest in this subject. I will continue writing about what I learn from this book as I read on, unless it gets too boring.

Continue to Part 2.

Ohjeita elämään

Aloin tehdä mentoroitavalleni ("kummipojalleni") listaa elämänohjeista, mutta kaipa se voisi olla kaikille lapsille ja nuorille hyödyllinen. Miksei aikuisillekin. Listaamani ohjeet eivät ole missään tarkoituksellisessa järjestyksessä, vaikka jonkin verran tärkeysjärjestystä tällaisiin listoihin väkisinkin tietysti syntyy.

• Ole esimerkki muille.
• Opi muiden virheistä.
• Opi myös muiden hyvästä esimerkistä, mutta älä ole kenenkään seuraaja. Ole oma johtajasi.
• Ole niin hyvä kuin voit olla - älä tuhlaa mahdollisuuksiasi.
• Pyydä anteeksi, kun siihen on syy.
• Ole ystävällinen kaikille, paitsi niille jotka väkisin osoittavat, etteivät ole sen arvoisia. Sivuuta ja unohda heidät. Niin luultavasti kaikki muutkin tekevät.
• Älä kiusaa ketään, edes kostoksi.
• Lue historiaa laajasti ja filosofian perusteita jonkin verran. Tällainen yleissivistys on hyväksi, mutta älä tee niistä elämäsi tärkeimpiä asioita.
• Tutustu erilaisiin asioihin, kunnes innostut jostain ja löydät intohimosi. Panosta siihen enemmän.
• Tunnusta tietämättömyytesi.
• Muista että voit aina olla väärässä - älä omaksu liian jyrkkiä kantoja tai uskomuksia.
• Vältä äärimmäisyyksiä.
• Jos jokin asia on sinulle tärkeä, ota siitä selvää mahdollisimman puolueettomasti ja rehellisesti. Muuten helposti petät itseäsi ja sorrut toiveajatteluun.
• Kerro tarinat tarinoina. Vain huono (ja epäeettinen) tarinankertoja väittää tarinansa olevan totta tai "perustuvan tositapahtumiin".
• Älä ryyppää. Jos juot alkoholia, juo sivistyneesti. Jos se ei onnistu, älä juo ollenkaan.
• Pukeudu asianmukaisesti, mutta siistististi.
• Huolehdi hygieniastasi.
• Kuntoile säännöllisesti, jotta pysyt terveenä vanhanakin.
• Venettele säännöllisesti.
• Opettele kaatumaan oikein.
• Harrasta jotain taistelulajia, se kohentaa itsetuntoa. (Ja sen ohella opit myös em. kaatumisen taidon.)
• Syö hyvin, siis oikeat määrät oikeita asioita.
• Nuku ja lepää riittävästi. Se on kehityksesi ja terveytesi kannalta tärkeää. Se voi myös olla nautinto. Nautintokin voi olla tärkeää. Mutta älä laiskottele turhaan.
• Varo lihomista, sillä laihduttaminen on paljon vaikeampaa kuin laihana pysyminen. Älä usko ihmedieetteihin.
• Opettele soittamaan jotain soitinta. Siinä ei tarvitse olla hyvä saadakseen siitä iloa ja hyötyä.
• Älä turhaan sulje itseltäsi mahdollisuuksia. Ei ole tarpeen polttaa siltoja takanaan, voittaakseen edessä olevat haasteet.
• Älä kadu ja murehdi menneitä liikaa, vaan opi niistä.
• Pidä hauskaa, nauti elämästäsi, äläkä murhehdi asioita joille et mitään mahda.
• Vaikuta parhaan tietosi mukaan niihin asioihin, joihin voit vaikuttaa (ja jotka ovat vaivasi arvoisia - valitse taistelusi järkevästi). Hyvät pyrkimyksesi tekevät elämästäsi entistä merkittävämmän myös muiden kannalta.
• Huomaa, että sinulle pieni asia voi olla toiselle paljon suurempi.
• Jos et voi muuttaa jotain häiritsevää epäkohtaa tai ärsyttävää asiaa, yritä hyötyä siitä jollain tavalla. Näin voit kääntää ikävän asian edes jossain määrin hyväksi.
• Sinulla on ehkä noin sata vuotta aikaa. Aikaisintaan 20-vuotiaana (ja luultavammin vasta 30-vuotiaana) alat saada tähän aikaskaalaan jokseenskin uskottavan näkökulman. Älä siis kiirhedi, mutta älä myöskään tuhlaa aikaasi.
• Älä tuhlaa aikaasi roskaan: huonoon kirjallisuuteen, surkeisiin elokuviin, jne. Pyri löytämään vain parhaat ja niistäkin vain ne joista pidät itse. (Toisaalta, roskasta eli toisten virheistä voi oppia, mutta sellaista oppia tarvitset vain jos haluat itse kirjailijaksi, elokuvan tekijäksi, tms.)
• Lue hyviä matkakertomuksia ja elämäkertoja (ainakin jonkin verran), sekä kohtuullisen laajoja ja syvällisiä katsauksia asioihin. Seuraa uutisia vain riittävästi, älä niin paljon että ne masentavat sinut.
• Päiväkirjan käyttö voisi olla hyvä idea. Siihen tietysti kirjoitat vain itsellesi tärkeimmistä asioista, tapahtumista, ajatuksista, jne. Se saattaa osoittautua hyödylliseksi joskus paljon myöhemmin, joten älä heitä sitä menemään. Säästä myös muut keskeiset dokumentit elämästäsi.
• Älä luule että tämä lista on täydellinen. Voit itsekin laajentaa sitä.

Symphony of Science

"The Symphony of Science is a musical project headed by John Boswell, designed to deliver scientific knowledge and philosophy in musical form."
http://www.symphonyofscience.com/

I only just learned about this project, and immediately thought to myself, what a remarkable project! I've never heard of someone trying this. And listening to the music, I can say they also pulled it off beautifully! This is certainly the kind of pop-science that just about anyone should be able to appreciate.

New website location / Uusi kotisivun osoite

I moved my website to the following address:

http://personal.inet.fi/koti/jouni_vilkka/

Yllä olevasta osoitteesta saa kotisivuani kurkistaa siitä kiinnostuneet.